THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

CONTENTS

T

Prof
Prof

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

EDITED BY

Prof. D. L. PAGE, M.A.

AND

G. E. F. CHILVER, M.A., D.Phil.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NUMBERS 1, 2

NUMBERS 3, 4

ERRATUM

Page 189: *For* Dunsten, A. J. *read* Dunston, A. J.

A HISTORY OF
Medieval Philosophy

MAURICE DE WULF (translated by E. C. Messenger).
The fourth and definitive English edition of De Wulf's
famous treatise, now considered a standard authority on
its subject. Based on the sixth French edition, it has
been completely revised. Volume Two will deal with
the thirteenth century, and Volume Three, not hitherto
published in English, will cover the period after the
thirteenth century. Volume One: *From the beginnings to
the end of the twelfth century.* 25s

*A prospectus of the series advertised below will be sent
on request to the publisher, Nelsons, 3 Henrietta Street,
W.C.2 or Parkside Works, Edinburgh 9*

Titles so far published are ANNALES GANDENSES,
edited by Hilda Johnstone ● THE MONASTIC
CONSTITUTIONS OF LANFRANC, edited by Dom
David Knowles ● DIALOGUS DE SCACCARIO,
edited by Charles Johnson ● JOCELIN OF BRAKE-
LOND, edited by H. E. Butler ● THE LIFE OF
AILRED OF RIEVAULX, edited by Sir Maurice Powicke.
English text faces the Latin original. *Each* 15s

NELSON'S
MEDIEVAL CLASSICS

edited by V. H. Galbraith and R. A. B. Mynors

Plato's *Phaedrus*

R. HACKFORTH

No English commentary on the *Phaedrus* has appeared since 1868. Here Professor Hackforth proceeds, section by section, to summarize, translate, and comment. He has added an Introduction, discussing in detail problems of date and purpose, the characterization, the dramatic date, the place, and the theories about Lysias and his speech.

18s. *net*

Sparta

H. MICHELL

A clear and fully documented account of what is known about Sparta and the Spartans, their constitution, their discipline, their system of land tenure, their public and private customs. 35s. *net*

The Development of Attic Black-figure

SIR JOHN BEAZLEY

The Sather Classical Lectures, Volume 24, given at the University of California. Professor Beazley believes that Black-figure technique, more than any other single source, reveals the origins of all western graphic art. The vases are studied not only as works of art, but also in relation to Greek literature and life. 45s. *net*

Latin Elegiac Verse

MAURICE PLATNAUER

A study of the metrical usages of Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid, providing students and teachers of Latin with a useful summary of the practice of surviving Augustan elegists. '...a learned little book... here are the answers, verified by statistics, to nearly all the questions which have haunted the minds of those who compose and teach Latin Elegiacs.' OXFORD MAGAZINE. 15s. *net*

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

NOTICE

The Publishers regret that on the cover of both numbers of the 1951 volume the continuous series number was wrongly printed as XLIV. It should have read XLV.

A

THE
assig
from
(P. I
resig
of ph
grate
in ob

Col.
the top
the pap
κόω, κ
possibl
remain
looks a
transve
the ma
of ϲ
In the
high al
accent
connec
of ρ, bu
Col.
scholia
of a ho
far abo
compat
10 The
.[: a ve
of a cir
and a t

4599.

A NEW FRAGMENT OF AEOLIC VERSE

THE following fragment of a papyrus-roll, written in a hand which may be assigned to the second or third century A.D., was bought by Professor O. Guéraud from the antiquary Nahman on behalf of the Société Fouad de Papyrologie (P. Fouad Inv. no. 239). With singular generosity Professor Guéraud has resigned to us the right to publish the text, which we now present with the help of photographs and a transcript, with notes, made by Professor Guéraud. We gratefully acknowledge an obligation to Mr. D. S. Crawford also for assistance in obtaining the photographs.

TEXT

Col. i   Col. ii

```
        ]cανορες . . [
     ]μαιτονετικτεκόω . [
       ]ονιδαιμεγαλωνύμ .
       ]μεγανορκοναπωμοςε                    εμμ[
 5     ]λαν·ά[[ε]]ϊπαρθενοϲεϲϲομαι     5       και . [
       ] . ωνορέωνκορύφαιϲέπι                 ρ . ε . [
       ]δενευϲονέμανχαριν·                    ω . . . [
       ] . εθέωνμακαρωνπατηρ·                 μοιϲαναγλα[
       ]ολοναυροτέρανθέοι                     πόεικαιχαρίτω . [
10     ] . ϲινεπωνύμιονμεγα·          10      βραδίνοιϲεπεβ . [
       ]εροϲουδάμαπῑλναται·                   όργαϲμὴπιλάθε . [
       ] . [ . ] . . . . αφόβε[ . . ]ʹ . ω·    θγάτοιϲιν·πεδ· χ[
                                              ]δαλίω[
```

Col. i. 2]μ: only the right-hand upright with foot hooked to right   . [: a dot level with the tops of the letters, no ink visible below or to the right of it; to the right, the surface of the papyrus appears to be worn away for the extent of one letter or a little more   Above κόω, κο . . is written   2–3 marg. schol. ¹ . [ ] . . . . [ ] . . ² . . . . ρ . . . []ωκαλλι : ²init. οϲ possible; after ρ, ι or possibly τ; then η probable, but ει perhaps not excluded; then the remains suggest μ followed by ω with space for a narrow letter between them   3 μ . : it looks as though μ and ω have run together, Mω   5 άεϊ: ε apparently cancelled by a transverse stroke   6] . : the upper half of λ or δ   7]δ : λ perhaps not excluded   In the margin, vestiges of scholia   8] . : vestige as of the right-hand end of the upper arc of ϲ   9 θέοι: the letter between ε and ι is misshapen, but α is not more probable than ο   In the margin, vestiges of scholia   11 marg. προϲπελαζει   12] . [: top of a stroke high above the tops of the letters, rising from left to right but not obliquely enough for an accent   Before α, upper halves of two uprights with a vestige of a horizontal stroke or arc connecting them, μ probable   ] . : right-hand end of upper arc as of ε, followed by loop (as of ρ, but unusually large),]έρ probable

Col. ii. 3 Above ϝ, a vestige which may belong to the first of the two lines of marginal scholia opposite col. i. 2 f.   7 Above the α of μοιϲαν, a vestige compatible with the start of a horizontal stroke, μοιϲᾱν probable   8 The upper part of ε appears to be prolonged far above the tops of the letters, resembling ε with an acute accent above it   . [: a trace compatible with the foot of the first upright of ν   9 Above βραδίνοιϲ, ραδινουϲ is written   10 There is ink resembling a grave accent above and parallel to the right-hand stroke of λ   . [: a vestige level with the tops of the letters, ϲ among the possibilities   11 θγ: upper arc of a circle as of θ, ο, followed at an interval by a stroke resembling the right-hand upright and a trace of the diagonal of ν   Above πεδ, με . is written, presumably μετ explaining πεδ

COMMENTARY

Col. i. 2 Since the line apparently refers to the son of Leto, χρυσοκό]μαι suggests itself.   Presumably Κόω κ[όρα or π[άιc, with Κοίου written above to explain Κόω. But if Κόω here = Κοίου, it is an exception to the general rule that -οι- followed by a vowel is not reduced to -ο- in Lesbian in disyllables such as do not form part of a system predominantly polysyllabic (*Ἀμ.* lvi f.).

3 Κρ]ονίδαι suppl. Guéraud.   Presumably μεγαλωνύμω(ι) was intended. The adjective is rare, but cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 315 Ζεῦ μεγαλώνυμε, *Nub.* 569 μεγαλώνυμον ἡμέτερον πατέρ᾽ Αἰθέρα, S. *Ant.* 148 ἁ μ. Νίκα.

4 Cf. *Od.* 2. 377 θεῶν μέγαν ὅρκον ἀπόμνυ, 10. 381, al.

5 The statement of Herodian (1, p. 497. 11 ff. Lentz) that Aeolic possessed a form ἄι is confirmed here for the first time; the adverb is not found elsewhere in the fragments of the Lesbian poets. It remains uncertain whether ἄι (or ἀὶ ?) πάρθενοc or ἀιπάρθενοc should be written.

6 κορύφαιc: probably dative, -αιc᾽.

8 θέων μακάρων also in Alc. P. Oxy. 2165, fr. 1, col. ii. 21; cf. ibid., col. i. 4 ἀθανάτων μακάρων.

9 The word preceding ἀγροτέραν was presumably either (*a*) ἐκατάβολον (of Artemis *hom. hymn.* 9. 6 only) or ἐκάβολον (S. fr. 401 Pearson, Naxian inscr. *BCH* iii. 3), or (*b*) ἐλαφάβολον (cf. *Scol. Anon.* 3. 3 Diehl ἐλαφηβόλον τ᾽ ἀγροτέραν).

10 ἐπωνύμιον: Pind. *O.* 10. 78, *P.* 1. 30, fem. adj., here it seems to be neuter noun.

11 Perhaps Ἔροc πίλναται: this rare verb occurs elsewhere only in dactylic hexameter verse.

Col. ii. 10 Presumably ᾽πιλάθεc[θ(αι).

INTERPRETATION

The general sense was apparently as follows: '[. . . Apollo] whom Coeus' [daughter] bore [in union with] Cronus' son, whose name is great. [But Artemis] swore a great oath: ['   ] for ever virgin I shall be [   ] on the peaks of mountains [   ] assent for my sake.' [   ] the father of the blessed gods [assented]. The gods [call her the Deer-]shooter, Goddess of the Wilds [   ] a great title [   ]. The Love-god(?) approaches her not at all . . . .'

METRE

The metre where most fully preserved indicates a line of Aeolic dactyls, but the length of the line can only be guessed. The longest line of this general type is represented by Alcaeus 130, 131, ⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ – –; Sappho's Second Book was composed of pieces in the line (common in Alcaeus also) ⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣ –; a shorter line of the type is attested in Sappho, *inc. lib.* 15, ⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣ –; and a further possibility is a line of the type represented by Alcaeus 132, –⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣⌣ –⌣ –. A plausible supplement in col. i. 5 would be νὴ τὰν cὰν κεφά]λαν, and it would be easy to supply the minimum requirements of the general sense throughout in lines of this metre.[1]

AUTHORSHIP

The fifth line of col. i is presumably the source of the anonymous quotation in the Homeric ἐπιμερισμοί edited by Cramer, *An. Ox.* i. 71. 19 ἀεὶ παρθένος

---

[1] e.g. col. i. 2 [Φοίβωι χρυσοκό]μαι, 3 [μίγειc᾽ εὐρυβίαι Κρ]ονίδαι, 4 [Ἄρτεμιc δὲ   θέων], 6 [– – οἰοπό]λων, 7 [θηρεύοιc᾽· ἄγι καὶ τά]δε, 8 [ὣc εἶπ᾽, αὐτὰρ ἔνευ]cε.

ἔϲομαι.[1] The statement that the source was Aeolic is consistent with the evidence of the new text: the metre, so far as it is preserved, is of a type common in Sappho and Alcaeus; the accentuation is characteristic of Aeolic texts; the dialect is in some respects characteristic[2] of, and nowhere demonstrably incompatible[3] with, Lesbian Aeolic. It is then likely that the author is either Alcaeus or Sappho. The choice between the two cannot be made on the evidence available, but one probably significant fact is to be observed: col. ii. 11, if correctly read, provides an example of the use of paragogic ν to make position; Alcaeus has several examples, Sappho none (except in the modal particle κεν), of this metrical expedient.

There is no particularly close relation between the Aeolic fragment and the Homeric Hymns addressed to Artemis (9, 27). There is some resemblance to *Scol. Anon.* 3 Diehl: . . . ἔτικτε τέκνα Λατὼ | Φοῖβον χρυϲοκόμαν . . . | ἐλαφηβόλον τ' ἀγροτέραν | Ἄρτεμιν. More striking is the relation to the opening of Callimachus' Hymn to Artemis. Artemis, still a child, as she must have been in the Aeolic poem, addresses her father, Zeus, asking him to grant her perpetual virginity (ἄι πάρθενοϲ ἔϲϲομαι)

δόϲ μοι παρθενίην αἰώνιον, ἄππα, φυλάϲϲειν,

and secondly to give her the mountains to live and hunt in (ὀρέων κορύφαιϲ' ἔπι)

δὸϲ δέ μοι οὔρεα πάντα . . . .

At the end of Artemis' prayer, Zeus nodded assent (ἔνευ]ϲε θέων μακάρων πάτηρ)

πατὴρ δ' ἐπένευϲε γελάϲϲαϲ.

The detail of Artemis' prayer is considerably expanded by Callimachus, but its structure and substance are the same in both places.[4]

E. Lobel
D. L. Page

---

[1] ὁ δ' Αἰολεὺϲ τριχῶϲ· ἀεὶ παρθένοϲ ἔϲομαι· καὶ αἰεί, καὶ αἰέν. Cf. *An. Par.* iii. 321 Cramer, τὸ ἀειπάρθενοϲ διὰ τῆϲ ει διφθόγγου γράφεται κοινῶϲ, Αἰολικῶϲ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ι. The fragment appears in Bergk as Sappho fr. 96; Lobel,

Σμ. inc. lib. 3; Diehl, Sappho fr. 102.
[2] e.g. col. ii. 9 βραδίνοιϲ = ῥαδινούϲ.
[3] But see note above on *Κόω.*
[4] In col. i. 2–3 marg. schol. Καλλι|[μαχ- is an obvious possibility.

THE EXEGETAI IN PLATO'S *LAWS*

τοὺς δ' ἐξηγητὰς τρεῖς φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ τέτταρας ἕκαστον ἐξ
αὑτῶν, τρεῖς δὲ οἷς ἂν πλείστη γένηται ψῆφος δοκιμάσαντας ἐννέα πέμπειν εἰς
Δελφοὺς ἀνελεῖν ἐξ ἑκάστης τριάδος ἕνα· τὴν δὲ δοκιμασίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ
χρόνου τὴν ἡλικίαν εἶναι καθάπερ τῶν ἱερέων. οὗτοι δ' ἔστων ἐξηγηταὶ διὰ βίου·
τὸν δέ γε λιπόντα προαιρείσθωσαν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ ὅθεν ἂν ἐκλίπῃ.

<div align="right">Plato, <i>Laws</i> 759 d–e.</div>

'As regards the exegetai three (in number) let the four tribes nominate
four (men) each (man) from their own personnel, and let them (i.e. the State)
scrutinize whichever three gain most votes and send nine to Delphi to appoint
one from each group of three; the scrutiny and the age-qualification shall be
the same for them as for the priests. Let these be exegetai for life; as regards
a vacancy let the preliminary election be made by the four tribes in which the
vacancy may occur.'[1]

In all standard texts τρίς is preferred to τρεῖς after the words τοὺς δ' ἐξηγητάς.
This preference is not justified by the MSS. of Plato and of Stobaeus. The
MSS. A and O, the former dating from the tenth century, both read τρεῖς,
and their authority carries most weight in determining Plato's text.[2] The
four MSS. S, M, A, and L of Stobaeus, which date from the early eleventh
to the fourteenth century, all read τρεῖς. These are the only MSS. of Stobaeus
which contain this passage.[3] To set against the authority of these six MSS.
the only evidence for τρίς lies in the marginalia of A (A[2]), where τρίς is
added in the margin, and of O (O[2]), where ι is written under τρεῖς. Now
in general the marginalia provide either a variant reading or a comment
intended to supplement the sense and not to dispute the text of the passage in
question.[4] In the opinion of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff[5] some variant readings
in the marginalia of O derive from variant readings which were added as
such to the prototype of A and O; they therefore merit consideration but not
preference thereby over the transmitted text. If the iota under τρεῖς in O[2]
indicates such a variant reading and if the τρίς in A[2] is intended to be a variant
reading and not a comment, then we can conclude that the reading was sug-
gested as a variant in the ninth century at latest but was not preferred to τρεῖς
in the six manuscripts which survive. If, however, the τρίς in A[2] is intended to
be a comment and not a variant reading, and if the iota was added by O[2]
because O[2] supposed it to indicate a variant reading, we may take this to be
another example of a not uncommon phenomenon in the *Laws* whereby a
marginal comment has been mistakenly inserted into the text during the pro-
cess of transmission.[6] In either case there is no doubt that the balance of

---

[1] On p. o8 will be found a fuller transla-
tion which is derived from the argument of
this article.

[2] D. Peipers, *Quaestiones Criticae de Platonis
Legibus* (1863), 8 and 17.

[3] Ed. Wachsmuth–Hense, *Florilegium* 44.
37 (Meineke 53) with the Prolegomena to
vol. iii.

[4] Peipers, op. cit. 82: 'Sunt enim plerum-

que breviora quidem nec tamen minus
aperta additamenta quorum pars grammatici
hominis ingenium redolet Platonem illu-
strantis et interpretantis, pars hominis critici
esse videntur qui varias lectiones in margine
libri adnotavit.'

[5] *Platon*, ii (1919), 331.

[6] Peipers, loc. cit. 'nec divinabantur pro-
fecto boni illi homines commentarios mox a

authority supports the reading τρεῖς. The purpose of this paper is to show that, once we retain τρεῖς, the difficulties of this passage can be resolved.[1]

Before discussing the meaning of τρεῖς and of τρίς in this context it is necessary to comment on some other phrases which have caused difficulty.

1. The two accusatives τοὺς δ' ἐξηγητάς and τὸν δέ γε λιπόντα are not governed by the main verbs which follow, for the object of φερέτωσαν is τέτταρας and an object such as τινά or τινάς is to be supplied with προαιρείσθωσαν. The two *accusativi pendentes* are natural in a string of regulations which are phrased in the staccato style of official language. The words τοὺς δ' ἐξηγητάς stand first in the sentence because Plato is passing from the ἱερῶν δὲ ἱερέας (759 a 8) to the exegetai and thence to ταμίας τε δή (759 e 3); the article is used with ἐξηγητάς because the exegetai have just been mentioned in 759 c 7. There is therefore no justification for Ritter's proposal[2] to delete τέτταρας, in order to make τοὺς δ' ἐξηγητάς the object of φερέτωσαν.

2. φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ τέτταρας ἕκαστον ἐξ αὑτῶν, τρεῖς δὲ οἷς ἂν πλείστη γένηται ψῆφος δοκιμάσαντας. The literal meaning of φερέτωσαν . . . τέτταρας is 'let them present four persons'. As in the phrases ψῆφον φέρειν and ὀστρακοφορία, φέρειν governs the accusative of the object so presented whether it be a pebble, a sherd, or a person. The literal meaning takes on a further colour, when we compare *Laws* 946 a 4 τῶν δὲ προκριθέντων, οὓς ἂν πλεῖστοι ἐνέγκωσι, τούτους ἐκλέξαι μέχρι τῶν ἡμίσεων 'of the men so preferred those, whom most present, shall be selected up to half'. In the preceding sentence each citizen has presented to the god (the name of) the man he thinks most suitable for the office of Euthunus. Thus the extended meaning of φέρειν in this context is 'to nominate as a candidate'.[3] The verb is used with the same meaning by Demosthenes when speaking of the nomination of candidates for a leitourgia (*c. Leptinem* 130 ἐνεγκεῖν . . . οὐδένα . . . χορηγόν and *c. Boeot. Nom.*, p. 996. 7 Μαντίθεον . . . οἴσουσιν). The absolute use of φέρειν in this sense is very common in the *Laws*:[4] cf. 753 c φέρειν δ' ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ βωμὸν ἕκαστον εἰς πινάκιον γράψαντα τοὔνομα 'each shall present upon the altar of the god (the name of a person), writing the name on a small tablet'.[5] Thus the sentence φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ τέτταρας describes the first stage of the procedure, namely the nomination of persons as candidates for the office of Exegetes. In the same way the procedure for electing Nomophylakes (753 b–d), Euthuni (945 e–946 b), Strategi (755 c–d), and Hipparchs (756 a) commences with the nomination of candidates. In the first two cases, as in our passage, the nomination is expressed by φέρειν, and in the other two by προβάλλεσθαι because the next stage is a χειροτονία.

The subject of φερέτωσαν is the collective phrase αἱ τέτταρες φυλαί, by which the individual members of the four-tribe group are meant. This is clear from *Laws* 753 d 1 (τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἐκ τούτων φέρειν πάλιν ὃν ἂν ἕκαστος

---

[2] *Platos Gesetze, Kommentar* (1896), 162.

[3] The passive is so used in 755 a 5, 755 a 7, and 756 c 5.

[4] 753 d 1 and 4; 755 a 5 and 7; 756 c 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8; 756 d 3, 4, 6, and 7; 756 e 4; 759 d 5; 946 a 4 and b 1. The passage 756 c 2 is discussed below, p. 7.

[5] In 756 e 2 the persons nominated are referred to as τὰ κατασημανθέντα ὀνόματα, in 753 c 8 as οἱ πίνακες, and in 946 a 3 as οἱ προκριθέντες.

βούληται 'the city shall nominate again in the same way from these whom-
soever each citizen desires') where ἡ πόλις means the individual citizens.[1] The
same passage (cf. 753 d 2 and 4) illustrates the meaning of ἐξ αὐτῶν in our
passage, that is 'let the individual members of the four tribes nominate four
persons each from among their own personnel'.[2] The word ἕκαστον figures in
the sentence to emphasize the fact that each member nominates four candidates
and *in each case* the four are to be drawn from the personnel of the four tribes.

The next sentence τρεῖς δὲ οἷς ἂν πλείστη γένηται ψῆφος δοκιμάσαντας
describes the next stage in the procedure. The nominations are counted as
votes, and the three nominees for whom most nominations have been pre-
sented are retained for the following stage of the procedure. The same means
of thinning out the nominees is employed in 946 a 4 (quoted above, p. 3),
753 c 8, and 753 d 4. And the same phrases are used in 753 d 4 τὸ δὲ τρίτον
φερέτω μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἑκατὸν ὁ βουληθεὶς ὃν ἂν βούληται, διὰ τομίων πορευόμενος·
ἑπτὰ δὲ καὶ τριάκοντα οἷς ἂν πλεῖσται γένωνται ψῆφοι κρίναντες ἀποφηνάντων
ἄρχοντας. If, then, we are guided by Plato's regulations for electing officials
and by his diction elsewhere in the *Laws*, these sentences yield a clear meaning.
The procedure is described from the beginning: each member of the tetraphyly
(to use an abbreviation) is to nominate four persons from those over 60 years
of age in the tetraphyly, and the three with most nominations are to be scrutin-
ized. Of the 1,680 members of Plato's tetraphyly 200 might be over 60 years of
age, and perhaps 50 might be nominated in all; of these the leading three are
retained for scrutiny. This elaborate system is not surprising if we compare the
systems proposed elsewhere in the *Laws*. For the office of Nomophylax the
5,040 citizens nominate one candidate each; from the ensuing list of nominees
they nominate one each and by counting the nominations as votes they reduce
the total to 100, and nominate again to reduce the total to 37. For the office of
Councillor the 5,040 citizens may nominate four candidates each, one drawn
from each property-class; from the ensuing list they nominate on pain of a fine
to reduce the total to 720, of whom half are selected by lot to become councillors.
For the office of Euthunus the 5,040 citizens nominate three candidates each;[3]

---

[1] Where the subject is not a collective
noun but a plural such as πάντες, the meaning
is again the individual members of the
plurality; cf. 756 c 3 and d 5, and 945 e 8–
946 a 1 which is discussed in n. 3 below.

[2] For the use of the reflexive pronoun cf.
945 e 8 ξυνιέναι χρεὼν πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν . . . τῷ
θεῷ ἀποφανουμένους αὐτῶν τρεῖς.

[3] 945 e–946 c. The meaning of the follow-
ing sentence is disputed: ξυνιέναι χρεὼν
πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν εἰς Ἡλίου κοινὸν καὶ Ἀπόλ-
λωνος τέμενος τῷ θεῷ ἀποφανουμένους ἄνδρας
αὐτῶν τρεῖς, ὃν ἂν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἡγῆται
πάντῃ ἄριστον εἶναι πλὴν αὐτοῦ, μὴ ἔλαττον
πεντήκοντα γεγονότα ἐτῶν. England, Ritter,
and Taylor maintain that the State presents
three men to the god and that each citizen
names only one man. According to this view
the words τῷ θεῷ ἀποφανουμένους ἄνδρας
αὐτῶν τρεῖς refer to the result of the whole
procedure whereby three Euthuni are in
fact appointed; and there are of course

analogies in the *Laws* for the result being
stated before the procedure in described. But
we are then left with no construction for ὃν
ἂν ἕκαστος ἡγῆται κτλ. Therefore England,
Ritter, and Taylor postulate a lacuna after
τρεῖς. The other view, advocated by Stall-
baum and adopted by Burnet in his punctua-
tion of the Oxford text, is that each citizen
presents to the god the three men whom he
considers to be πάντῃ ἄριστοι. These nominees
are then resumed in the next sentence τῶν δὲ
προκριθέντων οὓς ἂν πλεῖστοι ἐνέγκωσι κτλ.
The advantage of this view is that it does not
postulate any lacuna in the text. The diffi-
culty lies in the singular ὃν resuming τρεῖς.
Stallbaum's comment seems to me to dispose
fairly of this difficulty: 'ne oὕς ἂν desideretur,
inest etiam in ὃν ἂν multitudinis notio, ita
quidem ut simul singuli significentur' (Stall-
baum's edition (1859), xiii. 358). The pas-
sage is discussed by England ad loc. (ed.
1921).

of the ensuing list the half for whom most nominations are made are submitted to a further nomination and selection so that a quarter survive, and so on until only three are left to be appointed Euthuni.

This interpretation is not the usual one. Many scholars translate 'let the four tribes elect four persons and scrutinize the three who obtain most votes'.[1] This translation contains several difficulties. For, according to this view, Plato does not describe the procedure by which the election of the four persons is carried out; nor does he make any provision for that nomination which is general in the appointment of important officials in the *Laws*. If we assume (as we presumably must do) that the four are elected by a majority vote, why should four be so elected if only three are retained for scrutiny? Nor is it probable in view of the examples I have cited from the *Laws* that φέρειν here means 'to elect'.[2] In Plato's vocabulary the word for 'to elect' is ἐκλέγειν (756 e 5) or προκρίνειν (753 d 3); 'to vote for' is ψῆφον φέρειν τινί;[3] and 'to appoint to office'[4] is ἀποφαίνειν (753 d 7, 763 e 9, and 767 b 3) or ἀποδείξαι (946 c 4).

The only passage in the *Laws* where φέρειν may mean 'to elect' is 756 b 7: βουλὴν δὲ εἶναι μὲν τριάκοντα δωδεκάδας—ἑξήκοντα δὲ καὶ τριακόσιοι γίγνοιντο ἂν πρέποντες ταῖς διανομαῖς—μέρη δὲ διανείμαντας τέτταρα κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τούτων ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν τιμημάτων φέρειν ἐνενήκοντα βουλευτάς. This passage has been regarded as corrupt by Ast and England. They saw two difficulties, Ast that τούτων comes strangely after τὸν ἀριθμόν and England that the phrase κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν is awkward in view of the sentences which follow. Ast suggested reading οὕτω instead of τούτων. This reading should be accepted because it supplies the reason for the asyndeton of the next sentence πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἅπαντας φέρειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. England suggested bracketing κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν and retaining τούτων, which he takes to depend on μέρη, but the word τούτων is then redundant and oddly placed after τέτταρα. A further difficulty is that in the following sentences φέρειν occurs nine times with the meaning 'to nominate'. This suggests that φέρειν in the first sentence has the same sense. Now in the first sentence it is only the words ἐνενήκοντα βουλευτάς which prevent the meaning 'to nominate' from being given to φέρειν; for the nominations from each property-class greatly exceed 90. Therefore I propose to bracket ἐνενήκοντα βουλευτάς as a marginal comment made by 'an arithmetically minded commentator' (to use England's phrase), which has been subsequently inserted into the text.[5] I then read: μέρη δὲ διανείμαντας τέτταρα κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν

---

[1] Stallbaum, ii. 141, 'quaternae tribus iubentur creare quaternos religionum interpretes'; England, i. 568, 'to elect (by voting) four men'; Taylor, *The Laws of Plato* (1934), 'to elect four persons'; Wade-Gery, *C.Q.* xxv (1931), 86, 'shall elect four'; Jacoby, *Atthis* (1949), 249, 'are to elect four'.

[2] 'Elect' in the technical sense in which a constituency 'elects' one man from among other candidates. An individual constituent does not 'elect' X to be the M.P.; he simply 'gives his vote for X' or 'presents X's name' on a paper form.

[3] Cf. Isaeus xi. 18 ἐμοὶ . . . τὴν ψῆφον ἤνεγκαν and Dem. *De Corona* 134 οὐδεμία ψῆφος ἠνέχθη τῷ μιαρῷ τούτῳ. In *Laws* 766 b 4 the antecedent to ὅντινα ἂν ἡγῆται should be

supplied in the dative case. Cf. ὄστρακον ἐπιφέρειν τινί, Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 13. England, commenting on 753 d 1, and Taylor, translating 946 a 4, take φέρειν governing an accusative as 'vote for' which is not a correct translation.

[4] Yet Liddell and Scott[9] (iv. 7) translate φέρειν τινά '*appoint* or *nominate* to an office'.

[5] This marginal comment might be added to clarify κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, and later be inserted in the text by a scribe (cf. Peipers, loc. cit., cited on p. 4, n. 6 above). Once this has happened, the οὕτως becomes nonsensical because the following sentences provide for a larger number of nominations, and οὕτως might then be changed to τούτων.

ἀριθμὸν οὕτως ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν τιμημάτων φέρειν· πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων
τιμημάτων ἅπαντας φέρειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κτλ. 'After dividing them into four groups
of 90 in number, they shall nominate as follows from each of the property-
classes: firstly, nominations from the top class shall be made compulsorily by
all citizens.' Aristotle, *Politics* 1266ᵃ10, resumes this passage in the phrase τὸ δὲ
τοῖς μὲν εὐπορωτέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας. He uses
φέρειν here to mean 'nominate', as Plato does, and not 'appoint' or 'elect' into
office; for the rich alone are liable to a fine if they fail to nominate in the
preliminary stages, but the final stage is compulsory for the whole people
(756 e 4 πάντα ἄνδρα).[1]

The phrase ἕκαστον ἐξ αὐτῶν has been taken in a different way. England
believes that each voter was entitled to vote only for a member of his own tribe,[2]
Stallbaum translates 'unum ex suis tribulibus', and Wade-Gery translates
'shall elect . . . four, one per tribe'. Wade-Gery remarks 'ἕκαστον ἐξ αὐτῶν
must mean ἐξ ἑκάστης τῆς φυλῆς ἕνα, though I doubt if the words can strictly
bear that meaning', and adds in a footnote 'i.e. the language is slovenly, and
will not bear the meaning Plato intends'. There is, in fact, no doubt that the
normal Greek words for 'one per tribe' are ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα and that Plato
uses similar phrases, e.g. within the very same sentence ἐξ ἑκάστης τριάδος ἕνα,
or ἑκάστῃ φυλῇ ταξίαρχον (755 e 1). I can find no justification in the Greek words
for Stallbaum's and Wade-Gery's interpretation; the justification is rather in
the result, that it may explain why four men are 'elected' (on their interpreta-
tion) whereas only three are retained for scrutiny. Finally, the use of ἕκαστον
after τέτταρας is difficult to justify if it simply means all four persons elected;
on my interpretation of the passage, whereby the nominations are made by
1,680 persons each nominating four, there is more reason to add ἕκαστον.

3. δοκιμάσαντας . . . πέμπειν. The change from the imperative φερέτωσαν to
the infinitive πέμπειν is common in official language and presents no difficulty.
The change of subject from αἱ τέτταρες φυλαί to the masculine plural δοκιμά-
σαντας is abrupt but intelligible. There is also an actual change of subject, for
the whole State scrutinizes the leading candidates and sends nine to Delphi
for final selection by the god. Petersen,[3] Ehrmann,[4] Persson,[5] Jowett,[6] and
England[7] translate 'scrutinize and appoint the three leading candidates, and
send the remaining nine to Delphi'; this yields two forms of election analogous
to the two types of exegetai, οἱ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καθεσταμένοι and οἱ πυθόχρηστοι,
which are known to have existed at Athens in Roman times. Wade-Gery has
shown conclusively that the idea of two methods of election is excluded by the
sentence which provides for the filling of a vacancy. He adds 'nor do I readily
believe that δοκιμάσαντας could include the notion of κυρώσαντας'.[8] In fact the

[1] In the only other passage where Aristotle
uses φέρειν with an accusative of the person
(1305ᵃ33 τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας
ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον), he seems to be
referring to the nomination by tribes and not
to election (for which he uses αἱρεῖσθαι). If,
however, he is referring to actual election, he
is using a term technical for nomination to
express the whole process. But in *Laws* 756 c 2
φέρειν can hardly be used to express the
whole process when the word is used im-
mediately afterwards in the technical sense
of nominating. In *Laws* 755 a 5 and 7 I take

φερέσθω and ἐνεχθείς to refer to the nomina-
tion mentioned at 753 c 1.
[2] Rightly rejected by Wade-Gery, loc. cit.,
'the whole four tribes vote in each case. . . .
If you are going to compare the number of
votes, the comparison must be among votes
cast by the same constituency, viz. the whole
four tribes.'   [3] *Phil.* suppl. 1 (1860), 158.
[4] *De Iuris sacri interpretibus Atticis* (1908),
365.
[5] *Die Exegeten und Delphi* (1918), 10.
[6] *The Dialogues of Plato* (1871), iv. 276.
[7] Op. cit. i. 568.   [8] Loc. cit. 87.

meaning of δοκιμασία in the *Laws* admits of no doubt. For in the present passage the next sentence τὴν δὲ δοκιμασίαν κτλ. refers to the earlier sentence in 759 c δοκιμάζειν δέ κτλ. which concerns scrutiny only. The same meaning, that is scrutiny only, is found in all other instances of δοκιμασία and δοκιμάζειν in this book of the *Laws*.[1] Plato's own usage then makes it clear that the meaning is 'scrutinize (three) and send nine to Delphi'. Thus both the nominarchs and the scrutiny of the leading nominees are preliminary to the final selection by the god.[2]

4. τὸν δέ γε λιπόντα προαιρείσθωσαν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ ὅθεν ἂν ἐκλίπῃ. The emendation of Hermann προσαιρείσθωσαν is not precise in the context; for, when a vacancy occurs, the constituency does not elect an additional representative but a successor to the defunct representative. The word προαιρείσθαι is found in Aristotle, *Politics* 1298ᵇ27, where it has been emended likewise to προσαιρείσθαι. But the compound προαιρείσθαι occurs in *Inscr. Prien.* 108. 152 (second century B.C.)[3] with the meaning 'to elect previously'. This meaning is apposite both here and in Aristotle. For the nomination and the scrutiny of the leading nominees form the preliminary stage of the election, the final choice being made by the god. We should therefore keep προαιρείσθωσαν which is in all the manuscripts of the *Laws*. We then have an example of Plato's general rule stated in 766 c for filling a vacancy in a public office τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

5. αἱ τέτταρες φυλαί in the first sentence and in the last sentence. The State for which Plato is framing his regulations consists of twelve tribes (745 b–e), a significant number to which he repeatedly refers (746 d and 771 a–c). The number of officials is correlated to the twelve tribes; thus the taxiarchs are twelve, one for each tribe (ἑκάστῃ φυλῇ ταξίαρχον 755 e). So too in 758 e, before he turns to the appointment of the religious officials, he reiterates the twelvefold division, πᾶσα μὲν ἡ πόλις σύμπασα δὲ ἡ χώρα κατὰ δώδεκα μέρη διανενέμηται, and he returns to it again in 760 b, δώδεκα μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ χώρα πᾶσα εἰς δύναμιν ἴσα μόρια νενέμηται, φυλὴ δὲ μία τῷ μορίῳ ἑκάστῳ ἐπικληρωθεῖσα κτλ. There should then be no doubt that in the words αἱ τέτταρες φυλαί in the present passage Plato is describing a group of four tribes out of the total twelve tribes, and that the indefinite clause ὅθεν ἂν ἐκλίπῃ refers to any one of the three groups of four tribes in which a vacancy may occur. Jacoby, however, maintains that Plato has forgotten 'for the moment that *his* State had not four but twelve tribes', and that Plato is here copying an archaic law of Solon (itself hypothetical) framed for the Solonian State of four tribes. This seems to me an unlikely hypothesis, since the passage is sandwiched between references to the twelvefold division of Plato's State.[4] Jacoby's view rests mainly upon his interpretation of the definite article in the phrase αἱ τέτταρες φυλαί which he translates '*the* four tribes' and takes to refer to a State consisting of four tribes; for he believes that a 'factual difficulty' is caused by the definite article if the State really consists of twelve tribes. The explanation, however, is to be found in the normal Greek idiom, which Plato also observes, whereby the definite article

---

[1] 753 d–e, 754 d, 755 d, 760 a, 763 e, 765 c–d, 766 b, 767 d. The contrast between scrutiny and appointment is explicit in 754 d, 763 e, 765 c, 766 b, and 767 d.

[2] The procedure conforms with the general principle mentioned at 759 b τὰ μὲν αἱρετὰ χρὴ τὰ δὲ κληρωτά.

[3] Hiller von Gaertringen, *Inschr. v. Priene*,

προελομένου τε τοῦ δήμου θεωροὺς πρὸς βασιλέα Δημήτριον, ἀποδειχθεὶς καὶ Μοσχίων θεωρός, where the meaning seems to be that, after the people had previously elected envoys, Moschion also was appointed.

[4] Moreover, at 828 b and 873 d the exegetai are mentioned in juxtaposition to the twelvefold division of the State.

is employed with the part as well as with the whole when a fraction is stated. Thus in 848 a Plato describes the division of produce in any one of the twelve rural areas into three parts, of which one part is reserved for sale to non-citizens and two parts are withdrawn from the market; in describing one-third and two-thirds of the produce he applies the definite article, τὸ δὲ τρίτον and τῶν δύο μερῶν. Equally in 833 c he uses the article in fixing the course for the young men's race at two-thirds of the total length, τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν τοῦ μήκους τοῦ δρόμου θήσομεν.[1] In the present passage then φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ (τῶν δώδεκα φυλῶν) is the normal usage to express four tribes (out of the twelve tribes). The peculiarity in this case is the omission of τῶν δώδεκα φυλῶν, but the context has already supplied the sense of these words to the mind of the consecutive reader. In the second case, τὸν δέ γε λιπόντα προαιρείσθωσαν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ ὅθεν ἂν ἐκλίπῃ, the article defines the group of four tribes within which the vacancy occurs.[2]

We may now turn to consider the merits of reading τρεῖς or τρίς. The adoption of τρίς involves several difficulties. Some scholars[3] connect τρίς with αἱ τέτταρες φυλαί or with τέτταρας, making τρίς . . . τέτταρες a periphrasis for δώδεκα, but the order of the words militates against both interpretations. Others delete τέτταρας or μέν. The inherent difficulty is brought out most clearly by considering the views of Wade-Gery[4] and Jacoby,[5] who have recently made the most thorough and important studies of this passage. The former remarks, rightly in my opinion, that the position of τρίς 'in front of φερέτωσαν μέν seems to me intolerable unless it qualifies both φερέτωσαν μέν and τρεῖς δὲ δοκιμάσαντας'. He therefore translates 'Exegetai: three groups of four tribes each (lit. three times over, the four tribes) shall elect, each group, four.' The awkwardness here lies in the step between the literal translation 'three times over, the four tribes (shall elect four)' and the paraphrase 'three groups of four tribes each shall elect, each group, four'. Jacoby, rightly in my opinion, disagrees with this paraphrase; he translates 'thrice the four tribes are to elect four'. Then, as this makes no sense in Plato's State of twelve tribes but does make

---

[1] Cf. 758 b 7 τὸ δὲ δωδέκατον μέρος and 758 d 7 τὰ ἔνδεκα . . . μέρη and Thuc. i. 10 Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας. The definite article is sometimes omitted in one case, if no ambiguity results, e.g. 934 d 'four-fifths of a mina' τέτταρα μέρη τῆς μνᾶς τῶν πέντε.

[2] Jacoby does not translate this passage, but he refers to it as supporting his contention that ἕκαστον ἐξ αὐτῶν means 'one from each of the four tribes'. On his interpretation the four tribes constitute the State. Therefore αἱ τέτταρες φυλαί cannot be the antecedent to ὅθεν ἂν ἐκλίπῃ; for it is not sense to say 'the State within which the vacancy occurs'. An antecedent must therefore be supplied. It would seem to be in accord with Jacoby's interpretation if some such phrase as ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς is supplied, so that the translation will run 'in the event of a vacancy the four tribes shall elect a man from the tribe in which the vacancy occurs'. This means in effect that the tribes represented in the initial appointment of three exegetai will be represented in

perpetuity. The tribes so represented will be three or less than three (for there is no regulation to ensure that in choosing his three exegetai the God of Delphi will choose one per tribe). The remaining tribe or tribes will therefore be unrepresented in perpetuity. Such lack of representation constitutes a weak point in Jacoby's theory.

[3] Marsilius Ficinus in 1482 translated 'interpretes autem ter quattuor ferant tribus ipsae quattuor, ex earum ordine unaquaeque tres: et tribus probatis reliquos novem Delphos mittant, ut ex quaque trinitate unus oraculo deligatur'. He probably adopted the τρίς of the marginalia. Ast in 1814, reading τρίς and deleting τέτταρας, translated 'religionum interpretes creanto ter quattuor tribus etc.'. C. Ritter, Platos Gesetze, Kommentar (1896), 163, made such suggestions as reading τρίς and deleting τέτταρας, or reading τρεῖς and replacing τέτταρας with τετράκις.

[4] Loc. cit. 86–87.

[5] Op. cit. 248–9.

sense in a State of four tribes, Jacoby infers that the passage refers to a State of
four tribes. He then is faced with the difficulty that, if τρίς goes also with the δέ-
clause, the State must thrice scrutinize the three candidates, which is not sense.
He therefore maintains, wrongly in my opinion, that 'Plato emphasises (the
threefold repetition) by his order of words, stressing τρίς which of course covers
only φερέτωσαν not δοκιμάσαντας as well, for stylistic as well as for factual
reasons'. He then translates: 'thrice the four tribes are to elect four, each from
among their members; after having tested three who get most votes, send
nine etc.' The fact is that, if τρεῖς is emended to τρίς and no further alteration
is made in the text, a logical impasse is reached. For by the normal usage of
the Greek language τρίς, by virtue of its position, governs both the antithetic
clauses, and the resulting translation then becomes nonsensical: 'let the four
tribes thrice elect four men . . . and let the State thrice scrutinize whichever
three receive most votes and send nine to Delphi'. Nor is the position improved,
if my interpretation of φερέτωσαν 'let them nominate four' is accepted and τρίς
is retained.

These difficulties disappear if we retain τρεῖς, the reading of all six manu-
scripts. For τρεῖς then goes with the *accusativus pendens* τοὺς δ' ἐξηγητάς, and the
words mean 'as regards the exegetai three (in number)'. This order of words is
natural in Greek. As Plato's thought moves from priests to exegetai and
treasurers, he places those words first (759 a 8 ἱερῶν δὲ ἱερέας, 759 d 5 τοὺς δ'
ἐξηγητάς, 759 e 3 ταμίας τε δή). The article is used with ἐξηγητάς because the
exegetai have been mentioned in 759 c 7. As τοὺς δ' ἐξηγητάς are naturally the
first words in the sentence, τρεῖς must follow if it is to be mentioned at all. The
reason for mentioning τρεῖς at the outset is that the reader is thereby informed
of the result before he is plunged into the description of the procedure. Plato
supplies the result first in 756 b 7 (the Council is 360 in number), 763 c 5
(ἕποιτο δὲ ἂν ἀγορανόμοις γε ἀστυνόμοι τρεῖς ἑξήκοντα οὖσι), and 763 e 4
(ἀγορανόμους δὲ ἑξῆς τούτοις αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων
πέντε).[1] Nor is the position of the numeral after the substantive unusual. The
position of τρεῖς and πέντε in the last two quotations illustrates the point, and
one may add[2] 945 e 10 τῷ θεῷ ἀποφανουμένους ἄνδρας αὐτῶν τρεῖς. Nor is this
position peculiar to Plato: Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, generally puts the numeral after
the official (e.g. 54 κληροῦσι δὲ . . . ὁδοποιοὺς πέντε . . . λογιστὰς δέκα κτλ.).

We may then translate the passage, retaining τρεῖς, as follows. I use the
symbol ⟨ ⟩ to represent a word implicit in the Greek and ( ) to represent a word
which has to be supplied for clarity in English. 'As regards the exegetai three
(in number), let ⟨each member of⟩ four tribes (of the twelve) nominate four
⟨persons⟩ each ⟨person drawn⟩ from their own personnel, and let the State
scrutinize whichever three gain most votes (that is, nominations counted as
votes) and (so) send nine to Delphi to appoint one from each group of three;
the scrutiny and the age-qualification shall be the same for them as for the
priests. Let these be exegetai for life; as regards a vacancy let the preliminary
election be made by the four tribes in which the vacancy may occur.' When the
passage is read as a whole, it is apparent from the number nine that, after the

---

[1] If the view of England and others is
accepted for 945 e (cf. p. 6, n. 3 above), the
passage provides another example.

[2] Also 755 e 1, 765 b 4, 768 a 6, 771 d 5,
and 946 b 9. One may also note the order of

words in the scholiast at 916 c ἐξηγηταὶ τρεῖς
γίνονται where he may even be referring back
to the words τοὺς δὲ ἐξηγητὰς τρεῖς in our
passage.

thinning out of the nominees, each group of four tribes in the State of twelve tribes is represented by three candidates making nine in all to go to Delphi. In other words, the process described for one group of four tribes is enacted for the two other groups of four tribes in the State of twelve tribes, thus occurring *three times* in all. A commentator noted this point and added $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}s$ in the margin of A; another commentator added ι under the word $\tau\rho\epsilon\hat{\iota}s$ in O; and it was left to later scholars to eject $\tau\rho\epsilon\hat{\iota}s$ and incorporate $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}s$ in the text, 'ut posterioribus interpretibus multas aliquando curas molestiasque pararent'.[1]

If we wish to account for the procedure which Plato chooses for the election of his exegetai, we shall not be helped by comparisons with a supposed Solonian law or with the Athenian laws known to have existed in Roman times whereby two classes of exegetai were elected, the one by the people and the other by Delphi. The procedure can be explained only by reference to those he enjoins for other elections in the *Laws*. The motive underlying these procedures is expressed clearly by Plato in 771 a–b: 'We may open the legislation which is now to follow in some such way as this, with religion as our starting point. We must first return to our number of 5040; . . . our total number permits of division by twelve and so likewise does that of the tribe, so each such division must be thought of as a sacred thing, a gift of Heaven corresponding with the months of the year and the revolution of the universe.' In electing his exegetai he employs the sacred numbers, 4 (as a third of 12), 3, and 9. But his method is also practical. The grouping by units of four tribes secures that each geographical group is represented by one of the three exegetai finally selected. The nomination of four candidates by each member ensures a total of at least four candidates within which the majority system can operate. In fact Plato has here devised a practical method of election which is consistent with his faith in number as a $\theta\epsilon o\hat{v}$ $\delta\hat{\omega}\rho o\nu$, and he has expressed it in language which is indeed compendious but on comparison with the adjacent chapters intelligible without emendation.[2]

<div align="right">N. G. L. HAMMOND</div>

Clare College, Cambridge

---

[1] Peipers, op. cit. (quoted above on p. 01, n. 6). In the same way the variant reading in one manuscript of Stobaeus $\tau o\grave{v}s$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\nu\acute{\epsilon}a$ may be due to a marginal comment slipping into the text, as we might say 'the (resulting) nine'.

[2] The passage is also discussed in J. H. Oliver, *Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (1950), 55 f., which was accessible to me after this article was written.

CHRONOLOGICAL NOTES ON MIDDLE COMEDY

My chief object in these notes[1] is to provide evidence for tracing the ancestry of certain themes, situations, and characters which appear in New Comedy; I hope, however, that they may also be useful for the study of Middle Comedy itself. I am therefore chiefly concerned with the period from 400 B.C. to 320 B.C., when Menander had begun to write; I have, however, given some dates after 320 which were necessary to complete my story, but I have left out many plays by poets of New Comedy which can be dated in the decade 320–310 B.C. I have also omitted the originals of Plautus *Amphitruo*, *Persa*, and *Menaechmi*, although I am convinced that they all belong to Middle Comedy and hope to consider the problem more fully elsewhere; the tactics of the battle in the *Amphitruo* (242 f.) are possible for Epameinondas and Philip as well as for Alexander, but the clash of two kings seems to limit the reference to Alexander and Dareios as depicted in the famous mosaic, and the limits are 330–320 (there is very little evidence of mythological comedy after 320); the original of the *Persa* must have been written before Alexander's conquests and the limits seem to be 345–338;[2] Hueffner's late dating of the original of the *Menaechmi* has been successfully countered by Fraenkel[3] and the whole feel of the play suggests Middle rather than New Comedy. The following list is arranged in decades, except where it has proved necessary to use a longer period. I have tabulated first the plays or victories dated by inscriptional or other firm evidence; among these I have included the plays dated by Geissler,[4] without comment except where I disagree with him.

400–390 Lenaian victors:[5] Apollophanes, Ameipsias, Nikochares, Xenophon, Philyllios.

Strattis, *Zopyros Perikaiomenos*, *Kinesias*, *Potamioi*, *Makedones*; Aristophanes, *Pelargoi*; Theopompos, *Althaia*, *Stratiotides*.

394 Aristomenes, *Dionysos* (first at City Dionysia).

393/2 Plato, *Presbeis*.

391 Plato, *Phaon*; Aristophanes, *Ekklesiazousai*.[6]

390 Aristomenes, second in City Dionysia.

Geissler dates Theopompos *Medos* by the Second Naval Confederacy, and Schmid (*Gesch. der Gr. Lit.* iv. 164) does not decide between 390 and 369. The title shows that the money scattered by Kallistratos when he asked for an alliance (30 K) must be Persian money, and the date therefore before the peace

[1] I am very grateful to Professor D. S. Robertson for reading the first draft of my manuscript and making most useful criticisms.

[2] See recently Maidment, *C.Q.*, 1935, 15 f. Athens would scarcely be called 'fortunate and rich' (549) after Chaironeia; if the allusion to Diogenes (123) is accepted, the play cannot have been produced long before 340 B.C.

[3] *Plautinisches*, 369. The original is possibly the *Adelphoi* of Alexis produced soon after 342 B.C.

[4] *Phil. Untersuch.* xxx, 1925, 70 f.

[5] The dating of the Lenaian list is based on Capps, *A.J.P.*, 1900, 40 f.; 1907, 188 f., and *I.G.* 2325. Contrast excessively early dating in Schmid–Stählin, iv. 143, n. 5.

[6] I have adopted Geissler's date; the most recent discussions are in Schmid–Stählin, iv. 218 n. 1; Gigante, *Dioniso*, xi. 147; Barry, *Eccl. as Political Satire*, Chicago, 1942.

of Antalkidas. The fragment is in oracular hexameters and therefore 'sons of Achaeans' means merely Greeks or even Athenians. Kallistratos in 391 prosecuted the ambassadors who had been to Sparta (Didymos *in Dem.* 7. 25). The reference here is probably to the Boeotian alliance of 395, and 'the thin Rhadamanthys' may be Thrasyboulos who then first abandoned his cautious foreign policy.

Raubitschek (*R.E.* xx. 61 s.v. 'Philonides') suggests that Aristophanes *Gerytades* should be dated in the 90's because it mentions Philonides' love for Nais. We have no other fifth-century reference for Philonides or Nais, and Nais, who was mentioned by Lysias and Alkidamas (Ath. 592 d), was still alive at the time of Philetairos *Kynagis* (9 K). It seems to me therefore preferable to accept this dating and to suppose that the papyrus fragments dated to 409–405 (Demiańczuk 19–31), which have been connected with the *Gerytades*, belong to another play. K. J. Dover (*C.R.* lxiv. 7) dates Plato *Hellas* after 394.

390–380	Lenaian victors: Strattis, Kephisodoros, and three unknown.
	Aristophanes, *Second Aiolosikon* (produced by Araros); Plato, *Laios*, *Women after sacrifice*; Nikochares, *Galateia*; Theopompos, *Theseus*, *Aphrodisia*; Eunikos or Philyllios, *Anteia*; Epigenes, *Mnemation*.[1]
388	Aristophanes, *Ploutos*; Nikochares, *Lakones*; Aristomenes, *Admetos*; Nikophon, *Adonis*; Alkaios, *Pasiphae*.
387	Aristophanes, *Kokalos* (produced by Araros).

Plato fr. 185 K must come from a play produced soon after Agyrrhios was made strategos in 388. Antiphanes *Omphale* mentions the baker Thearion, who is known from Aristophanes *Gerytades* and *Aiolosikon* and from Plato's *Gorgias* (518 b) as well as from an unattributed comic fragment (K iii. 478: 374). This seems to secure Antiphanes *Omphale* in the 80's, and his *Kyklops* may therefore have been written before the death of Philoxenos in 380. I am therefore inclined to accept the traditional dates for Antiphanes (birth 408–405, first production 388–385, and death 334–331).[2]

380–370	Lenaian victors: one unknown, Philippos, Choregos, Anaxandrides, Philetairos.
	Theopompos, *Admetos, Hedychares, Pamphile*; Strattis, *Atalanta*.
Before 375	Anaxandrides, *Herakles* or *Achilleus*,[3] third prize at Lenaia.
376	Anaxandrides, first City Victory.
375	Anaxandrides, City victory, Lenaia third prize.
374–372	Euboulos, first City victory.
374	Anaxandrides, *Io*, fourth prize at City Dionysia.
373	Theopompos, *Eirene*.

---

[1] Meineke, i. 354, dated by Pixodaros.

[2] *Skythai* cannot be before 322 when payment for the Ekklesia was abolished; *Parekdidomene* cannot be before 312 (Seleukos) and Wilhelm (*Urk.* 56) prefers third century; *Didymoi* is dated by Ferguson (*Hell. Ath.* 118, n. 3) to 303, but by Ehrenberg (*Aspects*, 186) to 291. These plays are certainly by the later Antiphanes attested by Suidas, who may also have been the third-century actor. *Kitharistes* can just be included in the elder poet's work,

perhaps posthumously produced; *Dyspratos* (remodelled by Epikrates) and *Batalos* (named after a flute player who provided a nickname for Demosthenes in his youth) must have been among his earlier works. We cannot say which poet wrote *Gorgythos* or *Tyrrhenos* (both 340–320). The elder poet met Alexander (Athenaeus, xiii, *init.*).

[3] See Dittmer, *Athenian Comic Didascaliae*, Leiden, 1923, for this and other Anaxandrides' dates based on inscriptions.

Anaxandrides *Protesilaos* can be dated soon after 380 B.C. by Iphikrates' marriage to the daughter of Kotys (41 K). 'Demophon's praise of Kotys', mentioned by Ephippos in the *Homoioi* (16 K), may refer to the same event and a date in the 70's is confirmed by references to the dramas of Dionysios and to Korone (15 K), who is old in Philetairos *Kynagis* (9 K). The drunkard Euripides (16 K) recurs in Ephippos *Epheboi* (9 K) and in Anaxandrides *Nereides* (32 K); these plays therefore may also have been written in the 70's. Euboulos *Dionysios* with its description of the typical tyrant (25 K) belongs to the same period.

Dittmer (p. 50) suggests that the play of Anaxandrides which won third prize at the Lenaia before 375 was the *Herakles* rather than the *Achilleus* because it mentions Argas who flourished from 380 to 355.

Epikrates *Antilais* cannot be earlier than the late 70's if Lais was born in 422 B.C. and may rather belong to the 60's;[1] I see no reason for following Geissler in separating Kephisodoros *Antilais* from it.

Antiphanes *Anteia* is dated by the perfumier Peron, who is fixed in the early 70's by Ephippos *Homoioi* and Theopompos *Hedychares*; Anteia was a contemporary of Lais,[2] but Antiphanes' play may have been written when she was old (cf. Epikrates *Antilais*). Antiphanes *Philometor* calls the Chiot Metras (Metrodoros) 'dear to the people' and this may refer to Chios' position at the head of the list of members of the Second Confederacy (377).

Körte (*R.E.* s.v. 'Philetairos') equates Sotades in Philetairos' *Atalanta* (3 K) with the Olympic victor of 384; this is possible if the play is dated in the late 70's; it can hardly be earlier, as Taureas and Ktesias recur in the late 50's (see below).

370–360   Lenaian victors: Euboulos, Ephippos, Antiphanes, Mnesimachos, Nausikrates.
         Anaxandrides, *Odysseus* (fourth at City Dionysia), *Pharmakomantis* (fifth at City Dionysia); Theopompos, *Nemeas*.
368   Anaxandrides, *Erechtheus* (third at City Dionysia).
367   Anaxandrides, fourth at Lenaia.
364   Anaxandrides, *Mainomenos* (second at Lenaia). Anaxandrides, fifth at Dionysia.

Ephippos *Artemis* (1 K) is dated 368–362 B.C. by Alexander of Pherai; by 362 B.C. the friendship which caused Alexander to send the Athenians wheat was over; the allusion to Thessalian wheat in Alexis *Ponera* (191 K) should be of the same date. In Euboulos *Antiope* Kallistratos is rated as an 'elderly rake', which perhaps suggests a date in the early 60's rather than the 70's; in the *Sphingokarion* he is 'unwounded if anyone wounds him', which should refer to his acquittal after the loss of Oropos in 366 B.C. but precede his final withdrawal before 361.

The gains from Asia and Thrace noted in Antiphanes *Sappho* (196 K) suit the forward policy of Timotheos in the later 60's. Antiphanes *Stratiotes* speaks of dressing a chorus in gold (204 K), which is also mentioned by Isocrates in the *Areopagiticus* (7. 54), dated by Jaeger about 360 B.C.[3] The passage is repeated in the *Hydria* (213 K) which can therefore be dated 365–330. The 'fanning of the

---

[1] Meineke, i. 414.
[2] Geissler, op. cit. 75.
[3] *Paideia*, iii. 100. Perhaps also 'is throttled

by a trierarchy' is peculiarly appropriate to the years before the reorganization in 357.

King of Cyprus by doves' (202 K) in the *Stratiotes* must also be a story from the time of Timotheus' campaigns and probably refers to the luxury of Nikokles, who died in 358; the poet has substituted Paphos for the less known Salamis; a variant of the theme occurs in Alexis' *Eisoikizomenos* (62 K), which may therefore be contemporary. Antiphanes' *Philothebaios*, as Meineke suggested, should caricature an Athenian who imitated Theban manners and customs; in the 60's the elderly Aristophon was notably pro-Theban and was criticized by comedy for his treatment of Ceos in 364 (Schol. Aesch. 1. 64 = Hyperides frg. 40). In Anaxandrides *Poleis* an Athenian explains that disparity of customs makes it impossible for him to be an ally of the Egyptians; this may be connected with the official attitude of Athens at the time of the Satraps' Revolt (366–362), when Chabrias was unofficially aiding the Egyptians; Melanopos' 'false embassy to Egypt' (Demosthenes 24. 126–7) was probably connected with this, and Melanopos was a butt for Anaxandrides (40 K). Meineke dated Ephippos *Geryones* to 334 because he thought the mention of Celts (5 K) referred to the embassy to Alexander; the passage is repeated with additions in Ephippos *Peltast* which can probably be dated in the 50's; Celtic mercenaries were sent by Dionysios I to help the Spartans in 369 (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 20), so that the reference is to non-Greek dwellers in the West (corresponding to Macedonians in the North, Sindians beyond the Bosporus, and Lycians in the East) unless it is a scornful reference to Dionysios himself, which would date the the play to the very early 60's; but in any case the 'chief of the Lycians' would hardly be mentioned after the Satraps' Revolt, and a date before 362 seems certain.

Alexis *Apobates* is dated by the reference to Argas, who was already well known at the time of the marriage of Iphikrates (about 380 B.C., Anaxandrides 41 K), and should belong therefore to the late 60's rather than the 50's, when Alexis won his first victories.[1] Antiphanes *Kaineus* and Anaxandrides *Aischra* are dated before 360 because they mention Timotheos, the lyric poet who died 365–358.

Alexis *Phaidros* may owe its name to Plato's dialogue, as the young man is evidently in love and tries to define the nature of Eros; it should therefore also be dated in the 60's. Ephippos *Nauagos* (14 K) speaks of a young Academician taking up politics; Plato, Bryson, and Thrasymachos are combined probably in a single word. Bryson might have been associated with Plato in the 60's. In this context it seems to me more likely that the famous Thrasymachos is meant than Thrasymachos of Corinth, who taught Stilpo. He is mentioned in Plato's *Phaidros*, and the discussion of rhetoric there may well have been in Ephippos' mind. The description of the elderly Academician in Antiphanes *Antaios* appears to be contemporary. The classification of the pumpkin, attended by Plato, Speusippos, Menedemos, and a Sicilian doctor (Epikrates 11 K), alludes to the Academy's work in the time of the later dialogues, but as the play is by Epikrates it is more likely to have been written in the 60's than the 50's. The discussion of being and becoming by the Sophists in the Lyceum (Antiphanes, *Kleophanes*) should belong to the time of the *Parmenides*.

---

[1] The dating of some of Alexis' plays in the late 60's seems necessary: the final date for Alexis is given by the mention of Arsinoë II and Ptolemy Philadelphos in the *Hypobolimaios*; their marriage took place between 281 and 275 B.C.; if therefore Alexis' traditional age of 106 years is accepted, he could have been born well before 380 B.C., and therefore have begun writing in the late 60's.

(I have great hesitation in including the *Philiskos* plays of Alexis and Anti-phanes; Kock thinks Philiskos of Abydos, who was sent to Greece by Ario-barzanes in 368 B.C., is meant.)

360–350 Lenaian victors: Euphanes, Alexis, Aristophon.

357 Anaxandrides, fourth at City Dionysia.

356 Alexis' first victory at City Dionysia. Anaxandrides, fifth at City Dionysia.

352 Anaxandrides, fifth at City Dionysia.

360–340 Anaxandrides, *Dionysou Gonai*, *Amprakiotis*, both second in City Dionysia.

Alexis *Galateia* can scarcely have been written in Dionysios' lifetime but, as both Dionysios and Aristippos (d. soon after 361 B.C.) should awake fairly recent memories, it may be dated in the 50's.

Philetairos *Kynagis* (9 K) mentions Lais as dead, Theolyte as very old, and Korone as old. Lais was still alive in the late 70's and probably in the 60's (Epikrates 2 K); Theolyte was already old in the 60's (Theopompos 32 K); Korone was still young in the 70's (Ephippos 15 K, see above). It seems there-fore reasonable to date this play to the 50's, but presumably the early 50's since Phormisios (6 K) was already a prominent politician at the time of the *Frogs*. In Anaxandrides *Gerontomania* (9 K) the old men discuss their former flames, Lais, Anteia, Theolyte, Lagiskion (= Lagiska), and the dawning Okimon. Their memories go back to the early years of the fourth century (Lais) and include Lagiska, who flourished in the 70's (Strattis, 3 K); Theolyte is apparently still alive. Therefore a date in the 50's rather than in the 60's[1] seems to fit the facts. If Okimon was beginning to show her promise in the 70's, she would be at the height of her power now, and this justifies placing Euboulos *Kerkopes* (54 K) and Nikostratos *Pandrosos* (21 K) in the 50's; this would also suit the Chairemon quotation in Nikostratos (19 K).

A son of Aristophanes is unlikely to have written much after 350 and there-fore the mention of Hyperides in Philetairos *Asklepios* belongs to this decade, probably also the reference to Stratonikos in the *Oinopion*. The evidence about Stratonikos is confusing; he cannot both have been put to death by Nikokles before 358 and have been with King Ptolemy in 304 (or, if we need not press the 'King', after 323). *R.E.* rejects the later date; but Stratonikos is a living memory in the *Rudens* (932), which probably depends on an original of 310–300 and there is no reason to suppose that this is a Plautine addition. The stories in Athenaeus (163, 347–52) connect him with Diodoros of Aspendos (mentioned by Archestratos, a contemporary of Aristotle), the father of Chrysogonos, who was active in 355 (Didymus *ad Dem.* 12–41), Polyidos, whose first victory in Athens was between 399 and 380 (*MP*), Timotheos, whose death fell between 365 and 358, the actor Simykas, who acted in the 60's with Aeschines (Dem. 18. 262), and Nikokles (d. 358). There seems to be no reason to date any of these encounters before 370 at the earliest; therefore it seems possible that Stratonikos was born about 390 and lived at least until Ptolemy had become Satrap of Egypt.

Plays which mention Plato as alive must have been written before 347 B.C., and when the main work of the author appears to fall after 360 B.C., a date in the 50's seems likely: they are Aristophon *Plato*; Anaxilas *Botrylion*, *Kirke*,

[1] As suggested by Geissler, op. cit. 179; Capovilla, *S.I.F.C.*, 1922, 263 f.

Plousioi; Amphis *Amphikrates*, *Dexidemides*; Alexis *Ankylion*, *Meropis*, *Milkon*, *Olympiodoros*, *Parasite*; Kratinos *Pseudhypobolimaios*. The description of Ktesias in Anaxilas *Plousioi* (25 K) is repeated in his *Chrysochoos*. The definition of the lover in Alexis *Traumatias* must be a reminiscence of Plato's *Symposium* (203 b–d), and I am inclined to see a reminiscence of the *Gorgias* (464) in the equation of strategos and flatterer in Alexis *Kybernetes*. The reference to Platonic love in Amphis *Dithyrambos* (15 K) would also be more pointed if Plato were still alive; if the play can be placed in the 50's, other references to *gingros* and *gingras*, e.g. Antiphanes *Iatros* and Axionikos *Phileuripides*, can be dated; Axionikos *Phileuripides* also mentions Moschion as a parasite (4 K, cf. Alexis *Trophonios*, 236 K); Moschion gave the title to a play by Kallikrates, which can be dated 360–330 B.C. by the hetaira Sinope (see below).

Antiphanes *Knoiditheus* compares Philip to guests at a subscription party who fail to pay their share in spite of their promises: in the 50's Philip repeatedly promised to give Amphipolis to Athens but never did so. Philip's mercenaries under Adaios 'the cock' were defeated by Chares in 354–353, and this was mentioned both by Antiphanes (303 K) and by Herakleides. As this is the only reference to Herakleides it is tempting to suppose that the occasion when he won a third prize at the Dionysia or Lenaia is not far distant; this would give a date in the 50's or early 40's to Euboulos *Nausikaa*, if Wilhelm's restoration is accepted (*I.G.* 2322; Wilhelm, *Urk.* 42). Antiphanes *Plousioi* recalls a passage of Demosthenes *First Philippic* (4. 33) and must therefore have been written about 350 B.C.; it also mentions Taureas and Phoenikides, who recur in the *Auletris* (48 K), and Maton, who is found in the *Kitharoidos* and Anaxilas *Monotropos*; these plays therefore were probably roughly contemporary.

Menekrates is mentioned alone in Alexis *Linos* and with Nikostratos in Ephippos *Peltastes*; Nikostratos, the Argive Herakles, went to serve the King of Persia in 344 and was still alive in 337, and Menekrates, the doctor who claimed to be Zeus, is connected by anecdote with Agesilaos of Sparta (d. 361) and Philip of Macedon: 360–340 are probable limits for these two plays and the *Peltast* is likely to be early in this period if, as Kock thinks, the title has some relation to Iphikrates, who died in 353. The word *autolekythos* in Antiphanes *Athamas* may well refer to the *autolekythoi* mentioned in Demosthenes *Konon* (54. 16), which would date the play to the early 50's.

(I hesitate to include Aristophon *Philonides*, which may be called after Philonides (d. 366) but is not likely to have been produced before 360 as Aristophon did not win at the Lenaia before 350; he may have been the younger Philonides, son of the elder, who was one of Isokrates' earlier pupils (15. 93). It is tempting to suggest that the line 'fighting like Philammon with a sack' or 'with Korykos' (K. iii. 448–207) comes from Antiphanes *Korykos*, which could then be dated in the 60's or 50's by Philammon (Olympic victor in 359).)

350–340   Lenaian victors: four unknown, Asklepiodoros(?).
349   Anaxandrides, *Anchises*, fourth at City Dionysia.
348   Anaxandrides produced a play for Philip.
347   Alexis, City Victory.

Mnesimachos *Philippos* alludes to Philip's capture of Halus in 346. Sotades' *Paralytroumenos* speaks of Hegesippos (Krobylos) attacking Philip; his *Charinos* may have satirized the pro-Macedonian politician of that name who is also

mentioned with Stilpo (*c.* 380–300) in Sophilos' *Gamos*; Charinos was active in the late 40's (Dem. 58. 37). Anaxandrides *Agroikoi*, as Kock saw, quotes Demosthenes (2. 9) and was therefore produced soon after 349; his play produced at the Dionysia of 349 must therefore have been the *Anchises*. His *Tereus* speaks of Polyeuktos consuming his patrimony; as Anaxandrides criticized both Melanopos and Euktemon, his Polyeuktos is likely to be the son of Timokrates, who is mentioned with Euktemon as a hireling of Meidias (Dem. 21. 139) in 348 and proposed a law to help Melanopos in 353; the play must belong to the later 40's if Timokrates was still alive in 348. Euboulos' reference (119 K) to Philokrates as a glutton may also belong to this time. Ephippos *Sappho* is perhaps quoted by Aeschines (1. 75) and therefore belongs before 345. Five plays make fun of an antithesis made by Demosthenes in the Halonnesos debate of 342, Antiphanes *Neottis*; Anaxilas *Euandria*; Alexis *Adelphoi, Stratiotes*; Timokles *Kaunioi*. In Axionikos *Chalkidikos* a parasite says that he associated in youth with Philoxenos 'Pternokopis'; Philoxenos was grown up before Anaxagoras left Athens (430 B.C.) and is mentioned in the *Clouds* (656); if the speaker knew him in the early fourth century, the play was probably produced in the 40's; Philoxenos remained a legend until the time of Menander's *Kekryphalos* (317–307 B.C.). Antiphanes *Kares* has an ironical picture of Herakleides Pontikos, who was in Athens from about 364 to 338: he claims to have 'invented the Art of Theodektes'. This claim may perhaps be dated to the 40's if Theodektes' great rhetorical period was in the late 50's when he praised Maussolos.

340–330   Lenaian victors: Dionysios, Klearchos, Athenokles, Pyren.
339   First revival of old Comedy at City Dionysia.
332   Prokleides, City Victory. Decree in honour of Amphis (*I.G.* ii. 5. 173*b*).

The most likely date for Heniochos *Poleis*(?) seems to be 338 B.C., the formation of the Corinthian League, and as this fragment (5 K) seems to advocate Greek unity under Macedon his *Polyeuktos* is probably directed at Polyeuktos of Sphettos and may be dated 340–320. The allusion to Axionikos, in Alexis *Lebes*, suits the time of reconstruction under Lykourgos; his *Spondophoros* refers to Aristogeiton who was active from 340–320. Euboulos *Klepsydra* is quoted by Asklepiades on Demetrios of Phaleron, and presumably referred to a connexion between Demetrios and Metiche (Klepsydra) in Demetrios' youth; he was born about 350. His affair with Metiche may therefore have been in the late 30's or early 20's, and she probably flourished in the 30's. A fragment of Euboulos (139 K) about the Cynics must also belong to the 30's if Diogenes did not arrive in Athens until shortly before 340. Theophilos *Epidaurios* refers to Atrestides of Mantinea, who was well known in the 40's (Dem. 19. 305). Alexis *Lykiskos* mentions Pythionike, who left Athens in 329. Antiphanes *Kitharistes* refers to the Spartan hostages taken by Antipater after the death of Agis in 331 B.C.

330–320   Lenaian victors: Alkenor, Timokles, Prokleides, Menander.
329   Theophilos, City Victory.
327   Philemon, City Victory.
321   Menander, *Orge*.

A soldier in Philemon *Babylonian* speaks of Pythionike and Harpalos in Babylon, i.e. before Pythionike's death (329–326). Timokles *Delos* is dated to

approximately 323 by the reference to the bribing of Athenian orators by Harpalos. Coppola (*Rivista di Filologia*, 1927, 453 f.) has made a very good case for dating Timokles *Dionysos*, *Ikarioi*, and *Lethe* to 330–329 because Telemachos, who has a pot of beans in all three plays, can be identified with the orator who had a Cypriote crowned for sending the Athenians corn in the famine of 330–327; the *Ikarioi* mentions the famine, but Pythionike, who went to Harpalos in 329, is still in Athens. *Ikarioi* and *Lethe* are also tied together by the joke about 'baskets'; *Dionysos* may be earlier since we now know that Telemachos had been active politically since 339–338 (*Hesp.* vii. 292). Dionysios *Thesmophoros* is probably dated to the 20's by its reference to Archestratos *Hedypatheia* (Wilhelm, *Urk.* 128).

320–310   Lenaian victors: Philemon, Apollodoros, Diphilos, Philippides, Nikostratos.
315   Menander's first City Victory.
312   Menander, *Heniochos*.
Soon after 312   Menander, *Kolax*.
311   Philippides, *Mystis*; Nikostratos . . . *oskopos*; Ameinias (as Ephebe), *Apoleipousa*; Theophilos, *Pankratiastes*; Menander, *Paidion*.[1]

Timokles *Philodikastes* is dated 317–307 by the reference to *gynaikonomos*; so also Menander *Kekryphalos*, *Apistos* (= *Aulularia*), probably also *Dis Exapaton*; Philemon *Phasma* (= *Mostellaria* 941). The likeness of a fragment of Diphilos *Gamos* (24 K) to Menander *Kolax* 85 f. suggests a date near 312. Nannarion in the *Kolax* is also mentioned in Theophilos *Philaulos*, which may therefore be contemporary.

VARIOUS PLAYS, 350–310.

Timokles *Ikarioi* (330–329) mentions the sons of Chairephilos (17 K), Autokles, and Aristomedes (Page, *G.L.P.* 51 b; Demiańczuk 292/2). Aristomedes, son of Aristophon (*c.* 430–330), who was trierarch in 356 and was in 340 called a thief by Demosthenes (10. 73), is also mentioned as a thief in Timokles *Heroes* (Page, *G.L.P.* 51 a; Demianczuk 292/1) and in Philemon's *Lithoglyphos* (Page, *G.L.P.* 50 a). There seems no reason for dating Philemon's play before 330, the date accepted above for the *Ikarioi*, but in the *Heroes* Aristomedes is *kalos*, which may imply that he is younger, and 340, or soon after, is the date demanded by the reference to Demosthenes' antithesis (12 K). Autokles, who is mentioned in *Ikarioi*, is also mentioned in Theophilos *Boiotia*, which may therefore be roughly contemporary.[2]

Chairephilos and his sons were given Athenian citizenship by Demosthenes for bringing fish to Athens; his proposal was certainly made before Deinarchos' speech in 323 and apparently before 338–332 since Pamphilos appears with a deme name in an inscription of that date (*C.I.A.* ii. 172); the event is mentioned by Alexis in the *Epidaurios*, but in the *Sorakoi* Pheidippos is called 'a foreign fish importer'; we may therefore probably date the *Epidaurios* in the 30's and the *Sorakoi* in the 40's. In Alexis *Agonis* Pheidippos is called a fish-seller (as in

---

[1] In *I.G.* ii. 2. 2323a *Paidion* is certain; Plato is too early, Apollodoros and Poseidippos are too long. I suggest the reading may be Μενανδρος: πε:. Wilhelm, *Urk.* 49, remarks that there is scarcely room for Menandros before πεμ: .

[2] I cannot follow Körte's identification (*Rh. Mus.* lx. 414) of Autokles with the Autokles mentioned by Herakleides Pontikos (*ap.* Ath. 537).

Timokles, 17, 21 K); the other historical names in the *Agonis* are Philippides and Misgolas; Philippides' thinness was a joke for Aristophon (8 K) before 350, and for Menander (365 K) in 321. Misgolas was a notorious character and 45 years old at the time of Aeschines' speech against Timarchus (345). As Euripides' *Orestes* is parodied in the *Agonis* (3 K) and was produced in 341–340 (*I.G.* 2320), a date in the 30's seems likely for the *Agonis*.

Misgolas appears again in Antiphanes *Halieuomene* with Kallimedon, Kallisthenes, the aged Sinope, Kobios, the lovely Pythionike, the sons of Chairephilos, and Theano; the bottom date is given by the presence of Pythionike. Sinope had already some wealth in 356 (Dem. 23. 56) and is named in Antiphanes *Neottis* (after 342 B.C.); in Amphis *Kouris* she is rich when Lyka, Nannion, and Phryne are rich; in Anaxilas *Neottis* she is old when Nannion, Phryne, Plangon, and Gnathaina are still powerful and Theano is again described as thin; finally in Timokles' *Orestautokleides* Pythionike, Nannion, Lyka, Phryne, Plangon, Gnathaina are all old; Sinope is not included and may therefore be dead; Chrysis is added. Chrysis is one of the soldier's (past?) triumphs in the *Kolax* (295 K) and is perhaps the *anus doliaria clauda crassa* of *Pseudolus* 659 (original probably 309–308). Nannion was still alive or at least a living memory at the time of Menander *Pseudherakles*, after 321. Phryne was defended by Hyperides soon after 350, and was a model for Praxiteles and Apelles probably in the 40's, and outlived the rebuilding of Thebes in 316. Therefore it seems reasonable to date Amphis *Kouris* to the early 40's, Anaxilas *Neottis* and Antiphanes *Halieuomene* to the early 30's, and Timokles *Orestautokleides* to the early 20's.[1] By these means we can get limiting dates for some other plays: Alexis *Thesprotoi* 350–320 (Philippides); Timokles *Sappho* 345–330 (Misgolas); Alexis *Kleobouline*; Antiphanes *Arkas, Akestria, Kepouros*; Kallikrates *Moschion* 360–330 (Sinope); Alexis *Tarantinoi* 330–320 (Nannion mad for drink, therefore old); Euboulos *Pornoboskos*; Philippides *Ananeousa* 350–330 (Gnathaina); Euboulos *Nannion* 350–340 (Nannion, Kydias); *Stephanopolides* 350–330 (Nannion); *Plangon* 350–330 (Plangon); Axionikos *Tyrrhenos* (Gryllion, parasite of Phryne; Ischas also in Menander *Kolax* 295 K) 350–320; Timokles *Neaira* 350–330 (Phryne). Of these plays Philippides *Ananeousa* raises a problem; it not only alludes to Gnathaina but also to Plato's Good and would therefore naturally be dated, if not in Plato's lifetime, at least soon after his death. Suidas gives a floruit for Philippides in 336–332. He appears in the Lenaian list next after Diphilus, i.e. about 312, and was victorious in 311; and yet he was still active politically in 287–286 (*I.G.* ii. 314). We have a choice between assuming two poets of the name; or that Philippides was born about 357, that Suidas' floruit was his first production and Plato's Good the memory of an elderly character, and that he waited over twenty years for his first Lenaian victory.

Antiphanes *Halieuomene* further mentions Kallimedon, the oligarchic orator who had to leave Athens in 324 B.C., returned with Antipater in 322, and had to leave Athens again for ever in 318 B.C., and Kobios, a lover of Pythionike; Kallimedon and Kobios recur with Korydos (who later went to the court of Ptolemy I), Kyrebion (a relation of Aeschines called Epikrates), and Semidalis in Alexis *Pankratiastes*, and with Semidalis alone in Alexis *Isostasion*; in the last named Alexis says (97 K) that it was a subscription party and they were all

---

[1] Pythionike is still alive but may have left Athens. Körte (*R.E.*, s.v. 'Timokles') dates by Aeschines (1. 52) soon after 345, but I see no reason why Autokleides, like Misgolas, Tithymallos, etc., should not be notorious for 15 years or more.

called after kinds of food. This must be an allusion to the famous dining-club of sixty members which so impressed Philip that he sent them a talent in return for a copy of their jokes (Ath. 614 d, e) and therefore dates the *Pankratiastes* and the *Isostasion* before Chaironeia. A date in the late 40's seems likely if Korydos went to Ptolemy probably in the last decade of the century and Kallimedon's son Agyrrhios was still active in Athens in 285–283 (*Hesp.* vii. 100, No. 18). Alexis *Titthe*, which couples Korydos with Blepaios, mentioned twice by Demosthenes in 347 (21. 215; 40. 52), belongs to the same time. Kallimedon recurs with Chairephon in Menander's *Methe*, which must therefore be dated between 321 and 318. The limits for the other plays which mention Kallimedon are 345–318; they are Alexis *Dorkis*, *Mandragorizomene*, *Pontikos*, *Syntrechontes*, *Phaidon*; Antiphanes *Gorgythos*; Timokles *Polypragmon*; Theophilos *Iatros*; Philemon *Metion* (probably after 330); Euphron *Paradidomene* (probably after 320); Euboulos *Anasozomenoi* (probably soon after 340).

Chairephon also appears in Menander's *Orge* (321) and *Kekryphalos* (317–307). It seems therefore reasonable to date the plays in which he occurs 325–310; they are Alexis *Synapothneskontes*, *Phryges*; Antiphanes *Skythai* (after the abolition of pay for the Ekklesia in 322, 200 K); Nikostratos *Tokistes*;[1] Timotheos *Kynarion*; Apollodoros *Hiereia*, *Sphattomene*; Menander *Androgynos*, *Samia* (about 318). Timokles *Epistolai* combines Chairephon with Tithymallos, Korydos, and Neilos; Tithymallos occurs soon after 342 in Timokles *Kaunioi* (18 K) and Korydos has been noted above in the late 40's; it seems therefore reasonable to date the *Epistolai* to the late 20's and the other Tithymallos and Korydos plays between 345 and 320; they are Aristophon *Pythagoristai* (11 K on unwinged love probably takes with it Alexis *Apokoptomenos* and Euboulos *Kampylion*); Antiphanes *Tyrrhenos* (cf. Axionikos *Tyrrhenos*, above); Dromo *Psaltria*; Alexis *Milesia*, *Odysseus Hyphainon*, *Olynthia*, *Demetrios*, *Poietai*; Kratinos *Titans*; Timokles *Epichairekakos*, *Kentauros*. Two other plays may be mentioned in connexion with the *Epistolai*: Neilos and Korydos recur with Nereus, Phyromachos, and Phoenikides in Euphron *Muses*; as Euphron was still writing after 276 B.C. (10, 11 K) and Phoenikides was already known in 350 (Antiphanes, *Plousioi*), a date about 320 is indicated. Nereus is mentioned as an old man with Kallimedon in the first edition of Alexis *Krateuas*; the play can therefore be dated in the late 20's. Anaxandrides *Nereus*, in which Nereus is already famous, can then be dated to the 40's; presumably also Anaxilas *Nereus*, if this is not the same as Anaxandrides' play.

Ktesippos (defended as a very young man by Demosthenes in 354, trierarch in 334) is mentioned in Menander *Orge* (321), in Timokles *Demosatyroi*, and Diphilos *Enagismata*. Timokles refers to the effeminacy of Ktesippos, and Diphilos to his selling the stones of his father's monuments; Menander mentions both; the three plays should, therefore, be contemporary.

Much of this dating is necessarily rough and ready. It may seem more plausible if it gives a reasonable spread of plays. If we count up plays and victories (including the placings of Anaxandrides where they can be fixed by

[1] The *Tokistes* must therefore be attributed to the later Nikostratos who won a Lenaian victory in this decade, was second in the City contest in 311 B.C., and is mentioned with Philemon and Ameinias in a Delian inscription of 280 B.C. Wilhelm, *Urk.* 132, adds *Ornitheutes* (Harpokration quotes as New Comedy) and *Basileis*. Add also *Apelaunomenos*, *Mageiros*; both mention the Macedonian dish, *mattye*. The mention of Kephisodoros (cf. Dionysios *Homonymoi*, Amphis *Planos*, Timokles *Ikarioi*) in the *Syros* also suggests the younger poet.

inscriptional evidence) we get some idea of the spread. We must also remember that a play that we can date may or may not be the play with which the poet won the victory which is recorded for him in that decade; in some cases the poet himself may or may not have filled one of the known number of gaps in the Lenaian list. For these cases we can give a maximum and minimum figure. We may also give an even distribution to the plays which we cannot date within twenty or thirty years.[1] Thus we arrive at the following list: 400–390: 18; 390–380: 19 or 20; 380–370: 28 or 31; 370–360: 28–34; 360–350: 44–47; 350–340: 29–35; 340–330: 39–41; 330–320: 35–37. Whether the smaller number of plays in the first ten years is partly due to the restriction of production at each of the festivals to three plays we do not know, as we only know that five plays were again being presented in 387. We also, of course, do not know whether any of the datable plays were written for production outside Athens.[2] But when all allowances are made it looks as if we know something of more than 50 per cent. of the productions of each decade.

An examination of the titles of plays thus dated will tell us a little about the development of comedy, although this evidence has to be used with care. We have some check in our knowledge of the titles of over sixty plays produced in the last twenty years of the fifth century and at the other end in the titles of Menander. Mythological titles decrease remarkably after the middle of the fourth century, from 41 plays out of 108 dated 400–350, to 9 out of 89 plays dated 350–320. We can add a little to this: in the last twenty years of the fifth century just under half of the dated plays are mythological; the plays of Araros and Philetairos almost certainly may be dated before 350, and 9 of their 14 undated plays are mythological; Anaxandrides scarcely produced after 340, and 6 of his 21 undated titles are mythological; Euboulos scarcely produced after 330, and 27 of his 46 undated titles are mythological. Timokles scarcely produced before 340, and of his 10 undated titles only 1 is mythological: *Konisalos*, probably named after the prologue figure like the *Heros*, *Orge*, *Methe*, and *Trophonios* of Menander. Agnoia in Menander's *Perikeiromene* is the best known instance of the prologue figure, but we know that Kalligeneia, a nurse of Demeter, spoke the prologue in Aristophanes *Second Thesmophoriazousai*. It seems therefore likely that other comedies also were named after prologue figures, e.g. *Anagyros*, *Hellas*, *Sikelia*, *Gelos* (420–390); Theopompos *Eirene* (380–370); perhaps Antiphanes *Tychon* (370–360); Antiphanes *Knoithideus*, Amphis *Dithyrambos* (360–350); Anaxandrides *Anteros*, *Hybris* (before 340); Euboulos *Echo*, *Orthanes* (before 330); Timokles *Dionysos*, *Lethe* (330–320). But the vast majority of mythological plays are translations of heroic characters into low life interspersed in earlier times with political satire, and it is this class which decreases in the second half of the fourth century.

Plays named after historical contemporaries appear through the whole period

---

[1] I have not included in my lists, but have included in the following figures, the cases where we can say from the inscription (cf. Dittmer, op. cit.) that Anaxandrides won a place within a certain decade but cannot determine either the play or the exact year: 380–370, twice third and once fourth at the City Dionysia, thrice fourth at the Lenaia, 370–360 twice fourth at City Dionysia, once fifth in City Dionysia; 360–350 twice second at the Lenaia, twice fourth at the City Dionysia; 350–340 twice second at the Lenaia, twice fourth at the City Dionysia.

[2] Vitucci, *Dioniso*, vii. 210, 312, quotes evidence for productions of Comedy during the fourth century at Peiraieus, Ikaria, Anagyrous, Rhamnous, Aixone, Acharnai. Add for Aixone *Ath. Mitt.*, 1941, pl. 73 (cf. *J.H.S.* lxxi, 222, n. 7).

and were already known in the late fifth century. It is more difficult to be certain that a play has been named after one of its own characters. The *Krateuas* of Alexis and the *Orestautokleides* of Timokles can both be dated in the 20's and are both named after contemporaries; but, as far as I know, Menander has no such title. His *Thais* derives its name from a great hetaira of the past, but *Thrasyleon* is a significant name (like Polemon in the *Perikeiromene*) and has affinities with titles like *Dyskolos* which describe an important character but do not give his name; such descriptive titles can be traced back to the fifth century, and Aristophanes *Lysistrate* combines description and significant name in a title. In Menander's *Samia* Chrysis is so named because Chrysis was a name for hetairai; Moschion's name has a rather different pedigree: Moschion was a well-known parasite in the mid-fourth century, and Kallikrates named a play after him; the name thus came into the comic repertoire and could be so used for any young man. In Middle Comedy it is normally safe to assume that a play is named after a contemporary if a suitable contemporary is known to exist, and this has been my assumption in compiling my lists. The question is interesting in a few cases, where the fragments allow us to detect the flavour of New Comedy and the presence of a real character, however distorted, would to some extent hamper the poet's freedom. The three plays called *Neottis* (Antiphanes, Anaxilas, Euboulos) all seem to deal with the rescue of a young hetaira by her lover; we have no evidence for a famous hetaira of this name and love for a famous hetaira could scarcely be represented as other than disastrous; therefore these plays seem to have been named after a character and this practice had begun in the late forties, the date of Antiphanes' play; we may assume the same for Alexis' *Agonis* which was a recognition play, although Agonis is said by Suidas to be a hetaira name. In Euboulos *Pamphilos* the young man gives the girl's nurse a large bowl of wine like the youth in the *Curculio*; Pamphilos is then probably the name of a character and not the son of the fish-importer Chairephilos, although this would be chronologically possible.

Comedy of errors is the basis of *Menaechmi* and *Amphitruo* and remains as a subsidiary theme in many New Comedies. It is possible, as I hope to suggest elsewhere, that Alexis *Adelphoi* was the original of the *Menaechmi*; it was produced soon after 342. Antiphanes *Didymai* was produced 360–350 and twins of the same sex must have given rise to errors; the alternative title of *Auletris* suggests that the lost twin was in the establishment of a *leno*. We cannot be certain whether Anaxandrides *Didymoi* had the same theme; the twins may have been male and female as in the *Perikeiromene*. The earliest play with a title suggesting this theme is the *Homoioi* of Ephippos, 380–370.

I conclude with a brief note on the ancestry of certain other New Comedy themes. Of the various figures which play a considerable part in New Comedy, I need not mention the old hetaira, the parasite, or the cook, of whom the Middle Comedy ancestry is obvious. The braggart soldier with his flatterer appears before 360 in Antiphanes *Tychon*. The rich hetaira, ancestress of Menander's Thais, may have appeared as early as 390–380 in Eunikos or Philyllios *Anteia*. We can also see traces of the young girl who has to be rescued from *leno*, *lena*, or poverty (cf. *Rudens, Cistellaria, Heautontimoroumenos*) in Anaxilas *Neottis* (21 K, 340–330), Euboulos *Stephanopolides* (Ribbeck 12/1, 350–330), *Pornoboskos* (88 K, 350–330), Antiphanes *Neottis* (168 K, soon after 342), *Hydria* (before 334–331), Alexis *Agonis* (2 K, 340–330), *Olynthia* (162 K, 340–320), Euboulos *Pamphilos* (80–82 K. We cannot trace Euboulos after 330). We cannot tell

whether masculine foreign titles belong to the ancestry of Menander's *Karchedonios* as many other explanations are possible for foreign men, but the feminine titles *Amprakiotis* and *Samia* of Anaxandrides (before 340), *Boiotis* of Theophilos, *Milesia* and *Olynthia* of Alexis (340–320) foreshadow many in Menander, and in the last named a noble girl is being brought up in a poor household (162 K). The titles *Kanephoros*, *Kitharistria*, and *Phialephoros* of Anaxandrides (before 340) may be connected with Suidas' statement that he was the first to introduce love-affairs and the rape of maidens, since such titles involve love and sometimes also rape in Menander (cf. fragments of his *Arrhephoros*, *Kanephoros*). 'Maidens' in Suidas I interpret as imaginary contemporaries as distinct from the mytho-logical heroines to which the similar statement in the Life of Aristophanes (70) about his *Kokalos* presumably refers. The *Psaltria* and *Kalathephoroi* of Euboulos (before 330) belong to the same class. The *Pseudhypobolimaios* of Kratinos (about 350) seems to anticipate a theme which we know later in the *Samia* and the *Truculentus*. In the *Mandragorizomene* of Alexis the girl was presumably drugged to prevent her capture by a rival. The young man airs his love at length as early as Alexis *Phaidros* (370–360). The stern father is described by his son in Anaxandrides 53 K, which can hardly be later than 340 B.C.; Anaxilas' Hermit (about 350) and Anaxandrides' Boor (soon after 349) may belong to the same category. The slave gives advice to a young master in love in Amphis *Amphikrates* (6 K, before 350), and the rescue plays already quoted are likely to include a slave intrigue; some of them were probably also recognition plays; *hippiskos* (alternative title of Alexis *Agonis* 350–330) is explained as part of a garment and must have been a recognition token, as also the lettered cup in Euboulos *Neottis* (69 K; probably before 330).[1]

The fragments cannot tell us much about the structure of the plays but give a little evidence about the chorus. An actor calls on the chorus to dance in Alexis *Trophonios* (360–350); cities probably formed the chorus of a play produced by Heniochos about 338 (5 K); Timokles *Orestautokleides* (330–327) parodied the opening of the *Eumenides*, but whether the hetairai appeared or whether, if they appeared, they formed the chorus we cannot say. We have, however, the evidence of plural titles. The fact that their number decreases startlingly from 31 out of 67 plays in 420–400 to 15 out of 108 plays in 400–350 only tells us that the emphasis has changed from chorus to actors. We have rather to ask where they can give us positive evidence of the presence of a chorus, remembering that Menander's *Imbrians* was called after two men and his *Synaristosai* after three women, remembering also the possibility that a plurality like the advocati in the *Poenulus* and the fishermen in the *Rudens* might give a play its title (and this may be the explanation of Menander's *Halieis*, *Kybernetai*, *Stratiotai*). We have seen no reason to date any play of Timokles before 342 and the following plays of Timokles have plural titles of a kind which strongly suggest the presence of a chorus: *Dionysiazousai*, *Aigyptioi*, *Marathonioi* (undated); *Kaunioi* soon after 342; *Heroes* 340–330; *Ikarioi*, *Demosatyroi* 330–320. Other plays which might be considered are Euboulos *Stephanopolides* (350–330); Alexis *Thesprotoi* (340–320), *Poietai* (340–320), Kratinos *Titanes* (340–320), Alexis *Tarantinoi*, Euphron *Muses* (330–320), Antiphanes *Skythai*

---

[1] The reference to a recognition in Aristophanes *Kokalos* I have omitted because the *Kokalos* was a mythological play and no doubt other mythological plays contained parodies of tragic recognition scenes. The recognitions of New Comedy are scenes of everyday life.

(not before 322). This evidence is not conclusive, but it seems to me probable that plays were named after the chorus at least until 320 B.C. and that this also implies that at least the leader of the chorus was present throughout the action. Further knowledge of structure can only be derived from the originals of Plautus *Amphitruo*, *Persa*, and *Menaechmi*, but the dated fragments do give some evidence for the earlier appearance of themes, characters, and situations normally associated with the New Comedy; the tone, however, is different and we must always remember that Middle Comedy was played in the old obscene costume, since there is no evidence for a change of costume before Menander, and the distinctive masks of New Comedy, e.g. the leading old man, the wavy-haired old man, the admirable youth, the dark youth, the curly-haired youth, and the delicate youth, had not yet been invented.[1]

T. B. L. WEBSTER

University College, London

[1] See *C.Q.* xlii. 19; *Rylands Bulletin*, xxxii.

MR. A...
Martia...
amendr...
clear, b...
many c...
chosen...
seems h...
intende...
his wor...
accord...
est in M...

p. 13...
mean '...
justifica...
Virg. *A...
the firs...
uerba, i...
*primaqu...
emascu...

p. 13...
plausus...
wrong ...
Roma, ...
undoul...
7. 14. ...
comme...
etc. *pla...
in refer...
-que ha...

p. 13...
the obj...
should ...

p. 14...
awkwa...
deponi ...
either ...
ignorat...
full sto...
except ...
clearly ...
exampl...
146 f. '...
posse a...
Hofm. ...
the pop...

SOME OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF MARTIAL

MR. ALAN KER in *Class. Quart.*, vol. xliv, 1950, pp. 12–24, discusses a number of Martial passages which appear to him to be in need of elucidation or textual amendment. That some of these passages require elucidation seems indeed clear, but few require any treatment of the kind prescribed by Mr. Ker. In so many cases does he seem to me needlessly to alter the epigrammatist's carefully chosen words and ascribe to him others which he would never have used that it seems but proper to call attention to some instances. The following notes are intended to show that Martial was a more able writer and the transmitters of his work more competent than Mr. Ker's paper would suggest; the conclusions accord with Heraeus' observation (p. vii) '*coniecturis* omnino non multum loci est in Martiale, minimum, ubi αβγ conspirant'.

p. 13 : 9. 67. 4 'ante preces totas primaque uerba dedit'. M. must certainly mean 'before I had finished my prayer or indeed had begun to speak'. I see no justification for assuming that M. could not so use -*que*; compare cases like Virg. *Aen.* 1. 2–3 'Italiam . . . Lauinaque uenit litora', where see Conway's note; the first phrase, *ante preces totas*, gives the general picture, the second, *primaque uerba*, is limitative and more precise. With K.'s alteration *totum* the words *primaque uerba* would add nothing to *ante preces* and the whole sentence would be emasculated.

p. 13 : 9. 28. 1–3 'dulce decus scaenae, ludorum fama, Latinus | ille ego sum, plausus deliciaeque tuae, | qui . . .' That *tuae* (codd.) is right and *tui* (K.) wrong is as certain as anything can be. Here and in 10. 53. 2 '(Scorpus) plausus, Roma, tui deliciaeque breues', the word *plausus*, which K. takes as genitive, is undoubtedly nominative. Cf. 4. 87. 2 '(infantem) lusus deliciasque uocat'; 7. 14. 2 'amisit lusus deliciasque suas (puerum)'; 5. 34. 2 'puellam | oscula commendo deliciasque meas'; 8. 82. 6 'nos tua cura prior deliciaeque sumus'; etc. *plausus* may safely be added to K.'s list of abstract substantives used by M. in reference to persons (footnotes 2 and 3). With K.'s *tui*, it may be added, -*que* has no function.

p. 13 : 3. 50. 8 'putidus est, totiens si mihi ponis aprum'. M. chooses to specify the object of *ponis* rather than the subject of *est*, with which it is identical. Why should he not? *aprum* is in this position more natural than *aper* (K.).[1]

p. 14 : 1. 109. 13 'deponi monet et rogat leuari'. K. notes that 'this is awkward for *se deponi monet*' and proceeds to alter. What is awkward about *deponi monet* and not awkward about *rogat leuari*? The Latin is crystal-clear in either case. The poem continues (14 f.) 'castae tantus inest pudor catellae, | ignorat Venerem'. K. would place a comma for the full stop after *leuari* and a full stop after *catellae* on the grounds that '*tantus* never in M. looks forward except with *ut*'. That such a punctuation is false is shown by *castae* which quite clearly looks forward to *ignorat Venerem*. We have here, as Post observes, an example of parataxis where we might expect an *ut*-clause; cf. Plaut. *Most.* 146 f. 'atque edepol ita haec tigna umiditate putent: non uideor mihi | sarcire posse aedes meas', Hor. *Sat.* 1. 1. 13 f., etc. (see Schmalz-Hofm.[5], p. 688, and Hofm. *Lat. Umg.*, pp. 108 and 198 f.); the type of sentence is characteristic of the popular speech, which M. often reflects.

[1] Cf. Housman, Manil. I, Introd., p. xli.

p. 14: 2. 63. 3–4 'Miliche, luxuria est si tanti diues amares. | "non amo" iam dices: haec quoque luxuria est'. No alteration is justified. The literal translation of 3 is 'it is an extravagance, if it were as a rich man that you paid so high a price for your loving'. There is no difficulty either in the weight of the sentence falling on the adjective *diues* (as often in Latin) nor in the tense of *amares* (which does not 'imply that M. has now ceased to love'). With regard to 4, K.'s explanation is unnecessarily laboured. The meaning is ' "I am not in love" you will proceed to say', the point being that expensive love-making without being in love is another extravagance. *iam* both here and in 2. 60. 3 is taken naturally with *dices*, and is not, as K. thinks, to be included in the inverted commas.

p. 15: Under the heading 'Hiatus' K. deals mainly with cases of the lengthening of a short final syllable consisting of a vowel+consonant before a vowel. Because instances of such a lengthening very rarely occur in M., he is dubious about such as do occur. The truth is that this licence is rare in many of the Latin poets,[1] but that any particular poet uses it rarely is no evidence that he does not use it at all. And what is 'very insipid' about *et*(*tua* K.) in 10. 89. 1 'Iuno labor, Polyclite, tuus et gloria felix'? Its soundness is demonstrated (were there need) by Ov. *Pont.* 4. 1. 29 'ut Venus artificis labor est et gloria Coi', which M. is evidently re-echoing. The last example, however (7. 44. 1), 'cannot easily be explained away'.

p. 15: 1. 34. 6 'raraque Submemmi fornice rima patet'. K. proposes *sub Memmi fornice*, 'under the arch of Memmius, i.e. in the brothel'. But *fornix* cannot here mean both 'arch' and 'brothel'; it must mean either the one or the other. Here the context requires the latter meaning (one well established by M.'s time),[2] and the normal Latin for 'in the brothel' is (*in*) *fornice*. The adjective *Summemmianus* has also to be accounted for; we cannot believe that it 'was formed from the phrase *sub M. f.*', when there is neither anything to show that the phrase was in current use nor any reason why it should be.

By Lindsay[3] (it seems) and Izaac (Budé) *Submemmi* is regarded as the genitive of *Submemmium*, 'le quartier', states Izaac, without quoting his authority, 'où habitaient les courtisanes'. Lundström[4] appears to be the first to have taken into account a relevant bit of information, already quoted by Lindsay,[5] viz. Ps.-Cornutus, Schol. Iuu. 3. 66 'in Aurelianis . . . lupanaribus, quae Memmiana prius dicta sunt, quia Memmius hoc primus statuit'. Lundström assumes that *Submemmius* is a derogatory nickname of the brothel-owner Memmius as compared with the well-known Memmius; for the formation he compares *Subnero*. We should, however, expect the nickname to be given to one other than a Memmius, cf. the reference to Domitian as *Subnero* (Tert. *Pall.* 4) and to Pseudolus as *Subballio* (Plaut. *Pseud.* 607); and it seems improbable that the adjectives *Memmianus* and *Summemmianus* should both be applicable to the same place. It is far more likely that the manager of some smaller brothel, or of another owned by Memmius, was dubbed *Submemmius*. Or it is possible that an establishment adjacent to or subsidiary to the Memmian came to be known as the *lupanar Summemmianum* and that the manager was humorously given the name *Submemmius*.

[1] See L. Mueller, *De re metrica*, pp. 331 ff., where statistics are given of its occurrence in various poets.
[2] Cf. 11. 61. 4 '(obscena Leda) fornicem cludit'.
[3] *J. Phil.* xxix, 1904, p. 59.
[4] *Eranos* xiii, 1913, pp. 206 ff.
[5] *Archiv f. lat. Lex.* xiii. 279.

p. 15: 2. 6. 9 'haec sunt aut meliora si qua nescis', i.e. 'these are the poems or other better ones, that are unknown to you'. M. has included in his newly published volume poems that Severus has not read. I see no illogicality or difficulty to justify so artificial a punctuation as K.'s.

p. 16: 2. 69. 8 'si uir es, ecce, nega' (*ire n*. K.). The combination of *ecce* with an imperative, of which K. can find no other instance, occurs, for example, in Ov. *Met*. 2. 93, Nemes. *Ecl*. 1. 34. Above, the meaning, by a natural enough development, is 'come', 'there now', much like that of *en* in cases like Virg. *Georg*. 3. 42 'en age, segnis rumpe moras', Sen. *Phaedr*. 599 'en, incipe, anime', etc. (Is not the abbreviation *ē* for *es* very unusual?)

p. 16: 2. 86. 9. The words *difficiles habere nugas* do not mean 'to *have* difficult trifles', they are not 'meaningless', nor are they 'absurdly flat'. *habere* is often used in the sense of *facere, agere*, etc., with various objects (see *Thes*. s.v. 2441. 49 ff.). There is no occasion to add to the *auere*-for-*habere* collection.

p. 17: 4. 64. 31 'uos nunc omnia parua qui putatis'. K. states that 'neither *uos* nor *nunc* is necessary to the sense, but *haec* is', and proposes *haec* for *nunc*. On the contrary, both *uos* and *nunc* are necessary, while *haec* is not only unnecessary, but is inappropriate. The meaning is 'you who nowadays regard everything as small'.

p. 17: 4. 86. 9–11 'si damnauerit, ad salariorum | curras scrinia protinus licebit, | inuersa pueris arande charta'. Though a satisfactory explanation is given by Paley, K. supposes a lacuna and imposes on M. some feeble lines of which he could never have been guilty. K. objects (1) that 'no schoolboys ever got their scribbling paper from fishmongers'. The Latin does not suggest that they did. K. is misled by his misunderstanding of 8, which 'clearly suggests that the purpose of its consignment to *salarii* would be to wrap up fish'. Now 'nec scombris tunicas dabis molestas' can only mean that the paper will not provide coverings for mackerel while being cooked (cf. 3. 2. 3 f. 'ne nigram cito raptus in culinam | cordylas madida tegas papyro'; 6. 61. 8 'redimunt soli carmina docta coci');[1] with any other interpretation the phrase *tunicas molestas* (in which criminals were burned; cf. 10. 25. 5) would be pointless (as Friedl. and Izaac failed to see); there is no allusion here to fishmongers. It is indeed uncertain whether fishmongers come into the picture at all, for there appears to be little evidence that by *salarii* M. means anything but salt-sellers (see Friedl. on 1. 41. 8). If A. condemns the book, says M., then it may as well go to the drawers of the *salarii* (as typical shopkeepers) for use as scribbling paper (for accounts, etc.) by the slaves (cf. 1. 41. 8 'uiles pueri salariorum'). In his choice of the word *salariorum* M. was no doubt largely influenced by Catull. 14. 17 'ad *librariorum* curram scrinia', on which he is here playing. (2) K.'s objection that '*scrinia* are book-boxes, not fish-boxes' has no relevance.[2] (3) *licebit* is not 'meaningless', nor do 'we want *necesse est*'; *licebit* is as natural as 'may' in English.

p. 18: 5. 79. 5–6 'quare ego non sudo, qui tecum, Zoile, ceno? | frigus enim magnum synthesis una facit'. K. makes the remarkable statement that '*enim* cannot answer a question' and suggests *quare? ego . . . ceno*. No such unnatural punctuation is called for. *enim* is used in replies to questions both with purely affirmative (Plaut., Ter.) and with causal force (see *Thes*. s.v. 572. 45 ff., 585.

---

[1] Fish is sometimes cooked wrapped in paper at the present day both in this country and elsewhere. Cf. Mrs. Beeton s. *Red mullet* and *Trout*.

[2] *scrinia* are not indeed necessarily book-boxes; *scrinium unguentorum* in Plin. *Nat*. 7. 29. 108 and 13. 1. 3 suggests that they may be receptacles for anything one cares to put in them.

39 ff.). With the above cf. Pers. 1. 63 'quis populi sermo est? quis enim nisi . . .?'; in these two cases the force of *enim* may be represented by 'why!'.

p. 19: 6. 28. 10 'qui fles talia, nil fleas, uiator'. Here a blessing is invoked upon the sympathetic traveller. K. spoils the whole effect by altering *qui* to *ni*. Edd. compare 10. 61. 5 f. 'solus | flebilis in terra sit lapis iste tua' and 7. 96. 6 ff. 'da lacrimas tumulo, qui legis ista, meo, | sic . . .'.

p. 19: 6. 77. 7–8 'non aliter monstratur Atlans cum compare ginno | quaeque uehit similem belua nigra Libyn'. The whole point (as Paley saw and as Friedl. failed to see) lies in the *similarity* between the carrier and the carried: *compare* and *similem*, as is made clear by the context, indicate in the one case likeness in size,[1] in the other likeness in colour.[2] Were there a contrast, the comparison would have no relevance. Afer is carried by men exactly like himself, poor, young, and strong. In the same way (*non aliter*) people point their fingers when they see Atlas (evidently a dwarf; cf. with edd. Juv. 8. 32) on a mule of comparable size or a black elephant carrying a Libyan of like colour. K.'s conjecture *minimum* for *similem* has no attraction of any sort.

p. 20: 7. 18. 13–14 'dic aliquid saltem clamosoque obstrepe cunno | et, si adeo muta es, disce uel inde loqui'. K. observes that *dic* and *disce* 'must surely be alternatives' and that *et* is an 'inappropriate join'; he, therefore, alters to *aut*. A similar error was made by Izaac and corrected by Housman,[3] who pointed out that '*disce uel inde loqui* is not "apprends à parler même par là" but "apprends au moins de là à parler"; and *et* is not "ou" but "et" '. It is *speech* that is asked for; the *et*-sentence introduces no alternative, but goes on to suggest a possible source of speech.

p. 20: 9. 39. 3–6 'hac (luce) et sancta mei genita est Caesonia Rufi: | plus debet matri nulla puella suae . . . .' K. thinks that Caesonia is Rufus' daughter and states that 'M. could not possibly have used *puella* if he had Rufus' wife in mind'. *puella* is in fact sometimes used of a young wife (see exx. in L. and S.); it is so used in a nearby epigram, viz. 66. 1 'uxor cum tibi sit formosa, pudica, puella'. The reference to R. as *maritus* in 5 indicates that C. is his wife.

p. 20: 9. 90. 6. If M. could write *frontem rubens* (K.), he could certainly write *frontem ruber* (codd.).

p. 21: 10. 11. 5–6 ' "donaui tamen" inquis "amico milia quinque | et lotam, ut multum, terue quaterue (Haupt for *-que -que*) togam" '. K. in approving the reading *lotam multum* (he preserves *-que -que*) not only adopts a punctuation (inverted commas closed after *quinque*, v. 6 regarded as said by M.) productive of most improbable language which spoils the epigram; he also fails to take into account the reading *ut multum*, an idiomatic expression which can represent no copyist's handiwork but must reflect the poet. This expression does not, as K. suggests, mean 'as a big gift' but 'at most'; Heraeus in his edition compares 14. 97. 2 'ut minimum' ('at least'), and cites Juv. 7. 187 'sestertia Quintiliano, | ut multum, duo sufficient', *Hist. Aug.* 26. 46. 4, and Vulg. 1 Cor. 14. 27 'duos, aut ut multum, tres' (τὸ πλεῖστον);[4] compare the classical *summum*, e.g. Cic. *Fam.* 2. 1. 1 'a te . . . bis terue summum . . . accepi',

---

[1] The passage is wrongly noted in the *Thes.* s.v. 2004. 75 under the substantival use = *socius, sodalis*, etc.; it is clear that *compare* corresponds to *similem*.

[2] *similis* is used precisely as in 12. 31. 6 'gerit similes candida turris aues', where *similes* can only mean that the birds are

candidae like the *turris* (not 'like to one another', as K. suggests).

[3] *Class. Rev.* xlv, 1931, p. 82.

[4] Mayor on Juv. loc. cit. adds Hieron. *Epist.* 133. 13. 3 'unum, aut ut multum, tres homunculos' and Leo *Serm.* 16. 4 'puella . . . ut multum decennis'.

Liv. 31. 42. 4. Haupt's correction -*ue* -*ue* seems necessary,[1] and the Latin accordingly means 'and a toga that has been washed three or four times at most'.

p. 21: 10. 47. 12 'quod sis esse uelis nihilque malis'. The expression *nihil malis* means, naturally enough, 'prefer no other lot' (Paley) and *malis* well balances *uelis*. We may compare Sen. *Epist.* 124. 24 'tunc beatum esse te iudica, . . . cum uisis, quae homines . . . optant . . . , nihil inueneris, non dico quod *malis*, sed quod *uelis*'. There is little to be said for *maius*.

p. 22: 10. 100. 5–6 'habeas licebit alterum pedem Ladae, | inepte, frustra crure ligneo curres'. No Roman could interpret *alter pes* as anything but 'one foot' and the suggested meaning 'the foot of a second Ladas' (where in any case *alterum* would be redundant) is out of the question. Translate: 'though one of your feet be like Ladas', it will be no use your trying to run, if you have a wooden leg' (i.e. the other leg).

p. 22: 11. 1. 3–4 'numquid Parthenium uidere? certe. | uadas et redeas ineuolutus', i.e. 'Going to see P.? No doubt you are. Then you can go and return unopened.' There is no case whatever for alteration either on the grounds of abruptness or of M.'s elsewhere failing to use *certe* in this very common sense.

p. 22: 11. 7. 13–14 'quanto tu melius, quotiens placet ire fututum, | quae uerum mauis dicere, Paula, uiro!' K. objects that this couplet 'makes nonsense of the rest of the poem' and would read *quae malis* 'i.e. *si tu malis* as at 100. 2–3 (and see Housman in *C.R.* xxxix, p. 203)'. (1) No parallel for such a usage is to be found in either place; in the passages referred to the subjunctive in the relative clause represents the apodosis of a suppressed protasis; *quae malis* = *si malis* would be something very different. (2) In what respect would Paula's position be improved, if she told her husband the truth? (3) M. is clearly contrasting what P. *actually* does with what an *altera moecha* might have done. (4) The meaning must be that in telling her husband that she was visiting Caesar at one or other of his villas P. was in fact telling the truth and that the *moechus* was none other than (the now deceased) Domitian. Note the ambiguity of 4 'iam stropha talis abit' and 5 'Penelopae licet esse tibi sub principe Nerua'. The point of the epigram comes characteristically as a surprise in the last couplet. Very different, it may be noted, was the poet's language in the emperor's lifetime, when (9. 6. 2) D. was hailed as 'pudice princeps'.

p. 23: 12. 61. 11 'frons haec stigmate non meo notanda est'. K. objects that '*haec* has to mean *that brow of yours*, which should be *ista*' and alters to *hoc*. The change is entirely groundless. The pronoun *hic* is sometimes used in reference to the second person, almost = *iste*, *tuus*, *uester* (see Schmalz–Hofm.[5] p. 476 and exx. in *Thes.* s.v. 2704. 35 ff.). Here *haec* is emphatic 'a brow like yours' as in Ov. *Epist.* 16. 191 'hanc faciem' (190 'talem formam'). That M. may not elsewhere so use *hic* is no proof that he does not use it here.

p. 24: 14. 30. 1–2 '(uenabula) excipient apros expectabuntque leones, | intrabunt ursos, sit modo firma manus'. I see nothing 'extraordinary' about *expectabunt* (attested indeed by Isidore)[2] nor can I believe that M. could perpetrate so insipid a repetition as *excipient . . . exceptabuntque*; it may be regarded as certain that he would employ a verb of different meaning in respect of each of the three beasts specified.   A. HUDSON-WILLIAMS

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.

[1] *terque quaterque* would suggest frequency; cf. Virg. *Aen.* 1. 94 'o terque quaterque beati'.

[2] *Orig.* 18. 7. 4 (referred to by Heraeus); he does not quote M.'s precise words and has *expectantque leones*.

PLATO AND THE *ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΓΕΝΗ* OF THE *SOPHIST*: A REINTERPRETATION[1]

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

IT is important to recognize that the problem dealt with by Plato in the central part of the *Sophist* (232 b–264 d) is one which arises from the use of certain Greek phrases, and has no necessary or direct connexion with metaphysics (although the solution of it which Plato offers has an important bearing on the defence of his own metaphysical theory against one particular kind of attack). We tend to obscure this fact if we use English terms such as 'Being', 'Reality', 'Existence', etc., in discussing the dialogue, and indeed make it almost impossible to understand what Plato is trying to do. It is the way in which the Greek terms ὄν and μὴ ὄν and other such terms are used by the 'sophists' which gives rise to the problem.

The nature of the problem with which the main part of the dialogue is to be concerned is clearly indicated in the prelude which precedes it. At 232 b the Eleatic Visitor draws Theaetetus' attention to the fifth definition of the sophist, which described him as a controversialist (ἀντιλογικός), as being one which was specially revealing and significant. This leads on to a discussion of the art of imitation in general (234 b), and this in turn to a discussion of the art of imitation by means of words (234 c)—an art which 'exhibits verbal images' (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα). The sophist is an imitator of τὰ ὄντα by means of words (235 a), but his verbal images are not exact copies (εἰκόνες) of their originals; they are distorted and deceptive ones (236 a, b), and by means of these φαντάσματα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις (234 e) he produces false δόξα in other people. Plainly, therefore, we are to be concerned with these deceptive sophistic verbal images; and hence we are well prepared when we first hear the main problem propounded at 237 c: 'To what may we apply this name, τὸ μὴ ὄν?' Τὸ μὴ ὄν is, of course, the most famous and most deceptive of all such sophistic verbal images; and appropriately enough this question arises immediately from the description of the sophist's art as the art of producing false δόξα; for false δόξα is a δόξα which δοξάζει τὸ μὴ ὄν. This phrase, owing to the Greek idiom, appears to indicate that, in judging falsely, an act of apprehension (δοξάζειν) is involved *whose object is described by the term* τὸ μὴ ὄν. And similarly with the phrase λέγειν τὸ μὴ ὄν. From these phrases, then, the question at once arises, 'To what can this *name* τὸ μὴ ὄν be applied?' In other words, 'What is the "thing" (πρᾶγμα) of which this name purports to be the verbal image?'

The 'sophists'[2] maintained that the 'thing' of which τὸ μὴ ὄν is the name, was, as that name seemed plainly to indicate, just nothing at all. In the dialogue this view is typified by Parmenides' dictum, οὐκ ἔστιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν; and it must be at once admitted that this view is not in itself unreasonable. It is not unreasonable to hold that the 'thing' corresponding to the name τὸ μὴ ὄν is just nothing. Doubtless the term was used quite seriously and genuinely by Parmenides in this sense. But it was seized upon by the 'sophists', who claimed this same

[1] I am indebted for much valuable criticism of this article to Professor R. Hackforth, who most kindly read two draft versions of it.

[2] I use the term 'sophists' in this article for convenience, to refer to those thinkers whose views Plato is controverting in the dialogue.

meaning
extension

(1) th
be
wh
23
(2) μ̀
it

In both
indicate

Plato
factory,
phrase τ
does con
what is
denoted
—Plato
noted by
question
that the
thus tak
menon t
question
ask in a

It is a
but whe
has thor
not indu
will hav
ignore)
stultify

The I
(in spite
(237 b).
find an
τὸ μὴ ὄν

Before
first clea
all as τ
taken. I
tice, and
since the
τὸ ὄν, th

[1] Plato
thing (e.g
to be 'not
existence'
p. 215; :
does not
he says it

4599.1/

meaning for it when used elsewhere than in its original context. Two such extensions concern us in the dialogue:

(1) the allegation that false judgement (and false statement) is impossible, because ψευδῆ δοξάζειν = τὸ μὴ ὅν δοξάζειν, and an act of judgement whose object is nothing is not an act of judgement at all (see *Sophist* 237 e);

(2) μὴ ὄν used as a description of any copy or representation, which, because it 'is not the real thing', can be described as οὐκ ὄν (240 b).

In both cases the point at issue is this: the *name* μὴ ὄν seems conclusively to indicate that no 'thing' comes into the picture at all.

Plato at the outset makes clear his belief that this sophistic view is unsatisfactory, by asserting (237 b) that in practice we do not hesitate to use the phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν, in spite of Parmenides' ban, and use it as though some 'thing' does come into the picture. Plato's project is to show what this 'thing' is, and what is the correct name for it.[1] Whereas the sophist claims that the 'thing' denoted by the name τὸ μὴ ὄν does not exist *at all*—that there is no such 'thing' —Plato will show that as a matter of fact it *is* just as much as the 'thing' denoted by the name τὸ ὄν (cf. 258 b, c), viz. that it *is other than* the latter. No question of comparative 'degrees of reality' is involved; merely the establishing that there *is* a 'thing', against the sophistic assertion that there is none. Plato thus takes everyday practice—the use of the phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν—as a 'phenomenon to be saved'; and, as the Eleatic Visitor says (237 b, c), 'We will put the question, not for the sake of contentiousness or for frivolous purposes, but will ask in all seriousness, To what ought this name, τὸ μὴ ὄν, to be applied?'

It is a long time before we get the answer to this question (not until 257–8); but when we do get it, it is a serious answer, in the sense that by then the E.V. has thoroughly investigated what is involved in the phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν, and has not indulged in superficial and showy antilogies as the eristics do. By then he will have shown that the eristics have never investigated (or have chosen to ignore) what the phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν really involves, and have used it either to stultify discussion or to produce confusion in untrained minds.

The E.V. opens the discussion, as already mentioned, by emphasizing that (in spite of Parmenides) 'we do not hesitate to utter the phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν' (237 b). There is thus a *prima facie* case for thinking that we shall be able to find an answer to the question (237 c), 'To what ought we to apply this name, τὸ μὴ ὄν?'

Before he can begin to produce his answer to this question, the E.V. must first clear out of the way the 'Parmenidean' view that there is no such thing at all as τὸ μὴ ὄν, for so long as this view holds the field no further step can be taken. He therefore shows first that this view is contradicted in current practice, and that we do in fact speak as if τὸ μὴ ὄν had some meaning. Secondly, since the meaning of τὸ μὴ ὄν cannot be properly considered apart from that of τὸ ὄν, the E.V. must review the various conflicting views which are held about

---

[1] Plato's project is not to show how something (e.g. an image) admitted by the sophist to be 'not wholly real' can have 'some sort of existence' (Professor Cornford's view, *P.T.K.*, p. 215; see also p. 39 below). The sophist does not admit that it is 'not wholly real'; he says it is 'wholly unreal'. Plato's argument is *ad sophistas*; his purpose is to show that if the 'thing' denoted by their τὸ ὄν is, then the 'thing' denoted by their τὸ μὴ ὄν is just as much. Professor Cornford's error is due to his supposing that the 'images' dealt with in the *Sophist* are explicitly 'particulars' as contrasted with Forms; see p. 39 below.

the meaning of τὸ ὄν. He and Theaetetus will find themselves more than once brought into a state of 'perplexity'; but, as often, this is a necessary prelude to the production of the answer to the question.

First Attack on the Problem

The E.V. therefore begins by taking as an ὑπόθεσις 'Parmenides'' view that τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι, that τὸ μὴ ὄν has nothing to do with τὸ ὄν or ὄντα of any kind, and tests it to see whether it will work. He considers τὸ μὴ ὄν in three aspects:

(1) simply as a term, i.e. the actual phrase τὸ μὴ ὄν, apart altogether from its use as a name for copies, etc., or as the object of the verb δοξάζειν, etc.;
(2) as used to describe copies, reflections, images, etc.;
(3) as used in the phrase δοξάζειν τὸ μὴ ὄν, which was the immediate source of the problem's formulation in the dialogue.

In all these three cases the result is the same: Contrary to Parmenides' dictum, we find that τὸ μὴ ὄν cannot be kept separate from τὸ ὄν; we are 'constantly being forced to attach τὸ ὄν to τὸ μὴ ὄν' (241 a, b). These passages must be considered in detail.

(1) The three ἀπορίαι

The first examination consists of a series of three ἀπορίαι, as the E.V. calls them, in order of increasing magnitude.

(i) *First ἀπορία* (237 c ff.). Of course, says the E.V., we may not 'apply' (ἐπιφέρειν) the name τὸ μὴ ὄν to any one of the ὄντα. Indeed, it would seem to follow that whoever attempts to utter τὸ μὴ ὄν is not even saying or referring to anything, is talking nonsense. So far it looks as if Parmenides were right.

(ii) An even *greater ἀπορία* follows (238 a ff.). We may not say that any of τὰ ὄντα προσγίγνεται τῷ μὴ ὄντι—e.g. number, which is one of the ὄντα. But in order to be able to mention τὸ μὴ ὄν we have to speak of it as either singular or plural—i.e. we have to apply number to it; we cannot speak of it all by itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό). Yet in applying number to it we are applying τὸ ὄν to it, for number is one of the ὄντα. And as we have just agreed that τὸ ὄν must *not* be applied to τὸ μὴ ὄν, it would appear to follow that τὸ μὴ ὄν must be unutterable, etc. Again Parmenides seems to be right.

(iii) There is, however, a *third ἀπορία*, the greatest of all (238 d ff.). Even in attempting to refute τὸ μὴ ὄν we are forced into self-contradiction. (a) We said just now (in the second ἀπορία) that τὸ μὴ ὄν could not partake of unity and plurality; but all through we have been using the word τό (implying unity) in speaking of it. And further (b), in affirming τὸ μὴ ὄν ἄφθεγκτον εἶναι, etc., we have been attempting to 'attach' εἶναι to it. This of course vitiates our statements at the root.

At this point (239 b) the E.V. professes to feel himself beaten; he cannot demonstrate the 'orthology' about τὸ μὴ ὄν. This confession of failure is, of course, ironical, for ultimately, as we know, he will succeed in the demonstration. He will show that we *can* utter τὸ μὴ ὄν, and what we can correctly say of it.

Remarks on the ἀπορίαι

(a) It will be noticed that neither of the terms ὄν and μὴ ὄν is explained. At this stage the E.V. is working with these terms undefined and uninvestigated, i.e. as they figure in sophistic arguments. Furthermore, no justification is

offered either (A) for the statement in the first ἀπορία that τὸ μὴ ὄν cannot be attached to any one of the ὄντα, or (B) for the statement in the second ἀπορία that none of the ὄντα can be attached to τὸ μὴ ὄν. Both statements are put forward as self-evident; and at first sight, of course, they appear plausible enough —so long as the terms are considered merely as terms, without reference to what they really mean.

Both statements, however, are reversed later in the dialogue: (A) at 256 e, where the E.V. concludes that there is μὴ ὄν κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη, and (B) at 258 b, where the E.V. shows that τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἔστι; τὸ ὄν does 'attach' to it, it *can* be uttered, etc.

(*b*) In the first ἀπορία no supporting illustration is quoted. The statement (B) in the second ἀπορία seems at first sight to be merely the complementary of that in the first, (A). But there is going to be a sting in it, for this time the E.V. takes an example to illustrate his statement, and the example which he chooses of our being unable to 'apply' any ὄν to τὸ μὴ ὄν is one which will cause embarrassment to Parmenides, viz. number, for not even Parmenides could avoid 'applying' singular or plural number to it.

(*c*) Another point to be noticed is that the E.V. says during the second ἀπορία, 'We cannot rightly speak or think of τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, all by itself', which in this context means, 'without attaching to it at least one ὄν, viz. number (singular or plural)'. Later in the dialogue we shall see how 'Parmenides' ' error lay precisely in conceiving of τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, but in a somewhat different sense, for, as the E.V. will show, τὸ μὴ ὄν is an incomplete term if used 'all by itself'; it must be expanded and completed into τὸ μὴ ὄν X, i.e. other *than X*, or (in the case of ψευδὴς λόγος) τὸ μὴ ὄν περί τινος, untrue *about somebody or something*. The alleged 'absolute' μὴ ὄν, in the sense of having nothing whatever attached to it, will very shortly be dismissed entirely from the dialogue as unworthy of serious consideration,[1] for even Parmenides, as the E.V. has already pointed out, cannot get on without applying number (one of the ὄντα) to it. The time has not yet come for the E.V. to introduce the corrected version of τὸ μὴ ὄν; but his use of the phrase αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό is as it were prophetic, and suggests the sort of correction of τὸ μὴ ὄν which will be fully developed later in the dialogue.

(*d*) It is sometimes held (e.g. by Professor Cornford, *P.T.K.*, p. 208) that in this ἀπορίαι passage (237 b–239 b) Plato is intending to *endorse* Parmenides' view that τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν οὐκ ἔστι, that it is unutterable, etc. This interpretation, however, hardly seems to accord with what actually occurs in the dialogue. Parmenides says we cannot utter it; the E.V. points out that not only do we utter it without hesitation, but also we attach τὸ ὄν to it—*and so does Parmenides*. If, therefore, Parmenides or anyone else holds a view about τὸ μὴ ὄν which

---

[1] It is dismissed at 241 d, after the view of τὸ μὴ ὄν as the contrary of τὸ ὄν has three times over been found to be unworkable (first in the present ἀπορίαι-passage, then in each of the two definition-passages). Later in the dialogue, at 258 e, towards the close of the main argument, the E.V. refers to the dismissal of this μὴ ὄν, when he says, 'Let no one then say of us that we have shown τὸ μὴ ὄν to be the contrary of τὸ ὄν and that we make bold to say that this *is*. As for any

contrary to τὸ ὄν, we have long ago said good-bye to the question *whether there is such a thing or not*.' He does not say, and he does not mean, that he has *endorsed* Parmenides' view that such a μὴ ὄν *is not*. He means that as such a μὴ ὄν cannot in fact avoid having τὸ ὄν attached to it in some way, it is a waste of time to attempt to deal with it. The only point worth discussing seriously is *how* τὸ μὴ ὄν has τὸ ὄν *attached to it*, i.e. how it ἔστι κατά τι.

denies the possibility of uttering it or of attaching τὸ ὄν to it, then in Plato's opinion such a view must be *wrong*. It goes against the facts and it contradicts itself. Parmenides does not know the 'orthology' about τὸ μὴ ὄν, but the E.V. in the course of the dialogue demonstrates it and shows exactly how Parmenides' view is wrong. To use phraseology that comes later in the dialogue, Parmenides' mistake lies in refusing to allow τὸ μὴ ὄν to 'combine'; whereas the E.V. shows that it does 'combine'. And even here, at the very outset, we find that in attempting to state Parmenides' own conclusions we are forced (241 a, b)—*and so is Parmenides*—to attach number (an ὄν) to it. After this comes the E.V.'s 'confession' that he is beaten. But actually he has already won the first round against Parmenides, by showing that Parmenides contradicts himself in attaching τὸ ὄν in the shape of number to τὸ μὴ ὄν. We can only maintain that Parmenides' view is being *endorsed* by Plato if, as Professor Cornford does (*P.T.K.*, p. 209), we belittle Parmenides' error in applying ' τό ', etc., to τὸ μὴ ὄν. As Plato draws special attention to this third ἀπορία by calling it the greatest of the three, it seems unlikely that he meant it to be thought unimportant, especially as it vitiates the conclusions of the two preceding ἀπορίαι, which were favourable to Parmenides. Besides, it would seem strange that if Plato wished to endorse Parmenides' view he should choose to point out that Parmenides himself cannot state his view without self-contradiction. The point Plato is making here, at the very start, is that even the originator of the ' τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστι ' view could not in his very reference to it avoid implying that it had some sort of 'being', viz. number. Plato is condemning, not endorsing, Parmenides.

(2) *and* (3) *Two 'definitions'*

The second and third examinations deal with two further cases in which it is impossible to avoid saying that τὸ μὴ ὄν *is*. The E.V. considers (2) a definition of εἴδωλον, (3) a definition of the art of the sophist.

(2) 239 d ff. *What is an* εἴδωλον? What do we mean by calling all 'images' by one name? We mean ἕτερον τοιοῦτον πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον. Now τὸ ἀληθινόν is ὄντως ὄν. But an image is not ἀληθινόν. And μὴ ἀληθινόν is ἐναντίον of the genuine thing. Thus μὴ ἀληθινόν = οὐκ ὄντως ὄν. The image is not really ὄν. Nevertheless, says Theaetetus, ἔστι γε μήν πως, for it really is an image. Τὸ μὴ ὄν does seem to be *connected together* in this curious way with τὸ ὄν. Again we have been forced to say that τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν. We cannot keep τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν apart. Again Parmenides' dictum will not work in practice.

(3) At 240 c ff. the E.V. considers a definition of *the art of the sophist*. It consists, we agree, in producing false δόξα; and false δόξα δοξάζει τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι—it δοξάζει τὰ μὴ ὄντα, certainly; *but*, it δοξάζει τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι. Similarly, false λόγος is a λόγος λέγων τά τε ὄντα μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι. Again we are forced to attach τὸ ὄν to τὸ μὴ ὄν, and again Parmenides' dictum will not work.

Remarks on these two passages

(*a*) It should be noticed how the E.V. 'proves' that the image is οὐκ ὄντως ὄν. The original article is ἀληθινόν; this word is then equated with ὄντως ὄν; and the image, not being the original article, must therefore be *called* (λέγεις) οὐκ ὄντως ὄν. The equating of ἀληθινόν with ὄντως ὄν might, with proper safeguards,

be legitimate; but here it is done arbitrarily and deliberately, expressly in order to be able to conclude that the image is οὐκ ὄντως ὄν. This sophistic 'proof' is really a matter of juggling with words; and I presume that an argument of this sort had actually been used by the 'sophists' against Plato's doctrine of Forms and particulars (the particulars being regarded as 'images' or copies of the 'genuine' Forms), though, of course, Plato does not say so here, and indeed the examples which he uses in formulating the argument would not be appropriate for such a purpose: here, in the *Sophist*, both the original article and the copy (e.g. the person and the statue of him) are physical objects. It is important to recognize that in this passage there is no explicit mention of an 'image' as a physical object considered by way of contrast with an intelligible object of which it is a copy (particular versus *Form*). The images here being discussed (see 239 d) are images in water and in mirrors, images made by the draughtsman and the sculptor. Their originals are physical objects. But if in this passage we were to substitute for the physical original a Platonic Form, then the precise terms of the argument as here stated from 240 a 7 onwards would fit the situation exactly and verbatim without any alteration whatsoever; and I presume that it was for this reason that Plato stated the argument in the way he did. Indeed, with this substitution, the original, being a Platonic Form, would be ὄντως ὄν *in Plato's sense*; and Plato's reply on behalf of the 'particular' would be just the reply that Theaetetus makes on behalf of the image—' ἀλλ' ἔστι γε μήν πως '. It is not until later in the dialogue (257 b) that this πως is evaluated; and the value then given to πως is sufficient to silence the sophist's argument against this sort of image or any other sort of image, including 'particulars'. The answer given by Plato in this dialogue does not profess to do more than this: to rescue 'images' from the sophist who would by a trick of language deprive them of any sort of 'being' out of hand.

(*b*) We must not, however, lose sight of what kind of image is the main and avowed concern of Plato in this dialogue. The sophist is not a maker of particular physical objects, considered as 'images' of Platonic Forms; nor is he even the maker of the sort of images (statues, reflections, etc.) under consideration in the definition passage. The sort of image made by the sophist has already been explicitly mentioned, at 234 c–e, viz. images in discourse (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα): he is an imitator of τὰ ὄντα by means of words (235 a).[1] Furthermore, these verbal images of his are distorted, deceptive ones (τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα, 234 e). Now his retort to a description of himself as a maker of deceptive images will be that a thing cannot 'appear' and yet 'not be' (236 c); a thing either is, or it is not; therefore, he will say, such deceptive images do not exist, and he cannot be accused of deceiving by means of them. Hence it will be appropriate, indeed necessary, for Plato to work on this level of λόγοι, to show that such deceptive verbal images can and do exist; for the sophist would quickly object if the demonstration were offered on some irrelevant level. It would be no refutation of the sophist to prove that deceptive (or exact) physical copies of Platonic Forms exist, or that Platonic Forms themselves exist, or that they participate in each other. We shall therefore not expect Plato to be concerned with his own doctrine of Forms in this dialogue, but with counterfeit and deceptive sophistic λόγοι; and of all sophistic 'verbal images'

---

[1] Cf. 233 d–234 a, where the 'all πράγματα' (called τὰ ὄντα 234 b, τὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργα 234 e) of which the sophist makes verbal copies are listed as 'you and me, animals, trees, plants, sea, sky, earth. gods, and everything else'.

there can be no doubt that the chief and most deceptive is τὸ μὴ ὄν itself, and the statement τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν.

The sophist, as we have seen, is an imitator of τὰ ὄντα by means of words. But this is true also of the dialectical philosopher. Hence the E.V. distinguishes two species of image-making: (1) that which makes copies correctly representing their originals, as well as (2) that which makes copies misrepresenting their originals. The sophist is the counterfeit of the true philosopher: they both deal in λόγοι, but whereas the philosopher takes care that his λόγοι correctly represent their originals (i.e. he is a maker of εἰκόνες, 236 a), the sophist has no serious concern with the actualities (τὰ πράγματα, τὰ ὄντα, τὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργα, 234 c–e), but only with words, and he does not care whether his λόγοι correctly represent the actualities or not (i.e. he is a maker of φαντάσματα, 236 b). Indeed, the sophist goes so far as to reverse the proper order altogether: he pretends that we can infer the nature of 'things' from words. According to him, the name τὸ μὴ ὄν must obviously lead us to infer the corresponding 'thing' μηδέν, 'just nothing at all'; hence, τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγειν (speaking falsely) = μηδὲν λέγειν (uttering nothing at all). The only alternative is τὸ ὂν λέγειν; hence there are no false statements, all statements are true. It is a plausible and apparently watertight argument. According to Plato, however, τὸ μὴ ὄν is a φάντασμα, a deceptive verbal image, because it gives us a wrong notion of the 'thing' which it purports to represent. Plato will therefore demonstrate this: he will show (a) that it is an incorrectly constructed λόγος, an incomplete term, a defective image, a φάντασμα, and how it can be turned into a satisfactory εἰκών; and (b) what the original 'thing' is which really corresponds to it and which it ought to represent. This is prepared for by the question, 'To what may we apply this name, τὸ μὴ ὄν?' (237 c). Plato's answer will be that for the φάντασμα ' τὸ μὴ ὄν ' we must substitute the εἰκών ' τὸ μὴ μέγα ' and so forth, and for the (alleged) thing 'just nothing at all' or μηδέν, we must substitute the (actual) thing ' ἕτερον τοῦ μεγάλου ' and so forth (see 257 b–e); and similarly in the case of false statements. Once this fundamental image, τὸ μὴ ὄν, has been exposed, the sophist will no longer be able to claim exemption from scrutiny for his other images on the ground that they either are not or else must be true 'because there is no such thing as falsity'. When we come to examine the two μέγιστα γένη, ταὐτόν and θάτερον, we shall find that they also are defective verbal φαντάσματα, constructed without reference to actual 'things', and of the same pattern as τὸ μὴ ὄν.

But this detailed answer belongs to a later stage of the dialogue. The sophist could, if he wished, attack the E.V. at once for positing images at all, without waiting for him to distinguish two classes of them, correct and misleading ones. He could face the E.V. at once with the Parmenidean dilemma: Any image either is, or it is not. If we say it is, then he will maintain it is true, and our case against him falls to the ground. If we accept his argument (e.g. as stated in 239 d ff.) that all images are not, because they are not their original, the 'real' thing, then again our case collapses. Plato therefore takes an early opportunity of raising this question of images in general (at 239 d ff.), and of indicating which of the two answers he will defend: he will controvert the sophistic position that the image is οὐκ ὄν (240 b) and maintain that it ἔστι πως (240 b 11). But this, if proved, would in a sense prove too much, for it would prove the same about φαντάσματα as about εἰκόνες. Plato will also have to prove a similar distinction between the two sorts of image, and show that as originals are to

images, so are εἰκόνες to φαντάσματα. In both cases it will, in a sense, be the contrast of εἶναι versus 'appearing and seeming', of ὄν versus μὴ ὄν; but, since the images concerned are verbal ones, the contrast becomes that of truth versus falsity. Plato therefore raises this question also, immediately after the εἴδωλον passage, at 240 c ff., and indicates which line he will take about it. These two parts of the problem have already been stated, in this order, by the E.V. at 236 e: τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας. As he puts it a few lines later (237 a): Without the assumption of τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι, there could not be falsity. The subsequent part of the dialogue fulfils this programme: (1) the E.V. substantiates his assertion that τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι πως, (2) he shows how there can be falsity—how it is possible λέγειν καὶ δοξάζειν τὸ μὴ ὄν.

(c) Thus the purpose of the two passages, about the 'image' and the content of false δόξα, is not (as Prof. Cornford supposes, *P.T.K.*, p. 212) to define these as possessing 'a less degree of reality' and thereby to raise the problem of 'how what is not wholly real and what is not true can have a sort of existence' (p. 214). No demonstration to this effect is, of course, given in the dialogue. The expectation that it would be given (p. 215) is due to supposing that 'images' here are represented as things that are *not wholly real*. The fact that the *physical* original of an image is (un-Platonically) described as ὄντως ὄν (249 b), and the later assertions (258 b) that τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἔστι, and that it is οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, should be sufficient to warn us against falling into this error. Plato is not concerned in the *Sophist* to expound the *nature* of the existence which belongs to particulars as contrasted with that which belongs to Forms; nor is he even concerned to expound the *nature* of the existence belonging to an image. The sophistic view denies that these have *any existence whatever*, because we *say* of them that they 'are not'. Plato is not concerned with degrees of reality, but with εἴδωλα ἐν λόγοις, and his task is to expose the verbal fallacy in the theory which alleges that when we *say* any 'thing' A *is not* B, C, or D, this is equivalent to *saying* that A is not at all, and which leaves us to infer that for this reason A does not exist in fact. It is a theory which pretends that from the mere use of certain words and phrases, however idiomatic (as e.g. in ' τὰ μὴ ὄντα λέγειν ') and however mutilated (as e.g. in 'an image is not [the original]'), we can infer the truth about 'things'. The theory is based upon an abuse of argument. And owing to the fact that the word ὄν is involved, the incautious reader is misled (as the sophists intended their hearers to be misled) into supposing that high matters of metaphysics are involved and into taking the sophists for learned metaphysicians. Plato's opponents here are not metaphysicians, but sophistical logic-choppers (ἀντι-λογικοί); and he is going to meet them and beat them on their own ground. He is going to prove in the field of λόγοι a principle (viz. that the phrase οὐκ ἔστι = ἕτερόν ἐστι, aliter, that τὸ μὴ ὄν = θάτερον) which the sophist will be forced to allow Plato to use in defending his own metaphysical theory from sophistical attacks directed against its verbal expression.

This proof will be effected by means of the terminology of 'participation'; but, however pertinent this terminology may be for Plato's own ulterior purposes, it is clear that in this part of the dialogue it has no reference to any *metaphysical* participation: it is merely a way of describing *statements* of attribution.[1]

---

[1] It is not necessary to decide whether κοινωνεῖν in this sense was part of the 'sophistic' terminology, or whether Plato has deliberately added it here beside the other

This is shown also by the various alternative descriptions which Plato here uses for it; and above all by his incessant use of verbs of *saying*. Λόγοι—that is the level on which the sophist works; and Plato must meet him on his own level.

Now in the ἀπορίαι-passage, and in both the definition-passages, the E.V. takes it for granted during his actual presentation of the argument that there is no third possibility other than ὄν and μὴ ὄν, i.e. other than ὄν and ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος. He is observing the Parmenidean rule which allows only for τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν as separate and rigidly opposed contraries, which have nothing in common with each other. 'None of the ὄντα can attach to τὸ μὴ ὄν' (238 a). The rule does not admit any 'combination' or 'participation' between them. Thus, in the three ἀπορίαι we have the rigid contraries τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν, neither of which can have anything to do with the other. In the image-passage, τὸ μὴ ἀληθινόν is ἐναντίον of τὸ ἀληθινόν, giving the contraries ἀληθινόν)(μὴ ἀληθινόν, = ὄντως ὄν)(μὴ ὄν. In the false-δόξα passage, τὰ μὴ ὄντα are ἐναντία τοῖς οὖσιν. Parmenides offers us the two alternatives only: either ὄν or μὴ ὄν; there is no third choice. The E.V. and Theaetetus recognize that this situation is inescapable so long as they are bound by Parmenides' rules. But in each of the three cases they enter a protest and point out that in practice we do not observe these rules; we speak as though there were a third possibility, inasmuch as we are constantly *attaching* τὸ ὄν to τὸ μὴ ὄν. Contrary to the Parmenidean rules, we 'keep attempting' προσφέρειν (238 b), προστιθέναι (238 c), προσαρμόττειν (238 c), προσάπτειν (238 e) τὸ ὄν to τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Ultimately, of course, the Parmenidean view is rebutted, for the E.V. announces (257 b), that when we λέγωμεν τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον. But the matter needs careful handling before this conclusion can be reached.

Plato's first step will be to get the sophist to agree to an apparently harmless case of 'communion', 'mixing', 'combining' (just as the sophist often begins with an apparently unobjectionable instance), and it will be a case that involves not μὴ ὄν but ὄν merely, viz. the statement ' κίνησις ἔστιν '. The sophist cannot reasonably object to this statement. As the E.V. carefully points out in connexion with similar cases (cf. 250 b, 255 a, b), such a statement is not the *equating* or identifying of κίνησις and ὄν (to which the sophist might reasonably object), but merely the *attaching* of ὄν to κίνησις—attaching ὄν to 'one of the ὄντα '; quite literally the word ἔστιν is *attached* to the word κίνησις. Thus the sophist will agree that κίνησις has some connexion with ὄν, has something in

---

alternative terms ('mixing', 'blending', etc.) —as he could quite justifiably have done— because of his ultimate aim of providing a defence of his own κοινωνία of particulars with Forms. In view of the widely varying uses to which the term κοινωνεῖν was put, it seems likely that it had in fact been used in this sense by the 'sophists' themselves. Quite apart from the regular Platonic usage in other dialogues (the relation of particulars with Forms) and the usage at *Soph.* 253 d, e, where it refers to the relation between γένη in Division as practised by the dialectical philosopher, we find it used of the relation between vocal sounds (253 a), of the relation of the body to γένεσις and the soul to οὐσία

(248 a), and of the association together of the physical constituents of foods (Hipp. π. ἀρχ. ἰητρικῆς, ch. 15); cf. also the parallel use of μετέχειν, e.g. of the relation of God to αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη in *Parm.* 134 c. The fundamental meaning of κοινωνεῖν is the assertion of some relationship between the things which 'participate'; what that relationship is depends upon the things concerned in it. Κοινωνεῖν therefore takes its colour from its context, as is actually pointed out by Professor Cornford in his note on *Soph.* 248 a (*P.T.K.*, p. 239 n.). We must not assume that whenever Plato uses the term he means to imply some sort of *metaphysical* 'participation'.

common with it, participates in it. From this instance of connexion, combination, mixing, blending, or whatever we like to call it, Plato will lead the sophist on until he makes him admit that κίνησις and μὴ ὄν, and ultimately that ὄν and μὴ ὄν, have something in common, combine, or participate. 'Participation', even between apparent contraries, is thus the third possibility, which was missing from the Parmenidean scheme. Once the sophist has been forced to admit the validity of this principle, he will no longer be able to use his ' τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ' argument against *Platonic* 'participation', which, so far as its *verbal expression* is concerned, has hitherto been open to the sophist's attacks, as already indicated in paragraph (*a*) above.

(*d*) The word ἔτερον, which is to play an important part in the ultimate definition of τὸ μὴ ὄν, actually occurs in the passage about defining an 'image' (240 a 9); indeed, the definition there given contains all the ingredients required for constructing the correct definition of τὸ μὴ ὄν, viz. ἔτερον πρός τι. But the point is not taken up; instead, that which is 'other' is still assumed to be 'contrary' (τὸ μὴ ἀληθινόν is ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς, 240 b), as required by Parmenides' rules.

(*e*) Similarly, the definition of ψευδὴς λόγος at 240 e end (λέγων . . . τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι) is adopted later at 263 d 1, *with the necessary expansion*, as the correct definition—περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα . . . τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα . . . λόγος ψευδής. But at 240 e no indication is given of how the definition needs correction.

REJECTION OF THE 'PARMENIDEAN' RULE

Thus in these three passages, the ἀπορίαι and the two definition-passages, the E.V. is taking examples to show that the Parmenidean view of rigid incompatibility between τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν, the view that τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, is unworkable. We cannot in practice avoid 'attaching' τὸ ὄν to τὸ μὴ ὄν: the two are inextricably interwoven (240 c). The E.V. is therefore justified at this point, without further ado, in claiming that Parmenides' argument must be thrown over (241 d ff.). The first part of his task is completed: he has shown that ' τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ' will not work. But he still has to demonstrate that τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι κατά τι (241 d), and to explain how. For the present, however, this second part of the task is deferred, until some of the difficulties involved in τὸ ὄν have been reviewed, for the meaning of this phrase is 'no less puzzling' than that of τὸ μὴ ὄν (250 e).

INTERLUDE

At 241 c ff. the E.V. asks three 'favours' of Theaetetus. (1) 'Will you be indulgent if we try to free ourselves, even to a slight extent, from so strong an argument?' Th. agrees. (2) 'Please do not think me a sort of parricide if I put Parmenides' argument to the test, and establish in self-defence by main force in the teeth of that argument that τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι κατά τι.' Th. agrees. (3) The E.V. again refers to his 'distress' at having had so often before, and also now, to give up the contest. He asks yet a third favour. 'I fear, after you have heard all this, that you may think me feeble-minded, *shifting my position to and fro at every turn*' (παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω). Th. replies, 'Have no fear. I shall never consider you are making a *faux pas*, if you embark on this refutation and demonstration, so *go ahead with confidence*.'[1] Why does Plato insert this

[1] Incidentally, Theaetetus has already once before given the E.V. carte blanche, at 237 b, although there seems to be little need for it, since at 236 d the E.V. had to say to

third request and answer? It must be in order to indicate that the E.V. means to go on shifting his position in the succeeding discussion; as in fact he does. He is going to show exactly how sophistic arguments are managed, *'pulling the argument first this way and then that'* (as he describes the method at 259 c after he has exposed it).

242 b ff. Discussion of τὸ μὴ ὄν is now discontinued. Enough has been said to show that Parmenides' view is unworkable. But we must also realize that we are just as much in the dark about τὸ ὄν as we are about τὸ μὴ ὄν, although we fondly thought that we were quite clear about τὸ ὄν. The examination of the various views about τὸ ὄν which follows is of great intrinsic interest. But its purpose in the dialogue is to produce a state of 'perplexity' about τὸ ὄν. And, indeed, no final answer is produced to the question, 'What is meant by τὸ ὄν?', for, as Professor Cornford remarks, at 249 d the question is still considered to remain unanswered. Formally, it remains unanswered throughout the dialogue. But the E.V. makes a significant remark at 250 e; he says, 'Since both τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν are equally perplexing, perhaps any light thrown upon one of them will illuminate the other equally.' We shall be left to deduce for ourselves at the end of the argument what is intended by this. Meanwhile we cannot expect an answer about τὸ ὄν. We shall, instead, expect to find the E.V. working with τὸ ὄν as an undefined term.

So far the trend of the discussion has led us to expect a demonstration that τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, in order to show that there can be such things as sophistic verbal images, and that they can be deceptive. *Vis-à-vis* the sophist himself, the most convincing way of doing this is to show that his own terms contain their own refutation; and as a matter of fact this is precisely what the E.V. does. We should hardly expect Plato to attempt to convince the sophist by parading an argument based on the Platonic doctrine of Forms; and if we examine the credentials of the γένη or 'Forms' dealt with in the main discussion it will be patent that they cannot possibly be Platonic.

INTRODUCTION OF THE FIRST THREE γένη

The first two of the five γένη to appear (though they are not yet called γένη or εἴδη) are Motion and Rest. They first appear during the important discussion (248 a–254 d) which immediately precedes the central argument of the dialogue. (I prefer not to reckon the entry of τὸ ὄν as preceding that of Motion and Rest, owing to the shiftiness of its meaning during the long examination of the views of other philosophers about it. Later, it emerges as a third factor in which Motion and Rest 'partake'.)

This important passage, then, includes the following items, which we will examine in turn:

(1) the first introduction of Motion and Rest (248 e and 249 b);

him, 'You say "Yes", but have you thought what you are saying, or has some sort of momentum swept you on, through force of habit of the argument, into saying "Yes" straight away?' In fact Theaetetus offers no resistance or criticism to the E.V. throughout. He is playing almost too well the role assigned to him at the outset, when the E.V. said he wanted a respondent who would 'not make a nuisance of himself' and would be 'obedient to the rein' (ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως, 217 d),

and Socrates undertook that this should be so—'Choose any one of us you like; they will all make their responses to you quite meekly (πράως)'. I draw attention to these passages in order to forestall a possible objection to my interpretation on the ground that Theaetetus as an intelligent person ought to have complained of the E.V.'s behaviour in those parts of the argument where, as I claim, he is imitating the 'sophistic' methods.

(2) the introduction of τὸ ὄν as a third factor (250 b);

(3) the first introduction of the term γένη as applied to these factors in the dialogue (253 b);

(4) the description of the art of the true philosopher (253 b ff.);

(5) the announcement that we are not going to look for the true philosopher, but for the sophist (254 b).

First, how do Motion and Rest make their entry? They slip into the discussion almost by the way, in the course of the argument against the Friends of Forms (248 e). The E.V. asks, 'Can we without demur agree that Motion, life, soul, and intelligence are not present to that which fully is (παρεῖναι τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι)? We cannot.' But when the conclusion of this piece of argument is stated (at 249 b), it is put in this form: καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα; and this is shortly afterwards (249 b) restated as ἐὰν αὖ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντα εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν. But if we admit that all things are in motion we shall have to exclude intelligence from the class of ὄντα, because unless there is something that abides constant and unchanging there can be no intelligence; and this makes it necessary to posit Rest. Hence, at 249 d, the conclusion is stated thus: The philosopher will be forced ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν συναμφότερα λέγειν.

Thus the language is continually shifting. First (A), Motion is something which must be present to τὸ ὄν. Next (B), both Motion *and* τὸ κινούμενον are stated to be ὄντα. Then (C), the philosopher 'is forced to assert that τὸ ὄν and τὸ πᾶν are all ἀκίνητα and all κεκινημένα, both taken together'. The relationship between Motion and τὸ ὄν keeps shifting. Furthermore, the term used is at one time κίνησις, then it is τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κίνησις, then κινούμενα, then κεκινημένα. We do not know whether these are intended to be regarded as equivalents or not. Moreover, after this passage we hear no more of τὸ κινούμενον and κεκινημένα; only κίνησις is mentioned. And it is statement (B) quoted above which is then taken up (250 a): 'Motion and Rest, you say, both and each *are* (εἶναι).' And out of this assertion a third factor is set up beside them, viz. τὸ ὄν; while the statement (C) is flatly contradicted at 250 c, where it is categorically stated οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ ξυναμφότερον τὸ ὄν ἀλλ' ἕτερον δή τι τούτων; and further, that 'in its own nature' τὸ ὄν neither moves nor rests. The status of Rest also is obscure. Without it, τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτό could not γενέσθαι (249 b), but this relationship is not explained.

All this, as well as the long discussion about different views on τὸ ὄν which has preceded, is rightly described by the E.V. as leading to a state of 'perplexity' about τὸ ὄν (250 e). And it has been brought about deliberately by the E.V. himself. We do not know where we are with τὸ ὄν. He might have said the same about Motion and Rest. Which of the three statements (A), (B), and (C) are we to take as authoritative, if any? And what precisely are Motion and Rest? It is never made clear. Are they Platonic Forms, in which particulars participate? Or are they collective terms, denoting respectively all κινούμενα and all ἑστηκότα? We are never told. But we can guess. They come from the list of contrary terms that had figured in Zeno's dilemmas, mentioned at *Parmenides* 129 d, as is pointed out by Professor Cornford (*P.T.K.*, p. 277), though he does not seem to notice the significance of this fact. They were part of the regular eristic equipment of the 'sophist', and therefore we need not be surprised if their

meaning and status are obscure. The E.V. is working, as we expected he would, with the sophist's own terminology.

It is in such a welter of confusion that the terms Motion and Rest make their first appearance; and this appearance occurs in close connexion with τὸ ὄν, which also so far has been shifty in the extreme. But in spite of this, the three of them persist throughout the succeeding argument. Henceforward statement (A) is dropped: we hear no more of Motion (or Rest) being present to τὸ ὄν, but we now hear of οὐσία being *attached by us* (251 d) to Motion and Rest, and of Motion and Rest participating (251 e) and communicating (252 a) in it. Furthermore, when we come to the opening of the main discussion (254 d), we find that Motion and Rest still hold the field, and τὸ ὄν is said to be μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν.

So much for two of the leading dramatis personae. We now come to the third, τὸ ὄν (οὐσία). After the long passage which has drawn attention to the variety of conflicting views about τὸ ὄν, and has produced 'perplexity' on the subject, it is more than a little surprising to find the view which was expressed at 250 a–c ('when we assert both Motion and Rest *to be*, this involves us in the assumption of a third factor beside them, in which they both communicate, viz. τὸ ὄν '), reiterated at 252 a ('neither Motion nor Rest will *be* unless they partake of οὐσία '), and even more surprising when we find the same put forward again at 254 d and used there as the opening gambit of the main argument: here again τὸ ὄν is a third factor (now called a γένος) beside Motion and Rest, μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν. Such a view of τὸ ὄν as a third thing was one which (as we thought) had been condemned as far back as 243 d–e. But it persists, and is placed in a key position at the opening of the main argument. After having spent 242 c–250 d in an elaborate exposition of the obscurities surrounding the nature of τὸ ὄν, this glib propounding of τὸ ὄν as a third γένος by the E.V. without any clear and careful statement of what is meant by it, is certainly unexpected; but it is equally certain that it must have been deliberately done by Plato. In face of this, it is impossible to believe that Plato is putting forward this τὸ ὄν as an εἶδος which belongs to his own philosophic scheme; in fact, he could hardly have made it clearer that it does not.

At 252 e it is agreed that some, though not all, the factors (such as Rest, Motion, Being) will 'mix'; there must be some commixture, at any rate. The E.V. then quotes the parallels of letters of the alphabet (some of which 'fit together', others do not) and musical sounds (some of which 'mix' with each other, others do not). And we need a τέχνη to tell us which are able κοινωνεῖν in both cases. Now we have agreed, he says, that the γένη, too, stand in the same case with regard to mutual 'mixture', and we need an ἐπιστήμη—perhaps the greatest ἐπιστήμη of all—to tell us which γένη 'sound well' (συμφωνεῖ) with each other and which do not 'receive' (δέχεται) each other. It should be noticed that these two examples are not chosen at random; they are examples of sounds which can rightly follow each other in close succession. Not only are they appropriate metaphors to illustrate the work of Division according to γένη as practised by the true philosopher,[1] which the E.V. is going to describe 253 b–e; but also they apply even more literally to the practices of the 'sophist' which the E.V. is going on to deal with in the subsequent part of the dialogue, for there blending, mixing, participation, etc., will mean simply that the two

[1] Incidentally it may be noted that at the beginning of the attempts to define the sophist (218 d), the *definiendum* is described as τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος.

γένη concerned can 'go together' *in speech*, e.g. 'Motion is', as opposed to 'Motion rests'—the latter being an instance of two γένη which will not 'blend'.

This is the first occasion in the dialogue that the term γένη, or indeed any noun, is applied to Motion, Rest, and Being. And here it is slipped in unobtrusively. It occurs, too, at an interesting point. It immediately precedes the E.V.'s remarks about the business of the philosopher and his art, Dialectic. This ἐπιστήμη determines which γένη are concordant with each other. So far it coincides with what has been said just before. But the business of Dialectic includes something beyond this. Its business is also to make divisions κατὰ γένη and not to think the same εἶδος is another or that another is the same one (253 d). The man who can do this rightly will discern one ἰδέα διὰ πολλῶν, etc. To know how to divide κατὰ γένος, to know in what way the γένη can or cannot severally κοινωνεῖν—this is the business of the true philosopher. And that is the place where we shall find him, now or later, if we look for him. *But we are not going to do that now* (254 b); we must keep up our pursuit of the sophist; and he is not to be found in the brightness of τὸ ὄν, but in the dark region of τὸ μὴ ὄν. And almost immediately the E.V. proceeds to initiate the main argument which leads ultimately to the identification of τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Again there could hardly be a clearer way of indicating that in the discussion which is now to follow we are not to be concerned with the λόγοι of the true philosopher but with those of the sophist. But in case we have missed this warning, before he begins the E.V. gives another (254 c): 'Though we may not be able to grasp τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν with perfect precision, still we may at any rate give as satisfactory an account of them *as the nature of our present inquiry admits.*' Even without these plain words from the E.V. we should by now hardly expect the argument which follows to be dealing with the doctrines of the true philosopher, i.e. with the Forms, since we know that its theme is to be the investigation of the sophistic τὸ μὴ ὄν. But why does the E.V. give such a detailed description of the art of the true philosopher at this point? It must be to draw attention to the closeness with which, within certain limits, the art of the sophist parodies it. The sophist's is a false art, as we have seen; but furthermore, as we shall see, it is an art which we might describe in Plato's phrase as *purporting* to make divisions κατὰ γένος, it *purports* to discern one ἰδέα διὰ πολλῶν, whereas actually the sophist fails to make correct divisions and sees one ἰδέα διὰ πολλῶν where there is in fact no such one ἰδέα. This will become abundantly clear in the examination which the E.V. conducts. Plato, using the sophist's terminology, will expose its falsity, and show *inter alia* that the sophist has been treating as separate γένη two of his (the sophist's) own γένη which are really one (viz. τὸ μὴ ὄν and θάτερον). The sophist is to be revealed as an incompetent divider κατὰ γένη.

We have already noticed the undefined status of Motion and Rest, and the abrupt and unquestioned acceptance of τὸ ὄν. At the very beginning of the main argument the E.V. says (254 b) that he will not consider all the εἴδη, but will choose certain of τὰ μέγιστα λεγόμενα (he does not say by whom λεγόμενα), and the three γένη already mentioned, viz. τὸ ὄν, Motion and Rest, qualify as μέγιστα τῶν γενῶν. (The meaning of μέγιστον is not explained.) It is then assumed, presumably on the strength of the two previous passages (250 a–c and 251 e–252 a), that these three are γένη, whatever that may mean, for a γένος is never defined. No further justification is offered. But the point made at

250 b that τὸ ὄν is a third factor beside the other two is again made here (254 d), as we have noticed.

INTRODUCTION OF TWO FURTHER γένη

The E.V. then proceeds at once to the establishment of ταὐτόν and θάτερον as two further independent γένη.

Ostensible establishment of ταὐτόν and θάτερον as γένη in their own right (a) beside Motion and Rest, and (b) beside τὸ ὄν

(a) The following are the stages in the 'proof   ταὐτόν and θάτερον must be two additional γένη beside Motion and Rest and not identical with either:

1. So far we have been working with three γένη only, Motion, Rest, and τὸ ὄν. The Visitor now says: αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν (254 d). This is the first introduction of 'other' and 'the same'; and here the two predicates appear in their complete form:

> 'is other *than the remaining two*'
> 'is the same *as itself*'.

2. The qualifying part of the predicate in each case is then dropped, giving

> 'is other'
> 'is the same',

and out of these two truncated statements the two further γένη are erected, known as ταὐτόν and θάτερον (254 d ff.).

3. It is next assumed that, as we thus *attribute in speech* both of these to Motion and Rest alike, we are making a common attribution (κοινῇ προσείπωμεν) of each of them to Motion and Rest,

> e.g. we say Rest is the same
> and we say Motion is the same.

4. Now neither Motion nor Rest can *be* anything which we thus attribute to both of them in common. For instance, suppose that Rest were identical with, in fact *were*, ταὐτόν, because we attribute 'the same' to it in speech. We make this attribution also to Motion. In that case, we should be saying that Rest moves and Motion rests, for if Rest were 'the same' and Motion were 'the same', then Rest would be Motion, and Rest would have been forced to *change into the contrary of its own nature*, because it would be partaking of its contrary. (This, of course, could be 'proved' just as well from the common attribution of 'other' to both Motion and Rest.)

Therefore, although we must not say that either Rest or Motion *is* 'the same' or 'other', yet they both '*partake of*' 'the same' and of 'other'.

5. Conclusion. Hence, 'the same' and 'other' are γένη distinct from Motion and Rest, in which Motion and Rest both partake.

Remarks on this passage.

The illegitimate step is taken in stage 2, where the qualifying part of the two predicates is quietly dropped. This is, of course, a regular eristic trick, well known to us from other dialogues of Plato. It is exactly parallel to the trick used by Dionysodorus in the *Euthydemus*, where he 'proves' that Ctesippus is the son of a dog (298 d, e) and that Cleinias' friends wish for his destruction (283 d), as follows:

(*a*) Ctesippus has a dog; the dog is Ctesippus'.

The dog is the father of puppies; the dog is a father. ('Of puppies' is
then omitted, and the two statements are put together to give:)
Therefore the dog is Ctesippus' father.

(*b*) Socrates and his friends wish Cleinias to become wise. He is not wise now,
but ignorant. Therefore, says Dion., βούλεσθε αὐτὸν ὃς νῦν ἐστὶν μηκέτι
εἶναι (283 d). And ὃς νῦν ἐστὶν μηκέτι εἶναι = ἀπολωλέναι. The 'proof'
has been effected by dropping the qualifying words ὃς νῦν ἐστίν, or else by
understanding them merely as a relative clause (i.e. either 'C. to be no
longer [the person he is now]' or, 'C., who is now, to be no longer').

The procedure of the E.V. is invalid in precisely the same way, because he is
deliberately working so far on precisely the same lines as the sophists. He is
showing how they construct their γένη. He drops the qualifying words in the
two statements

Motion is the same as itself, i.e. as Motion; } . . . { Motion is the same;
Rest is the same as itself, i.e. as Rest,   } giving: { Rest is the same,

and treats these as statements making a common attribution (viz. of 'the same')
to both Motion and Rest. There is, of course, no common attribution; the com-
mon attachment of the word ταὐτόν is obtained only by omitting the remainder
of the phrase in each case. The E.V. is demonstrating how the sophist
manages to see one ἰδέα where there is not one.

Having done this, the E.V. next makes the point that in such a case of
(alleged) common attribution, neither Motion nor Rest can *be* that which is
so attributed to them; the fact is, he says, that they both *partake of* what is thus
attributed to them. It is important to notice here how close the parallel is
between this procedure and that which is the foundation for the legitimate
establishment of a Platonic Form. We say

Socrates is δίκαιος,
Theaetetus is δίκαιος, and so forth.

This does not imply the identification (or the identity) of either S. or T., or any
other subject, with τὸ δίκαιον; that is a piece of childish or doting silliness which
we can dismiss from mind (cf. *Sophist* 251 b, c). It is, however, a legitimate
instance of common attribution, because no part of the statement is dropped in
either case. We may therefore legitimately posit a Form, named τὸ δίκαιον, and
say that S. and T. and the others 'partake of' it. Τὸ δίκαιον is thus a correct
verbal image, an εἰκών. The procedure of the E.V. is superficially an exact
replica of this,[1] except for the one illegitimate step, which renders the verbal
image ταὐτόν incorrect—it is a φάντασμα.

---

[1] We must also remember, of course, that
the sophist's factors (viz. verbal terms) are
all on one level, whereas Plato's own factors
(viz. physical particulars and immaterial
Forms) are on two levels. This, among other
reasons, is a strong justification for Plato in
having chosen Parmenides as the type of the
antagonists he is dealing with in this dia-
logue. Parmenides could work on one level
only at a time, as is shown by his poem, and
also by the sort of objection he is made to
raise against the particular-Form relation-
ship in the *Parmenides*: his objections assume
that only one level is involved, not two (and
therefore, of course, do not touch Plato's own
theory). Just as Parmenides supposed that
'thinking' was a correct index to 'being'
('Only that which can be thought can be'),
so the sophists supposed that 'saying' is a
correct index to 'being': we can deduce the
nature of 'things' (ὄντα) from words.

(b) (i) *'Proof' that ταὐτόν is a γένος in its own right beside τὸ ὄν*

The E.V. 'proves' that ταὐτόν cannot be one and identical with τὸ ὄν as follows:

> If there were no difference in meaning between τὸ ὄν and ταὐτόν, then, when we *say* Motion and Rest both *are*, we shall be speaking of them both as being the same. As this is obviously absurd, we must conclude that it is impossible for ταὐτόν and τὸ ὄν to *be* one and identical.

Here we notice:

1. Our manner of *speaking* of things is regarded as giving a correct representation of what those things *are*. The conclusion is stated thus: ταὐτόν and τὸ ὄν cannot *be* one and identical.
2. 'We shall be speaking of them both as being the same.' This is obviously intended to be understood, and is in fact understood, by Theaetetus to mean 'the same *as each other*'. But it cannot legitimately mean this. We have here a further example of interference with the predicate. First, 'the same as itself' was cut down to 'the same'; now, 'the same' is expanded by implication into 'the same as each other'. This is managed very adroitly by the E.V.: ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα προσεροῦμεν (255 b, end).

(b) (ii) *'Proof' that θάτερον is a γένος in its own right beside τὸ ὄν*

The E.V. 'proves' that θάτερον cannot be one and identical with τὸ ὄν as follows:

> Some ὄντα are *spoken of* (λέγεσθαι) as αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά; others always as πρὸς ἄλληλα. But θάτερον is always spoken of in the latter way, i.e. as πρὸς ἕτερον. In this respect it 'differs enormously' from τὸ ὄν, for τὸ ὄν 'partakes' of both εἴδη, viz. (1) of being spoken of as καθ' αὑτό and (2) of being spoken of as πρὸς ἄλλο. If θάτερον fell under (1) as well as under (2), we might one day find in the class of ἕτερα (τῶν ἑτέρων τι) some ἕτερον which was ἕτερον καθ' αὑτό and not ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον. But any ἕτερον is always of necessity ἑτέρου, or πρὸς ἕτερον. Therefore, because it differs so enormously in this respect from τὸ ὄν, θάτερον cannot be one and identical with τὸ ὄν, but must be stated to be a fifth εἶδος in its own right.

Here we notice the following points:

1. Τὸ καθ' αὑτό and τὸ πρὸς ἄλληλα (or πρὸς ἕτερον) are described as εἴδη, of which τὸ ὄν 'partakes' (255 d). Are we to infer from this (as Professor Cornford assumes, *P.T.K.*, pp. 256–7 and p. 281, n. 2) that Plato believed these were Forms?
2. What is the relation of 'the ὄντα' to 'τὸ ὄν'? What is meant by 'the class of ἕτερα'? and what is the relation of these ἕτερα to θάτερον?
3. Most important of all, we see that the E.V. chooses to establish that θάτερον is distinct from τὸ ὄν by pointing out that θάτερον is *of necessity* ἑτέρου or πρὸς ἕτερον. This is an excellent piece of irony on Plato's part, for this very fact makes it abundantly clear that θάτερον is an incomplete term, whose meaning varies from case to case. Θάτερον is *of necessity* θάτερον ⟨than X, or Y, or Z⟩. It has no constant value or content. It cannot therefore constitute a common attribute; and its establishment as an εἶδος is therefore as illegitimate as the similar establishment of

ταὐτόν. Both these γένη, θάτερον and ταὐτόν, are based on the same sophistic trick of suppressing an essential part of the attribution, and therefore are invalid.

The E.V. now proceeds to make some statements, which on examination we find to be founded entirely on verbal usage without regard to fact.

1. At 255 e he says: 'Each of them is other than the rest of them, not because of its own nature, but because it partakes of the ἰδέα of θάτερον.' This is obviously absurd. If each one has its own nature (as is said here, and has been previously said at 250 c 11 and 255 b 1), it must surely be its own nature which in fact makes it other than the rest. It is absurd to suppose that any γένος A cannot *be* other than a γένος B except by partaking in a third γένος C. Such assertions apply only to *speech*, not to 'things'. Κίνησις is not other *in speech* until we have tacked θάτερον on to it; that, and no more, is what is involved by 'partaking' of a γένος in this discussion. It would be equally, and even more obviously, absurd to assert that no γένος can *be* the same as itself in virtue of its own nature, but only in virtue of partaking of 'the same'. Otherwise, what could be meant by its 'own nature'? Further, why should partaking in θάτερον make it other than B, C, and D, but not other than itself? As the E.V. will soon remind us, the so-called γένος ' θάτερον ' in no case represents the complete attributions from which it is ostensibly derived. This kind of terminology, as we saw, purports to deduce the truth about 'things' from mere verbal usage; it deceives us with verbal φαντάσματα.

2. Similarly, at 256 a, the E.V. says, 'Motion *is* because it partakes of τὸ ὄν ' (a statement repeated from 252 a). This implies that Motion's 'own nature' counts for nothing. For what then could be meant by the name 'Motion'? Κίνησις would be a *vox nihili*. It is absurd to suppose that Motion cannot *be* unless it partakes in another γένος. Again, the fallacy is the same; it lies in assuming that modes of speech are necessarily a true index to 'things'. The argument is: We *say*, Motion is. This is taken as an attribution of 'being' to Motion, and Motion is then said to 'partake of' being. Thus, obviously, until 'being' is attached to 'Motion' (ἔστι to κίνησις), Motion cannot be. It is a merely verbal matter. (Plato himself avoids this sort of difficulty in his own system, because for him a Form is, e.g. αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι καλόν. 'Being' is part of the very nature of the Form, not another 'Form' which has to be 'partaken of'.)

SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF τὸ μὴ ὄν

Up to this point the E.V. has been reproducing perfectly the sophistic method. He has managed to slip in Motion and Rest, and then (without examination) τὸ ὄν; and he has elaborately 'proved' that ταὐτόν and θάτερον are two further γένη in the approved sophistic manner; and now finally he states some antilogies which appear to follow as a matter of course. This is the sort of demonstration which he describes later (at 259 d) as 'demonstrating that the same is other ἀμῆ γέ πῃ and that the other is the same'. Antilogies of this sort are not based on fair argument. They must be tackled firmly, and when anyone produces them we must cross-question him carefully and find out the manner in which (ἐκείνῃ) and the respect in which (κατ' ἐκεῖνο) he alleges these things to be so (259 d). And this is precisely what the E.V. proceeds to do at 256 a. He points out, what the sophist would carefully conceal, and what he has so far carefully concealed himself, that the terms used are equivocal

(256 a ff.). Taught by the sophist, we are led into saying Motion is the same, and also Motion is not the same. The sophist, of course, intends us to boggle at this. But we need not, and the E.V. shows why. We have merely to remember that such apparent antilogies result wholly from the suppression of part of the statements concerned; or, to put it more bluntly, from playing with words (παιδιά; see 234 a, 235 a). If we like, we can dignify the trick by saying that it is based on deliberately confusing statements of identity (e.g. Motion is 'the same'—an impossibility; therefore Motion is not 'the same') and statements of attribution (e.g. Motion is the same sc. as itself—'participation').

1. At 256 a the E.V. points out explicitly that in such cases we are using the words in different senses.

> We say (1) Motion is the same. This means, Motion is the same because it partakes of ταὐτὸν πρὸς ἑαυτήν (restoring the full phrase, suppressed since 254 b).
> We say (2) Motion is not the same. This means, Motion is not 'the same', because it communicates in 'other', and 'other' separates it off from 'the same' and makes it not that (ἐκεῖνο, = ταὐτόν) but other (ἕτερον).

All this, it will be noticed, is done while using the sophist's own terminology, for it is Plato's purpose to show that this terminology itself contains its own refutation so far as τὸ μὴ ὄν is concerned. The E.V. now proceeds to apply the same treatment to 'other' and to τὸ ὄν, and thus to show that we can say A is and A is not. It will be merely forcing the sophist to do with τὸ ὄν what he is fond of doing with 'the same' and 'other'. Τὸ ὄν, similarly, is equivocal.

The E.V. continues: Motion is other than 'other'; so it is not 'other' (identity), and at the same time it is other as partaking of 'other' (attribution). Also, Motion is other than τὸ ὄν; so it is really not ' ὄν ' (identity), and at the same time it is ὄν, because it partakes of ' τὸ ὄν ' (attribution). And this applies to all the γένη; μὴ ὄν is 'upon' (ἐπί, κατά) them all. We can rightly speak of them all as οὐκ ὄντα (strictly, of course, he should have said οὐκ ὄν; but this is a minor sophistic licence), and also — because they partake of τὸ ὄν—we can speak of them as εἶναι and ὄντα. Each of them is not (sc. identical with the remaining ones); at the same time each of them is (because it partakes of τὸ ὄν, i.e. 'being' (ἔστιν) is attached to it in speech).

(It is interesting to notice how the E.V. skates over the difficulty involved in saying that Motion is other than 'other' (256 c 9). He conceals the difficulty by pretending that the case is on all fours with the two cases already considered. 'Motion is other than other, *just as* it was ἄλλο than the same and than Rest; so κατὰ τὸν νῦν δὴ λόγον it is οὐχ ἕτερόν πη *and* ἕτερον.'

First, then, how was Motion 'other than Rest'? We find the statement that it is 'other than Rest' at 255 e 13 ' κίνησις, ὡς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἕτερον στάσεως'. This, as seems also to be implied previously at 254 d 11, might be thought to be self-evident, on the ground that Motion is 'of its own nature' other than Rest; but as this statement comes immediately after the statement at 255 e 4 ff. to the effect that 'each one is ἕτερον than the remainder not because of its own nature but διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου ', we must suppose that the E.V. intends this rule to apply even to the case of Motion being other than Rest—i.e. that it is other than Rest not because of its own nature but because of partaking of the Form of 'other'.

Secondly, how was Motion 'other than ταὐτόν'? At 256 b 2 we read (as

quoted above) ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταὐτὸν (sc. τὴν κίνησιν εἴπωμεν), διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖ θατέρου, δι' ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' ἕτερον. Here the E.V. explicitly states that the reason why Motion is other than 'the same' is its 'communion in θάτερον'.

We thus get the following scheme:

(A) Motion is other than Rest
>   because it partakes of 'other' (than the remaining γένη).

(B) Motion is *the same* (i.e. the same as itself)
>   because it partakes of 'the same' (sc. towards itself);

Motion is *not the same* (i.e. is not 'the same')
>   because it partakes of 'other' (sc. than 'the same' and the remaining γένη).

On the same pattern we should get:

(C) Motion is *other* (i.e. than the remaining γένη)
>   because it partakes of 'other' (sc. than the remaining γένη);

Motion is *not other* (i.e. is not 'other')
>   because it partakes of 'other' (sc. than 'other' and the remaining γένη).

Thus Motion would be both *other* and *not other* for one and the same reason, viz. because of its participation in 'other'. Furthermore, it would actually be its participation in 'other' that made it other than 'other'. The E.V. therefore cleverly refrains from going into details on this subject, and contents himself with saying that Motion is other than other *just as* it was other than the same and other than Rest.)

2. It is now possible to show what is really meant by a statement such as κίνησις ἔστιν. At 257 the E.V. shows this in connexion with τὸ ὄν. He says, τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ὄν ἐκεῖνα (viz. Rest, Motion, etc.), on the one hand (*a*) is *itself*, one thing; on the other hand (*b*) is not all the other innumerable things. From this we see that just as 'Motion is other' is incomplete, and as 'Motion is not' is incomplete, so too 'Motion is' is incomplete, and should really be 'Motion is itself', i.e. 'Motion is Motion'. Thus, even with τὸ ὄν there is no common attribution, for τὸ ὄν, just like θάτερον, has a different content and value in each case. Like θάτερον and ταὐτόν, τὸ ὄν also is an invalid γένος.

3. Ultimately we come to the explicit identification of τὸ μὴ ὄν with θάτερον (257 b). When we say τὸ μὴ ὄν, we mean not the contrary of τὸ ὄν, but other than τὸ ὄν, ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος.

4. Having made this point, the E.V. proceeds immediately to fill in the missing words on both sides. Instead of speaking of ὄν and μὴ ὄν, he now speaks of μέγα and μὴ μέγα, καλόν and μὴ καλόν, etc., and points out explicitly that the *words which follow* μή and οὐ in each case are an essential part of the business (257 b, c). By μὴ ὄν we mean, not something which *is not at all*, but something which is merely other than some ὄν. Thus for the verbal φάντασμα ' τὸ μὴ ὄν ' and the (alleged) thing 'that which is not at all', we must substitute respectively the verbal εἰκών ' τὸ μὴ μέγα ' and the thing ' ἕτερον τοῦ μεγάλου ' and so forth.

In the whole of this demonstration, no terms are used other than those of the sophist's own stock-in-trade. The E.V., as we were told at the outset, is quite familiar with it; but instead of using it in order to parade antilogies, he shows what are the deficiencies and fallacies involved in it, and how it must be corrected. Above all, he shows that τὸ μὴ ὄν is no more the contrary of τὸ ὄν

than θάτερον is the contrary of τὸ ὄν, *aliter*, that when we say A οὐκ ἔστι B we no more deny A's existence than we do when we say A is ἕτερον than B. He shows that τὸ μὴ ὄν is a verbal φάντασμα. The sophist is exposed as a maker of false εἴδωλα; his art is the worst sort of counterfeiting, for it is the counterfeiting of Forms; it is a sort of εἰδωλοποιική, a parody (is not the word itself meant to suggest it?) of the true εἰδοποιική, the art of the dialectical philosopher. The sophist plays with words, with verbal 'images' which have no true correspondence to the things whose names they bear; indeed, the sophist does not really know what these names mean. Unlike Plato, the sophist is interested only in words, as Plato is careful to emphasize not only by his explicit statement to this effect at 240 a ff., but also and very strikingly by his *incessant use of verbs of* '*saying*' throughout the discussion. The sophist divorces words from things, and having done so feels himself at liberty to play about with them without reference to their true meanings. And although his μὴ ὄν gives us more trouble than his ὄν, the latter is just as much a deceptive 'image'.

In the final stage of the argument we notice that the E.V. introduces certain terms which are also used in the *Parmenides*. He speaks of the 'nature' of θάτερον being 'chopped up' and 'distributed into parts' among all the ὄντα. This is strange language to use of a 'Form', as Professor Cornford points out (*P.T.K.*, p. 293); but we cannot escape the difficulty of the language by saying that τὸ μὴ καλόν (a 'part' of θάτερον or τὸ μὴ ὄν) is 'part of the whole field of Forms which make up the Real; it is in fact the whole group of Forms that is separated off from, and contrasted with, the single Form, the Beautiful itself' (ibid.).

In the *Parmenides* (144 b) Parmenides says: ' ἡ οὐσία is distributed out into portions (νενέμηται) over all the many ὄντα . . . it is chopped up (κατακεκερμάτισται) ὡς οἷόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας '. Similarly, at 144 e, ' τὸ ἕν itself, κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, is many and infinite in number, for τὸ ἕν and οὐσία run an even pace with each other throughout. Thus, not only is τὸ ὂν ἕν many, but τὸ ἕν itself is διανενεμημένον by τὸ ὄν and must be many.' The purpose of this is to discredit τὸ ἕν by showing that it is many: it is 'chopped up' into many. It would appear that the purpose of the E.V. in the *Sophist* is the same. 'The nature of θάτερον has been shown κατακεκερματίσθαι . . . . The parts of the nature of θάτερον, which is one, have each their own name' (257 c). 'We showed the nature of θάτερον, οὖσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, and we made bold to say that each part of it set over against τὸ ὄν is precisely ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν ' (258 d, e). ' Τὸ μὴ ὄν was shown to be one of the γένη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον ' (260 b). A 'Form' which is chopped up into pieces is a strange candidate for the status of a Platonic Form. We are bound to infer that such a 'Form' has no proper nature or unity at all; the 'unity' of it disappears when it is chopped up. Indeed, we have been reminded already by the E.V. at 255 d that θάτερον 'all by itself' is meaningless: it must always be θάτερον πρὸς ἕτερον. (In other words, there is no Platonic Form θάτερον, no αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ θάτερον.) There is thus no true γένος ' θάτερον ' at all, but only 'parts' or 'pieces' of θάτερον—θάτερον than X, Y, Z, τὸ μὴ ὂν X, Y, Z. As the E.V. stated in the passage quoted above (258 e), it is *each part of* θάτερον that is set over against τὸ ὄν which is precisely ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

The positive results implied in the dialogue are these:

1. Plato's own Forms, unlike the sophist's γένη, are based upon true and

genuine common attributes, and their names are εἰκόνες, not φαντάσματα. The word correctly represents the 'thing'.

2. The three γένη which 'permeate' all the others, viz. ταὐτόν, θάτερον (τὸ μὴ ὄν), and τὸ ὄν, are defective in structure, and must be completed into ταὐτὸν πρὸς ἑαυτό, θάτερον πρός τι (τὸ μὴ ὄν Χ), and τὸ ὄν Χ—and then, of course, their alleged unity disappears in each case. We remember that the E.V. said that the two problems, that of τὸ ὄν and that of τὸ μὴ ὄν, were equally difficult, and that a solution to one might indicate a solution to the other. The solution is that, just as τὸ μὴ ὄν must really be τὸ μὴ ὄν Χ or Υ, so τὸ ὄν must really be τὸ ὄν Χ or Υ; and this is precisely the way of expressing a Platonic Form—ὃ ἔστιν Χ or Υ. Out of the sophist's own terminology, Plato has forced him to give support to the doctrine of Platonic Forms. Τὸ ὄν *simpliciter* is as empty of content as τὸ μὴ ὄν *simpliciter*. When the sophistic τὸ ὄν is corrected and completed, we find that the result is exactly the formula for a Platonic Form.

3. More generally, Plato has shown the error of setting up rigid contrarieties, such as τὸ ὄν versus τὸ μὴ ὄν, first formulated by Parmenides. In the following part of the dialogue he will show the error of the rigid antithesis, truth versus nonsense. In the former case we have the intermediary θάτερον τοῦ ὄντος Χ; in the latter, falsity (ψεῦδος), which is the thinking or saying of ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων περί τινος. This insertion of 'means' between extremes runs like a thread throughout Plato's work, and there is no need to quote examples here. But one application of the demonstration which he has effected in the *Sophist* has already been forecast above (pp. 37, 39), and must be mentioned again now. This demonstration enables Plato to defend the world of 'particulars' against the verbal attacks of the 'sophist'. He can admit that particulars are not ὄντα (which in *his* case will mean Platonic Forms), but he is not thereby forced into admitting that they are μὴ ὄντα in the sophistic sense, viz. as not existing at all, for he can now show that they are merely ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων; in the phrase of the *Republic* (5. 479 d), they roll about between pure ὄν and μὴ ὄν; they are 'means'. To this the sophist can now have no answer. Parmenides' view, that only τὸ ὄν can be, has been proved wrong. There can be such a thing as τὸ μὴ ὄν, not in the sense of the contrary or complete negation of τὸ ὄν—no one can say whether there is such a thing as that or not, and it does not matter (258 e–259 a)—but in the sense of 'other than τὸ-ὄν-this-or-that'. In the *Sophist* Plato has shown that the sophist's verbal images are deceptive φαντάσματα; he has also shown how they can be converted, not necessarily into the names of Platonic Forms (though this is sometimes possible), but at any rate into true and correct εἰκόνες. Although he has not been dealing directly with 'particulars', he has also shown that they too, considered as 'images', cannot be dismissed out of hand as 'unreal' by the verbal legerdemain of the sophist. They are re-semblances, more or less perfect, of 'real things', not identical with them, but not therefore unreal. And of course, for Plato, these ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων partake of τὰ ὄντα (the Forms) in the true sense of the term. Plato is now at liberty to expound, at his leisure, and free from captious verbal objections, what precisely the nature of their existence is (e.g. in the *Timaeus*).

FALSE ASSERTION AND FALSE THOUGHT

Now that the question of τὸ μὴ ὄν has been disposed of, the E.V. can go on to deal with the original question, How is it possible ψευδῆ λέγειν and ψευδῆ δοξάζειν? for ψευδὴς δόξα δοξάζει τὰ μὴ ὄντα (240 d 9), and ψευδὴς λόγος is

one which τὰ ὄντα λέγει μὴ εἶναι and τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι (240 e). In this early passage, of course, τὰ μὴ ὄντα are still equated with τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσιν (240 d 6); and so long as we allow the sophist to make this equation, to deny that there is any such thing as τὸ μὴ ὄν, we have to admit that ψεῦδος is impossible. But we have now forced him to agree that this equation cannot stand, and that τὸ μὴ ὂν μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος (260 d). He will have to admit their participation to this extent at any rate. But he may still contend that λόγος and δόξα do not 'partake of', do not admit of combination with, τὸ μὴ ὄν; in other words, that in spite of what has been shown, it is still impossible λέγειν and δοξάζειν τὸ μὴ ὄν. The E.V. has therefore to convince him that it is possible; and the line he takes will be similar to that which he has already taken, viz. to show that in such a phrase as λέγειν τὸ μὴ ὄν some essential qualifying words have been left out.

In order to prove his point, the E.V. has first to define what we mean by λέγειν; What is a λόγος? He shows (261 a–262 c, d) that, in order to produce a valid λόγος, at least a 'name' and a 'verb' are required: a λόγος must assert something *about* something or somebody; it cannot be *about* nothing at all or nobody at all. This point is repeated several times; and it is emphasized that both the true λόγος and the false λόγος, e.g. 'Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies', are *about* Theaetetus (περὶ ἐμοῦ, 263 a twice; περὶ σοῦ, 263 b thrice; 263 d once). Just as earlier the E.V. showed the absurdity of the notion of τὸ μὴ ὂν simpliciter, by showing the absurdity of the notion of 'other' unless it was other *than* something, so here he points out the absurdity of the notion of μὴ ὄν, in the sense of 'untrue', unless it is untrue *about* something. We saw before that μὴ ὄν must be μὴ ὂν X, other *than* X. So now, the action denoted by the verb must be *about* somebody or something. It cannot be αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό. In either case μὴ ὄν must have *reference to* something. Furthermore, the same applies to a true λόγος as to a false one: it, too, must be *about* some subject. When, therefore, we maintain that it is possible λέγειν τὰ μὴ ὄντα, we mean, it is possible, for example, to state *about* somebody τὰ-μὴ-ὄντα-about-him as though they were ὄντα-about-him. We agreed earlier, says the E.V. (at 263 b; he is referring to 256 e), that there were many ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον, and many οὐκ ὄντα. The false λόγος then, states *about* Theaetetus τὰ-μὴ-ὄντα-about-him as if they were ὄντα-about-him. It states what are other than ὄντα (i.e. other than true) *about him* as though they were ὄντα (i.e. true) *about him*. As the E.V. emphasizes once again in his final summing-up of the matter, Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα μέντοι . . . μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα . . . λόγος ψευδής (263 d).

The clear statement that the true λόγος, the λόγος which λέγει τὰ ὄντα, as well as the untrue λόγος which λέγει τὰ μὴ ὄντα, is περί τινος, confirms my interpretation of the earlier argument, viz. that just as τὸ μὴ ὄν is really τὸ μὴ ὂν X, so τὸ ὄν is really τὸ ὂν X.

We also see that the sophist has no more idea of what is meant by τὰ ὄντα λέγειν than he has of what is meant by τὰ μὴ ὄντα λέγειν. Similarly in the earlier discussion, he was as ignorant of the nature of τὸ ὄν as he was of the nature of τὸ μὴ ὄν. His mistake lay in being a 'separatist', in this sense: he would not allow μὴ ὄν to be joined with an ὄν, (e.g.) δίκαιον. He makes a similar mistake with regard to true and false λόγος; he thinks he can talk about λέγειν τὰ μὴ ὄντα and λέγειν τὰ ὄντα simpliciter, cutting them off from their term of reference, (e.g.) περὶ Θεαιτήτου. Both procedures are equally futile; and the sophist's attempt shows he is as ignorant of the nature of a λόγος as he was of the nature of a Form. In the *Sophist* Plato has given us a thoroughgoing demonstration of his

rejection of ὄν *simpliciter* as a philosophical concept: ὄν is not a Platonic Form. But when we allow those things to be joined together which the sophist had kept asunder, when we allow ὄν to be associated together with its proper term of reference, then we get a true Platonic Form, τὸ ὄν δίκαιον, ὃ ἔστι δίκαιον.

A Few Observations in Conclusion.

I. It is sometimes held that the remarks made by Socrates in the *Parmenides* (*Parm.* 129 b, d, e) lead us to expect a demonstration in a later dialogue that Forms can be 'mixed' together, and that such a demonstration is given in the *Sophist*. The passage in the *Parmenides* reads as follows: 'If anyone can prove that ὃ ἔστιν ἕν itself is many, or that τὰ πολλά are one, then I shall begin to be surprised. And so with all the others. If the γένη or εἴδη in themselves were to be shown to have these contrary characteristics, there would be good ground for surprise . . . . If someone were, first of all, to distinguish apart αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ εἴδη, e.g. likeness and unlikeness, plurality and unity, rest and motion, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, and then were to show that among themselves they are able to be mixed together and to be separated (συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι), then I should be very much surprised indeed.'

It is difficult to see that any such demonstration is given in the *Sophist*. (1) Even assuming that the εἴδη in the *Sophist* are εἴδη of the kind which Socrates has in mind in the *Parmenides*, we find that the only two which are mentioned both in the *Parmenides* passage and in the *Sophist* are Rest and Motion, and these are stated in the *Sophist* quite unmistakably *not* to 'mix' with each other. In fact they are the only pair which do not mix with each other; but it would seem to follow that any pairs of contraries of that sort would, according to the *Sophist*, be excluded from mutual 'commixture'. (2) It is not shown that πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα can 'mix'. Only τὸ ὄν, θάτερον (τὸ μὴ ὄν), and ταὐτόν can 'mix' with each other and with Rest and Motion and the other γένη. (3) It is not shown that any εἴδη whatever are able to be mixed *and* separated; only that certain γένη are *always* 'mixed' and that others are *always* separate and incapable of mutual 'commixture'.

II. At 259 c–d the Eleatic Visitor, in an important passage, sums up the demonstration which he has just given. He describes the futile sort of argument which he has been exposing, and the way in which it has been dealt with and corrected. He speaks of those who take delight in 'dragging the discussion now this way and now that'. What we have to do, he says, is 'to be able to criticize anyone who says that ἕτερον ὄν πῃ is ταὐτόν, and that ταὐτὸν ὄν is ἕτερον, by reasoning with him about *the way in which* (ἐκείνῃ, corresponding to πῃ above) and *the respect in which* (κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο) he says either of these is so. As for demonstrating that *in some unspecified way* (ἀμῇ γέ πῃ) ταὐτόν is ἕτερον and θάτερον is ταὐτόν, the great is small, and the like unlike, and to take delight in perpetually trotting out such contradictions in discussion, this is not genuine criticism, but a sign of philosophic adolescence.' This gives a precise and accurate diagnosis of the sophistic method, and also a precise and accurate description of the way in which the E.V. has dealt with it in the preceding pages. The 'sophist' deliberately omits to specify *how* ταὐτόν is ἕτερον, etc., and the E.V. ensures that he is forced to specify, to evaluate the πῃ in each case. And this applies not only to ταὐτόν and θάτερον which are mentioned here, but of course above all to τὸ μὴ ὄν, which the sophist uses αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτό, i.e. without specifying its reference; he says τὸ μὴ ὄν where he ought to say τὸ μὴ καλόν, etc. When the full particulars

of the reference of the term are supplied, the contradictions disappear. We might therefore go so far as to say that the demonstration to which Socrates referred in the *Parmenides*, in the passage quoted above, is just the sort of demonstration which the 'sophist' professes to give; but it is a sort of demonstration which is founded on fallacies, and is thoroughly and explicitly exposed by Plato in the *Sophist*. If the *Sophist* provides a sequel to Socrates' remarks in the *Parmenides*, it is one which shows such alleged 'demonstrations' to be valueless.

III. It is not easy to suppose that Plato thought the business of the true philosopher, as described at *Sophist* 253 d–e, consisted in spending his time on such verbal futilities as saying that Rest is not Motion, Motion is the same as itself, Motion is other than Being, etc. (Indeed, even in the discussion in the *Sophist*, the E.V. and Theaetetus require no 'high art' to see that Rest and Motion cannot 'mix'.) The difficulties caused by sophistic verbal conjuring must, of course, be overcome by the philosopher; but once they are overcome, the philosopher can go forward with his own proper work. It is indeed surprising that the view has ever been entertained that the business of the true philosopher, as described in *Sophist* 253 d–e, is illustrated by the argument about the μέγιστα γένη. The philosopher's work, as epitomized in the phrases κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι (253 d) and διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι (253 e), is surely much more closely represented by the making of 'Divisions', of which semi-serious examples are given in the earlier part of the dialogue, than by the discussion about the μέγιστα γένη. It is, of course, true that any such work of Division would be blocked at the outset so long as the τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν objection held the field; but once that objection is cleared away the course is open for the true dialectical philosopher to proceed with his work.

A. L. PECK

Christ's College, Cambridge

THE Athenian expedition led against Macedonia by Archestratos, son of Lykomedes, early in 432 was not diverted from its destination by the revolt of Poteidaia. Archestratos had received additional instructions to enforce the Poteidaia ultimatum if he could, but, this being already impossible, he continued with the real object of his mission, the attack on Perdikkas II of Macedon.[1] The widespread revolt among the Chalkidians had deprived the Athenians of the bases for this attack on which they might have reckoned, and Archestratos had at the outset to make good this loss by recapturing Therme, at the head of the gulf to which it gave its name. Therme, or Serme, had been a tributary member of the Delian League since 450/449:[2] it need not necessarily be said that it lay within Macedonia, as Poppo and Bergk inferred from Thucydides I. 61. 2, but it is at least likely that it lay on the boundary, as it was handed over to Perdikkas under the agreement of 431 (Thuc. 2. 29. 6).[3] However, that the Athenians could include in their Empire a city within Macedonian territory is shown from the position of Berge (tributary since 452/451), and is likely in other cases, e.g. Haison. From Therme, Archestratos moved on to Pydna, presumably by sea, and laid siege to it. Here he was joined by substantial reinforcements, while at the same time the situation in Chalkidike became increasingly embarrassing, so that a peace and a reinsurance alliance were seen by both sides to be 'imperative' (Thuc. I. 61. 3). When these had been concluded, the Athenians moved against Poteidaia.

Thucydides (I. 61. 4) describes this journey of Archestratos' force from Pydna to Poteidaia as follows (I give the text of the manuscripts): ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν . . . κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. In this passage the emendation of ἐπὶ Στρέψαν for ἐπιστρέψαντες, made by Pluygers (but suggested also by Donaldson), is now universally accepted, and I do not propose to discuss it further.[4] Strepsa is an uncertain

[1] That war with Macedonia had already been undertaken previous to the revolt of Poteidaia is apparent from Thuc. 1. 57. 2, and *I.G.* i². 296. For the latter see now *S.E.G.* x. 223, where the references to the considerable literature of recent years on the chronology of τὰ Ποτειδαιατικά are collected.

[2] Following the identification of the two in *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, vol. i (1939), Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, p. 546, with n. 3. This view was challenged by C. F. Edson, *Class. Phil.*, vol. xlii, 1947, pp. 100–4, and by Prof. A. W. Gomme, *Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. i, p. 214, but the identification is defended in *A.T.L.*, vol. iii (1950), pp. 220–1, n. 123.

[3] Thucydides says ἀποδοῦναι, which may mean 'hand back' or 'restore'; but that need imply no more than that Therme had been reckoned as part of the Macedonian realm

before it had joined the Delian League. However, the basic meaning of the word is 'to give what is due', and so here 'to hand over what Perdikkas was entitled to (under the covenant)'. The presence of Therme in the assessment of 421 indicates that Perdikkas' tenure was not at all certain.

[4] See Gomme, *Commentary*, i. 215–18, and the earlier edd. Its attractiveness as an emendation does not mean that it is necessarily right, and there are other plausible possibilities, one of the best of which is that Thucydides wrote ἐπὶ Στρέψαν ἐπιστρέψαντες, 'diverting (their journey) to Strepsa', mentioned in Shilleto's apparatus criticus. That ἐπιστρέψαντες is not used intransitively elsewhere in Thucydides constitutes no strong objection. It is in fact used transitively only twice. K. A. Laskaris, Φῶς εἰς τὸ Θουκυδίδειον Ἔρεβος (Athens, 1922), pp. 46–48,

site; Gomme considers that it should be placed to the south of Therme (*Commentary*, i. 217), and Edson (loc. cit.) is in agreement.[1] From there the Athenians went overland to Gigonos and so to Poteidaia. The real crux of the passage lies in the preceding name, the town which they reached before they came to Strepsa. This survives in our text as Beroia, and its identification has caused great difficulty. The Macedonian Beroia, which would naturally spring to the reader's mind, lies to the north-west of Pydna. An Athenian march to it would take them deeper into Macedonia, thus contradicting the emphatic ἀπανίστανται, which can only mean 'get up and quit'. Geyer[2] has attempted a defence of the manuscript text here on the grounds that the coast-line of the Thermaic Gulf at that point lay farther to the west in ancient times, so that the coast road from Pydna to Pallene would run by way of Beroia. He spoils this by retaining, or attempting to retain, κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες . . . τοῦ χωρίου; as Gomme points out, the Athenians had just made a treaty with Perdikkas, and it is nonsense to suppose that they would follow it up at once with the seizure of a Macedonian town. But his statement about the position of the Macedonian coastline may well be right,[3] and it would on this argument be feasible to retain Beroia with the emendation of ἐπὶ Στρέψαν for ἐπιστρέψαντες. The treaty undoubtedly provided for the immediate evacuation of Macedonia by Archestratos' troops, and may have guaranteed them a safe conduct by the overland route.

But Thucydides' emphasis on the fact that the Athenians finished the journey by land (ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν) leads one to assume that the earlier part of it was by sea. Further, Beroia and Strepsa are far apart to be linked together in this way simply as pointers to the route that Archestratos took. The assumption must be, therefore, that ἐς Βέροιαν is a textual corruption, or that there was another Beroia,[4] or that there has been a misplacement of the mention of Beroia.[5] Of these choices only the first has anything substantial to recommend

---

prefers ἀποστρέψαντες, for which cf. Thuc. 6. 65. 3.

[1] In *A.T.L.*, vol. i, pp. 550-1, it was located north-west of Therme, accepting that the Athenians went first to Macedonian Beroia (see below). This view is retained, against Gomme's criticisms, in vol. iii, p. 220, n. 122, and pp. 314-16, with nn. 62 and 64. However, this does not take into account the full force either of ἀπανίστανται or of κατὰ γῆν (see below). If the Athenians went by land they may well have had to go via Beroia, but the probabilities are that they did not take the land route. It would have been a slower process, and both sides, each for reasons of their own, were anxious that the Athenian expedition should leave Macedonia with all speed. The ships were there to hand, and there is nothing to show that the position was complicated by the presence of Philip's cavalry contingent, which is not attested until the next year (*I.G.* i². 296, lines 19-21; cf. *A.T.L.*, vol. iii, pp. 322-3). On balance, the *A.T.L.* view has less to recommend it than have the views of Gomme and Edson.

[2] *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft xix, 1930), pp. 57-59. See also the same author in Pauly–Wissowa, *Realenyclopädie der Altertumswissenschaft*, s.v. 'Makedonia' (Geschichte), col. 707. Geyer is hard put to it to justify his retention of the MS. text here, and his strained interpretation is effectively disposed of by Gomme and in *A.T.L.* i. 551, n. 1. His is the latest of numerous attempts to find some reason for sending the Athenians up country to Beroia: cf. the notes of Arnold and Shilleto on this passage.

[3] See S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria*, p. 14 and Map II, and C. F. Edson, 'The Antigonids, Heracles, and Beroea', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. xlv, 1934, p. 232 and n. 5.

[4] As Grote thought: but Gomme has clearly demonstrated that such an assumption is unjustified. However, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility; βεργ-, βυργ-, and πυργ- forms are widespread in the Aegean.

[5] Gomme seems somewhat in favour of this solution, though he does not adopt a firm line in his note.

it. It has already been postulated, in the matter of Strepsa, that corruption has crept into the text at this point. It remains to consider the emendations that have been offered for it.

All in all the result has been disappointing, and modern editors generally do no more than retain Beroia and hope for the best,[1] or they obelize it, as Hude, without accepting an alternative. Classen suggested $\Theta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\mu\eta\nu$ for $B\acute{\epsilon}\rho o\iota a\nu$, an emendation warmly defended by Müller–Strübing.[2] The corruption is not easy, but by no means impossible, although the probabilities are against it. However, it would suit the strategic requirements admirably, and that the Athenians returned to Therme, whence they had set out for Pydna, is very likely, though Gomme prefers to put them ashore somewhere near Aineia. If we do not accept another town-name in place of Beroia, there is the possibility of adopting the emendation of Herbst, which Gomme commends.[3] But the $\kappa\check{a}\kappa\epsilon\hat{\iota}\theta\epsilon\nu$, if genuine, surely demands a town-name. If this is not to be Therme, it must be, in any case, a town lying between where we presume Therme to be and where we presume Strepsa to be, i.e. in the north-west of the Chalkidic peninsula at a point on the main Macedonia–Poteidaia route. We might also assume that it was not in revolt against the Athenians. Strepsa was, and Therme had been, but we are not told that the Athenian expedition had to make an attack on this unknown city.

These factors seem best accounted for by the reading of $B\rho\acute{\epsilon}a\nu$ for $B\acute{\epsilon}\rho o\iota a\nu$. This emendation was long ago proposed by Bergk,[4] who disagreed with Classen's Therme (though on mistaken grounds). However, his proposal did not meet with a favourable reception, and was rejected both by Müller–Strübing and by Stahl.[5] To accept it meant, in any case, to explain *ignotum per ignotius*, because the site of Brea is quite unknown, and Stahl, Müller–Strübing, and Herbst, in rejecting Bergk's emendation, take their stand on the two literary texts which appear to throw light on the foundation of that colony. The passage in Plutarch's *Life of Perikles* (ch. 11), in which Perikles' colony-foundations are listed, includes the mention of a colony sent to Thrace.[6] This has been thought to refer to the foundation of Brea. In that case Brea will

---

[1] e.g. Forster Smith in the Loeb series.

[2] *Jahrbuch für classische Philologie*, 1883, pp. 600–5, n. 8, where he rejects Bergk's criticism that Therme was in Macedonia. This long and important note deals with the literature on this passage up to that time. Müller–Strübing ends by preferring Skapsa to Strepsa as the second town named.

[3] $Ka\grave{\iota} \ \acute{a}\phi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu o\iota \ \pi\epsilon\rho a\iota\omega\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma \ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\hat{\iota}\theta\epsilon\nu \ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\grave{\iota}$ $\Sigma\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\psi a\nu$—*Zu Thukydides, Erklärungen und Wiederherstellungen*, Books I–IV (Leipzig, 1892), p. 26. It is, as Gomme says, ingenious, but it does not really carry conviction. R. Laqueur believed, though surely mistakenly, that $\kappa\check{a}\kappa\epsilon\hat{\iota}\theta\epsilon\nu \ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\psi a\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ represented an addition to the original draft by Thucydides himself, on the receipt of later information (*Rheinisches Museum*, vol. lxxxvi, 1937, pp. 318–19, n. 1).

[4] *Philologus*, vol. xxii, 1865, pp. 536–9. Bergk, however, identified Brea with the colony founded among the Bisaltai (see below), which involved the location of the

Bisaltai in the north-west of the Chalkidian peninsula. The corruption from 'Brea', a name which soon became unknown, to 'Beroia', well known in later antiquity, is an easy one. For the later importance of Beroia see Edson, 'The Antigonids, Heracles, and Beroea', pp. 233–5. It is possible that the mention of the city in the Acts of the Apostles (xvii. 10; xx. 4) might help to make its name more familiar to a scribe.

[5] Forbes, for instance, gives it very summary treatment (*Thucydides, Book I*, p. 54 of of the notes). Stahl at first took it up, but dropped it again in his revision of Poppo. Neither Shilleto nor Stuart-Jones (O.C.T.) mentions it. Herbst at least says that it shows *Gelehrsamkeit*.

[6] $E\acute{\iota}\varsigma \ \delta\grave{\epsilon} \ \Theta\rho\acute{a}\kappa\eta\nu \ (\check{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\nu) \ \chi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}o\upsilon\varsigma \ B\iota\sigma\acute{a}\lambda\tau a\iota\varsigma$ $\sigma\upsilon\nu o\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma o\nu\tau a\varsigma$. Strabo (7, frag. 36) places the Bisaltai about the River Strymon, so that on this reckoning Brea would have to be not far from Amphipolis.

lie beyond the north-east, and not in the north-west, of Chalkidike (so Böhnecke, followed by Müller–Strübing, Stahl, Busolt, and Tod). This supposed identity of Brea and the Bisaltic colony ruled Bergk's proposal out of court in the eyes of his critics: but, as Ed. Meyer saw (*Gesch. d. Altertums*, iv. 21 and note), there is no sure connexion between the two at all. Meyer in fact wished to place Brea along the Thracian coast even farther to the east, somewhere between Abdera and Ainos. The important point is that he felt the Plutarch passage to constitute no bar to this.

Support for the identification of Plutarch's colony with Brea has been sought in a fragment of Kratinos.[1] This is a quotation from Hesychios to the effect that Kratinos mentions the place and its colony, Hesychios himself adding that it was in Thrace. Although Kock lists the quotation as 'from an uncertain play', the mention of Thrace has led to the assumption that the play must be the 'Thrattai', performed soon after the ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias, i.e. *c.* 442 B.C. Brea was therefore founded *c.* 445/444, which again suits the Plutarch passage, where the foundations appear to be listed in chronological order, and the Bisaltic colony comes before the foundation of Thourioi. The date of the 'Thrattai' is not in dispute, but the inferences drawn from it in connexion with Brea are, to say the least, questionable. By the same token, were Aristophanes' *Birds* the lost comedy of an unknown author, with lines 1038–41 all that survived to us,[2] we should presumably be justified in assigning the fragment to a suitable play produced in the year 448/447, immediately following the publication of the Decree of Klearchos (*A.T.L.* ii, D. 14) establishing uniformity of silver currency and standards of measurement in the Athenian Empire. We may therefore treat with scepticism this evidence for the date and location of Brea. In any case, even Hesychios' mention of Kratinos is suspect (cf. Gomme, op. cit., p. 374). He may well mean not Kratinos but Krateros, whose Ψηφισμάτων Συναγωγή presumably included what is our only certain evidence for the foundation, the famous Brea inscription (*I.G.* i². 45 = M. N. Tod, *G.H.I.* i². 44: for an additional fragment see B. D. Meritt in *Hesperia*, vol. xiv, 1945, pp. 86–87, and *S.E.G.* x. 34). If this is so, and if Krateros was the source of Hesychios' statement, it is clear that Hesychios may well have derived from this inscription the information that Brea was a city in Thrace (see, for example, lines 16–17). 'A city in Thrace' does not imply that Brea must have lain about, or east of, the Strymon. Therme and Strepsa, for instance, are similarly described by the lexicographers, who may have derived that description from Hellanikos. It means no more than that all these places were 'in the Thraceward area'. 'Thrace' in line 5 of Kleon's great assessment of 425 (*I.G.* i². 63 = *A.T.L.* A9) includes all this territory.

I.G. i². 45 is the lower and surviving portion of the decree which made provision for the foundation of the colony at Brea. The inscribing of it was not well done. It is a stoichedon text, but the individual letters are engraved without exactitude or care, and the lines deviate from the horizontal. Although the use of the four-bar sigma indicates a date later than *c.* 446, the appearance of R and

---

[1] Frag. 395, Kock. The identification of it with the 'Thrattai' (frags. 71–84, Kock) was made by Busolt (*Griech. Gesch.* III. i, p. 417).

[2] Ψη. Ψηφισματοπώλης εἰμὶ καὶ νόμους
νέους
ἥκω παρ' ὑμᾶς δεῦρο πωλήσων.
            Πι. Τὸ τί;

Ψη. ' Χρῆσθαι Νεφελοκοκκυγιᾶς τοῖς αὐ-
τοῖς μέτροισι
καὶ σταθμοῖσι καὶ ψηφίσμασι καθάπερ
'Ολοφύξιοι.'
         (= *A.T.L.* ii, T 30a.)
ψηφίσμασι: νομίσμασι Bergk.

THE SITE OF BREA: THUCYDIDES 1. 61. 4   61

not **P** shows that we should not be justified in assigning it a date too long after 446. In fact the letter-forms do fit in with the thesis of a foundation *c.* 445/444. In addition, lines 26–29 of the decree indicate that an Athenian army is in the field: and this has been thought to refer to the expedition which put down the revolt of Euboia (446).

But the precise dating of inscriptions by their letter-forms is a practice which can be much overdone, and which is liable to be dangerous in the extreme. Both the lettering of the Brea inscription and the mention of the troops in the field by no means preclude a slightly later date—440/438, for instance. In this case the expedition referred to will be that besieging or occupying Samos.[1] This Busolt observed (*Griech. Gesch.* iii. i, pp. 417–18, n. 1), but he did not press the point. With the possibility in mind, therefore, that Brea was founded *c.* 438, we may consider the general policy of Athens towards Macedonia, which does not seem to have taken shape until the early thirties.

Until then, the Athenians showed greater interest in the consolidation of their position in the Thracian Chersonese and along the Pontic corn-route. But in 465 they had made their unsuccessful attempt to colonize the site of Amphipolis, and their continued interest in the Strymon area is shown by the foundation of that 'colony among the Bisaltai' which we have presumed was not Brea. Athens had, however, not thought seriously of the growing power of Macedonia, although the reception by the Macedonians of the exiled inhabitants of Histiaia[2] after the suppression of the revolt of Euboia must have directed their attention towards King Perdikkas. Perdikkas was engaged in consolidating his loosely knit dominions, and although the early history of his reign is obscure he may already have had to dispose of the opposition of one of his brothers, Alketas.[3] At all events, by 440 the Athenians had cause to fear the possibility of an expansion of his interests to the detriment of their own. Their foundation of Amphipolis in 437 limited Perdikkas' *Lebensraum* to the east, and was probably the occasion of the treaty of friendship and alliance (*I.G.* i². 71 = *S.E.G.* x. 86; see *A.T.L.*, vol. iii, pp. 313–14, n. 61) which the Athenians afterwards violated when they decided to assist Philip and Derdas. In 432/431 and subsequently Methone, to the south of Perdikkas' kingdom, appears in the Tribute Lists, though it is absent from a complete panel in the previous tribute period (438–434). The Athenians were extremely interested in its welfare (*I.G.* i². 57; *A.T.L.*, vol. ii, D 3–6). But even before Perdikkas was contained on the east and south it is likely that the Athenians will have taken steps to prevent that meddling in the affairs of Chalkidike which he subsequently undertook (Thuc. 1. 57). The foundation of a colony of Athenian citizens in the north-west of Chalkidike (following Thucydides' indication, near Perdikkas' point of entry into the peninsula) would form a substantial barrier to his ambitions. Hence a date *c.* 438 for the colonization, besides suiting other conditions, is close enough to the foundation of Amphipolis and the 'absorption' of Methone to form part of a coherent policy.

In fact the foundation was, as it seems, ineffective. Perdikkas intervened with

---

[1] The treaty with Samos was probably ratified at the Panathenaia of 438 (*A.T.L.*, vol. ii, p. 74). Athenian troops would, no doubt, have remained there after the surrender of the city in 439 until the final peace was concluded.

[2] Theopompos, frag. 387 (Jacoby).

[3] Otto Abel, *Makedonien vor König Philipp II* (Leipzig, 1847), pp. 166–70, believed that Alketas reigned alone from 454 to 448, though Geyer disagrees strongly with this supposition. Alketas' name appears in *I.G.* i². 71, second only to that of Perdikkas himself. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 471 a–b.

success in Chalkidike, while it is well known that Brea apparently vanished from history and became no more than a vaguely remembered name.[1] The reasons for this disappearance of a carefully organized city must remain doubtful, for lack of evidence. If it lay in north-west Chalkidike, explanations such as its destruction by the Thracians or its absorption in Amphipolis will not suffice. If we have deduced the purpose of its foundation aright, that purpose had already been nullified by the revolt of the Chalkidians and the synoecism at Olynthos. One may perhaps hazard a guess that its inhabitants were brought into Poteidaia when the latter was recolonized and became the new focal point of Athenian power in western Chalkidike. Or the Athenian defeat at Spartolos may have had the consequence of causing it to be compulsorily absorbed into Olynthos. Either event would have had little direct bearing on the course of the war, so that the silence of Thucydides need not cause surprise. Whatever the precise occasion of the disappearance of Brea, it seems reasonable to assume that the city did not long survive the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

Two further, and minor, points help to reinforce the suggestion of a later dating for the Brea inscription. The proposer of the decree was one Demokleides. If he is the Demokleides who moved the amendment in *I.G.* i². 152,[2] the lettering of which indicates a date well on in the fifth century, then the Brea inscription might plausibly be given a date as late as it can stand. The same argument holds if we identify the Phantokles of the Brea inscription with the γραμματεύς of *I.G.* i². 75 (*c.* 430–425).[3]

I conclude, therefore, that the historical and epigraphical probabilities, combined with the difficulties of the text of Thucydides 1. 61. 4, make it a strong presumption that Brea lay between Therme and Strepsa, and that it was to Brea, not Beroia, that Archestratos came. It may have lain on the coast, for Thucydides does not specifically mention the overland march until after the unsuccessful attempt on Strepsa. If so, it may, as an Athenian colony remaining loyal to Athens, have formed a base for the original attack on Therme. Therme was too valuable an advanced post, and a possible *point d'appui* for Perdikkas, to be left alone by Archestratos' expedition. It says much for the difficulty of the Athenian position in 431 that it was found necessary to cede it, if only temporarily, to Macedonia.[4]

<div align="right">A. G. WOODHEAD</div>

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

[1] See M. N. Tod, loc. cit.

[2] Kirchner, however, distinguishes the two (*Prosopographia Attica*, 3474 and 3475).

[3] This time Kirchner agrees (*P.A.* 14114), as does Hiller in *I.G.*

[4] My particular thanks are due to Professors F. E. Adcock, A. J. Beattie, and M. F. McGregor, and Messrs. G. T. Griffith and P. H. J. Lloyd-Jones for having read this paper in MS. and for giving me the benefit of much helpful advice and criticism. This paper was already in the proof stage when I received information of an article by S. Pelekides, entitled 'Concerning the Potidea affair', in the *Epeteris* of the Philosophic School of the University of Salonika, vol. vi (Memorial volume for N. G. Pappadakis). This article is said to deal with the disputed topography of the routes of Aristeus and Kallias in 432, but I have not been able to consult it.

FINAL CLAUSES IN LUCIAN

THE revival of the optative by authors of the Second Sophistic is the most striking example of their endeavour to return to Attic usage. Criticisms of it are generally of two kinds: first, that the optative was not current in the spoken language of the period, and secondly, that having reintroduced the optative they used it incorrectly.[1] The first of these faults, if it is a fault, only carries farther the normal tendency of artistic writers to archaism; for all literature goes to some extent by precedent, and it is natural for its admirers to regard changes in the language with suspicion. Lucian has received a full share of harsh words for his use of the optative,[2] and it is true that by Attic standards there are mistakes. It is, however, hazardous to generalize too freely about the language of so versatile a writer, especially in view of his penchant for parody, and it will be more convenient to consider one particular construction.

The final clauses in Lucian (and those in the spurious works) are catalogued in 'Die Absichtssätze bei Lucian' by H. Heller, published in *Symbolae Ioachimicae* in 1880. This work analyses almost all the examples thoroughly, and appears studiously to avoid criticizing. Classifying first according to the particles, Heller shows that Lucian mostly used ἵνα with the subjunctive (of 107 examples from the genuine and spurious works, only 8 have the optative). Of 318 final clauses introduced by ὡς, 235 have the optative (including 10 with ἄν) and 78 the subjunctive (including 9 with ἄν). Two clauses have both moods together and three have the future indicative. The use of ὅπως is then considered; of 35 examples which are purely final, 24 have the subjunctive, 10 the optative, and 1 both moods together. A further division according to the nature of the main verb shows something approaching chaos; e.g. ὡς with the optative is found after main verbs in the imperfect, aorist indicative, aorist participle, aorist imperative, pluperfect, perfect, present (historic and otherwise), future indicative, and optatives with and without ἄν.

Thus the use of the moods in final clauses appears to be governed by the choice of particle rather than by the grammar of the main clause; and it is, in fact, not impossible that Lucian should have constructed his sentences in this way. His mastery of Greek was achieved after having to begin by learning it as a foreign language;[3] and the most frequent form of final clause which he would hear would be ἵνα+subjunctive, the normal form in Hellenistic Greek. ὡς+ optative would be current only in sophistic circles; but Lucian learnt it and like most users of foreign languages he may have made habitual use of selected modes of expression which he knew to be correct, one of them being ὡς+

---

[1] Cf. W. Schmid, *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern*, i, p. 97, which combines the two: 'diesen dem jetzigen Gebrauch ganz abhanden gekommenen . . . Modus ziehen diese Schriftsteller mit aller Absichtlichkeit wieder hervor und gebrauchen ihn, bei oberflächlicher Beobachtung früherer Ausdrucksformen, in einer nicht immer korrekten, manierierten Weise.'

[2] e.g. Meillet, *Aperçu d'une histoire de la langue grecque*, p. 213. Most recently A. Perretti, 'Ottativi in Luciano', published in

Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica, 1949, p. 73: 'Luciano usa liberamente l'ottativo in tutte le sue opere, con le incoerenze e gli errori che sono inseparabili dall' uso convenzionale, artificioso, letterario, di una lingua che non si parla più come si scrive'.

[3] Cf. *Bis Accusatus* 27, where Rhetoric says τουτονὶ κομιδῇ μειράκιον ὄντα, βάρβαρον ἔτι τὴν φωνὴν καὶ μονονουχὶ κάνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα ἐς τὸν Ἀσσύριον τρόπον . . . παραλαβοῦσα ἐπαίδευσα.

optative (it would be more useful by being correct in Attic as a formula for indirect speech too). Things which were correct but less common would probably seem the more elegant, and it may be that other and odder features of Lucian's style originated in the conscious imitation of rarities which he admired.[1]

But Lucian uses ἵνα in final clauses with the subjunctive, optative, and indicative, and ὡς and ὅπως with the subjunctive and optative. Hence the particles became interchangeable, as in the Attic authors, if indeed he did not treat them so at first, and normally none of them carries any emphasis or calls attention to its origin as a relative. The use of ἵνα . . . ἄν+indicative, of which the examples are given below (section 6), is a possible exception, as it can plausibly be analysed as ἵνα = where = in what way or in which case+the apodosis of a conditional sentence. Lucian also makes use of ὡς ἄν+optative, a frequent construction in Xenophon, which may in some cases be regarded similarly.[2] In the Attic authors, ὡς is more common in tragedy, ὅπως and ἵνα in prose (except Xenophon). ἵνα was the most common final particle in the κοινή[3] as it had previously been in conversational Greek; its predominance would be assisted by the fact that ὡς was current in other senses and was also liable to cause confusion, since at this period it would sound the same as ὅς.[4] But as the vowels changed more slowly in educated than in uneducated speech,[5] presumably the Atticists who revived ὡς (or maintained it) as a final particle would still pronounce it with the old distinction of length, if not of pitch.[6]

By the time of Lucian the optative had disappeared from popular speech[7] except for restricted use in main clauses, such as St. Paul's μὴ γένοιτο. His use of it in all other circumstances may be regarded on these grounds as artificial; but it is not altogether true that 'l'ottativo è sentito da Luciano come equivalente al congiuntivo o al futuro indicativo, ai quali è preferito solo per reazione all' uso volgare che ignora l'ottativo'.[8] Lucian's grammar departs from the regular Attic sequence of moods; nor is it possible to draw up a consistent scheme in which one mood indicates a more remote possibility than the other,[9]

---

[1] e.g. the frequent (Schmid, op. cit. i. 428) and often un-Attic use of the particle γοῦν; the placing of adjectives in predicative position without cause, as μεγάλην τὴν κύλικα in Timon 54; and the use of the article with an accusative, as though there were an ellipse of some participle, e.g. de Electro 2 πότε δὴ ἐπὶ τὰς αἰγείρους ἀφιξόμεθα, τὰς τὸ ἤλεκτρον.

[2] Kühner–Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik d. gr. Sprache, ii. 553. 1 and 5(b). See below, section 5.

[3] Schmid, iii. 86. The use of the particles at different periods is also summarized by Perretti (p. 89, n. 1), who remarks on the absence of ὡς from the New Testament. If the reading of Souter and of Westcott and Hort is right, however, there appears to be a noun-clause of the form ὡς+subj. in St. Mark 4. 26. It is explained by Moulton, Prolegomena to Grammar of NT Greek, p. 185, as a 'futuristic' subjunctive. Alternatively (as suggested by Professor J. B. Skemp)

there may be an ellipse of ἵνα to avoid ὡς ἵνα. The Resultant Greek Testament, 3rd edn., gives ὡς ἐάν as a reading (so Lachmann et al.).

[4] Meillet, op. cit., p. 205; Mayser, Grammatik d. gr. Papyri, i. 22.

[5] Cf. Hatzidakis, Einleitung in die Neugr. Grammatik, pp. 304 f.

[6] Dionysius Hal. De Compositione Verborum, 14, distinguishes vowels by quantity and quality, though even he, in the analysis of the rhythms of Demosthenes (ch. xviii), allows the last syllable of εὔνοιαν to be long or short, preferably the former, and treats the second syllable of πόλει as short (Rhys Roberts, ad loc.).

[7] Meillet, pp. 209 ff.; Hatzidakis, p. 218; Schmid, p. 97.

[8] Perretti, p. 85.

[9] In Epistulae Saturnales 30 both moods occur, οὐχ ὅπως αὐτοὶ χρήσωνται, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὑμεῖς θαυμάζοιτε. Similarly in Fugitivi 33 there is a negative final clause with the sub-

or one emphasizes the proposed action, the other the achievement of an object. But the use of the optative made possible a range of more exact expressions in conditional sentences, and even in the best Attic there is no difference in meaning between the subjunctive and the optative in the subordinate clauses of other constructions. The choice of the one or the other was usually according to the grammar of the immediate context. As a matter of fact some 70 per cent. of final sentences in the genuine works of Lucian conform to Attic rules, and it seems possible to distinguish some kind of system in his usage even where it is un-Attic. The distinction between present and aorist forms, which was alive in the κοινή and survives in Modern Greek, is generally maintained.

In the following list examples are given only from works which are genuine according to Helm's list in Pauly–Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, xiii. 1725; so no reference is made to the *Amores, Charidemus, Cynicus, Lucius (Asinus), Nero, Ocypus, de Parasito, Philopatris, de Syria Dea*, or *Tragodopodagra*.

1. The subjunctive is used in elliptical sentences; that is, where the final clause does not express the intention of the main verb, but introduces some new subject, e.g. *Dialogi Mortuorum* 12. 5[1] ἵνα σοὶ μὴ τὰ ἐν Τύρῳ μηδὲ τὰ ἐν Ἀρβήλοις διηγήσωμαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι ᾿Ινδῶν ἦλθον, or adds a parenthetic comment, e.g. *Timon* 3 ἵνα σοὶ φορτικῶς διαλέγωμαι. Quotations are usually brought in in this way, e.g. *Somnium (Vita)* 5 ἵνα καθ᾿ ῞Ομηρον εἴπω, θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος. Sometimes, but not in the majority of cases, a verb of saying can be imagined as the omitted main verb, e.g. *Rhetorum Praeceptor* 7 ἡ ἑτέρα δὲ . . . τοιαύτη οἵαν μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἶπον, (sc. I just say this) ἵνα μὴ καὶ ταὐτὰ λέγων πολλάκις ἐπέχω σε ἤδη ῥήτορα εἶναι δυνάμενον. Loose constructions of this sort are not infrequent, especially in dialogue, the sequence being automatically primary.[2]

> *1st person singular.* Adversus Indoctum 2, 29, Alexander 3, Bis Acc. 26, Convivium 8, 23, de Mercede Conductis 28, Dialogi deorum 1, Dial. meretricii 9. 5, Dial. mort. 1. 2 (ὅπως), 12. 5, Icaromenippus 2, 29, pro Imaginibus 24, Iuppiter confutatus 17, Iup. tragoedus 37, pro Lapsu inter salutandum 6, Navigium 27, Nigrinus 38, Philopseudes 11, Piscator 25, 42, Rhet. praec. 7, Somn. (Vita) 5, Tim. 3, 5, Vitarum auctio 1.
> *2nd sing.* pro Imag. 1 (ὡς ἄν εἰδῇς), Scytha 11 (ὡς θαυμάσῃς), Tox. 7 (ὅπως εἰδῇς).
> *1st pl.* Nigr. 1, Abdicatus 20.
> All not otherwise noted are introduced by ἵνα.

2. (*a*) The subjunctive is used in about 40 per cent. of final clauses which depend on a main verb in a primary tense (including some optatives and aorist forms referring to present or future action). Cf. Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553. 2.

> *1st sing.* Bis Acc. 5, Cataplus 24, Dial. de. 17. 1, Dial. mort. 22. 3, Icarom. 21 (where aorist indicates momentary and repeated action), Nigr. 11, de Saltatione 33, Somn. (Gallus) 6, 21, Tim. 57.

junctive, and a positive one with the opta-tive. But in *Toxaris* 37 the two moods occur in one negative clause without distinction— unless ὡς μὴ διαμαρτάνοιμεν τῆς φιλίας indicates a single action and μηδὲ ἀπόβλητοι δόξωμεν εἶναι a continuing state of affairs (cf. Perretti, p. 90, n. 3).

[1] Reference is to paragraphs in the Teubner text of Nilén, supplemented by that of Jacobitz for the works not published in Nilén's edition.

[2] e.g. Sophocles, *Ph.* 989; Plato, *Rep.* 507 d; Demosthenes 45. 5; Theocritus 15. 91.

2nd sing. Adv. Ind. 25, Alex. 29 (verse), Anacharsis 18, Charon 7, de Luctu 24, de Merc. Cond. 3, 10, 14, 38, 42, Dial. de. 4. 1, 5. 2, 20. 10, Dial. mer. 12. 3, Dial. mort. 10. 2, Fug. 33, Hermotimus 57, 77 (two), Historia quomodo scribenda sit 33, pro Imag. 21, 22, Iup. trag. 52, de morte Peregrini 43, Pisc. 9, Rhet. praec. 17, de Salt. 35, 85 (where, however, Harmon in the Loeb Classical Library text vol. v reads ἐπανίοις), Somn. (Vita) 15, Somn. (Gall.) 7, 28, Tox. 36.

3rd sing. Abd. 8, Catap. 17, de Luc. 13, de Merc. Cond. 3, 13, 18, Dial. marini 2. 4, Fug. 33, Hercules 8, Herm. 68, Hist. quom. 61, Icarom. 34, pro Imag. 28, 29, Iup. trag. 25, 32, 34 (verse), pro Laps. 7, de mor. Per. 30 (verse), Pisc. 2, 14, 45, 51, Prometheus (Caucasus) 1 (Harmon καταπαγείη, εἴη), Tim. 32.

1st pl. Calumnia 2, Catap. 28, Dial. de. 20. 5, 20. 15, Dial. mort. 4. 1, 30. 1, Icarom. 11, Iup. trag. 1 (verse), pro laps. 7, Nav. 10, 36, Phalaris I. 12, Pisc. 17, 48, Tim. 48.

2nd pl. Anach. 31, Bis Acc. 17, de Domo 21, Scy. 1.

3rd pl. Bis Acc. 2, 7, Char. 14, Conv. 39, de Sacrificiis 11, 12, Dial. mort. 6. 3, Hist. quom. 5, Iup. trag. 13, Nigr. 30, Pisc. 39, 45, Rhet. praec. 20, Tim. 19, 40.

(*b*) The optative is used in most final clauses which depend on a main verb in a secondary tense (including historic present) (Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553. 2).

1st sing. Abd. 1, 24, Anach. 16, de Elec. 1, Dial. de. 6. 2, Dial. mer. 2. 3, Dial. mort. 11. 3, Herm. 24, Hist. quom. 4, Iup. trag. 15, pro Laps. 1 (two), Menippus 7, Philops. 6, 24, Pisc. 11, Somn. (Gall.) 9, 18, Tim. 15, 27.

2nd sing. Dial. mer. 9. 2, 12. 1, 14. 2, Dissertatio cum Hesiodo 1, Herm. 1, Pseudologista 2, Somn. (Gall.) 1, Tim. 48.

3rd sing. Adv. Ind. 6, Alex. 32, 36, Conv. 18, 46, de Elec. 2, Demonax 5, Deorum Concilium 5, Dial. de. 9. 2, 22. 2, Dial. marini 7. 1, 11. 1, 12. 1, 15. 2, Dial. mer. 2. 3, 3. 2, Dial. mort. 8, 19. 5, Fug. 8, 12, Herm. 81, Hist. quom. 25, 62, Iup. trag. 14, Lexiphanes 20, de mor. Per. 14, 23, 35, 36, 43, 44, 45, Phal. I. 12, Pseudol. 9, Somn. (Gall.) 9, 11, Tox. 50.

1st pl. Dial. mer. 12. 4, Herm. 83, Somn. (Gall.) 11.

3rd pl. Alex. 30, 51, 55, Apologia 3, Conv. 18, 33, Dial. mort. 6. 4, Ep. Sat. 29, 32, Fug. 7, 13, Hist. quom. 62, Icarom. 25, Iup. trag. 40, de mor. Per. 39, Pisc. 11, Tim. 4, Tox. 20.

3. The subjunctive is occasionally used in a final clause depending on a main verb in a secondary tense, if (*a*) its intention continues into what is, from the speaker's point of view, present time (Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553. 3(*b*)) or (*b*) the 'graphic construction' is used, as especially frequent in the historians, where the speaker transfers himself mentally to the past time of the action (ibid. 3(*c*)). All the examples from the *Vera Historia* are in this form.

1st sing. Abd. 1(*a*), Ver. Hist. 1. 4(*a*).

2nd sing. Conv. 24(*a*), 26(*a*), de Salt. 76(*a*).

3rd sing. de Dom. 17(*a*), Hist. quom. 54(*a*), Nigr. 28(*b*), de mor. Per. 25(*b*) (the main verb being historic present), Philops. 39(*a*), Tim. 56(*a*), Ver. Hist. II. 29(*b*), Bis Acc. 21(*a*).

1st pl. Conv. 27(*a*), Ver. Hist. II. 35(*b*).

2nd pl. de Domo 32(*a*).

3rd pl. Abd. 8(*a*), Dial. mort. 21. 2(*b*), Somn. (Vita) 18(*a*), Somn. (Gall.) 18(*a*).

4. The optative is occasionally used in a final clause depending on a main verb in a primary tense, when the action is purely hypothetical. The main verb may be (*a*) an optative expressing a wish (Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553. 4(*b*)a) or (*b*) an optative expressing a purely arbitrary assumption (ibid. 4(*b*)β), e.g. as in a conditional sentence of the type εἰ+optative, optative+ἄν. (Where an optative+ἄν in the main clause is equivalent to an indicative or imperative, the subjunctive is regular in the final clause, and examples are included under 2(*a*).)

2nd sing. de Merc. Cond. 27(*b*), Tox. 42(*b*).
3rd sing. Anach. 38(*b*), Pisc. 27(*b*), Prom. (Cauc.) 21(*a*).
1st pl. Ep. Sat. 21(*a*).
3rd pl. Cronosolon 12(*a*), Hist. quom. 42(*b*) (by a sort of attraction).

5. Both the subjunctive and the optative are occasionally used by Lucian after ὡς ἄν. The subjunctive with ὅπως ἄν was the usual formula for final sentences in Attic inscriptions, and with ὡς ἄν or ὅπως ἄν is found in various classical authors (Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553. 5(*a*)). The optative with ὡς ἄν or ὅπως ἄν is rare except in Xenophon, and at times the relative nature of the particle (ibid. 5(*b*)) may be considered to remain even in Lucian, though it seems on the whole to be lost.

(*a*) *Subjunctive*

1st sing. Dial. mer. 11. 1.
3rd sing. De. conc. 14 (a ψήφισμα follows, so reference to official language may be intended; but the order of words ὡς μὴ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἄν γίγνηται is unusual), Dial. mar. 4. 3.
1st pl. Fug. 24, Nav. 46.
3rd pl. Herm. 75.

(*b*) *Optative*

1st sing. Dial. mort. 4. 2, 27. 6, pro Imag. 16, Nav. 20.
2nd sing. Rhet. praec. 15.
3rd sing. Dial. de. 11. 2, Pisc. 15, Tox. 15.
3rd pl. de mor. Per. 37.

6. There are four examples in Lucian (if *Nigr.* 32 is admitted) of ἵνα ἄν with a past tense of the indicative, in a final clause where the main verb is of the form ἐχρῆν+infinitive, or otherwise indicates an impossible wish.

1st sing. Dial. mort. 6. 2, Tox. 18.
3rd sing. Pisc. 2.
3rd pl. Nigr. 32 (reading ἵν' ἄν ἔσπων as Fritzsche's 1st edn. but Jacobitz, Heller, Nilén, ἵν' ἀνέσπων).

In the sentence (*Icarom.* 21) πολλάκις ἐβουλευσάμην μετοικῆσαι ὅτι πορρωτάτω, ἵν' αὐτῶν τὴν περίεργον ἄν γλῶτταν διέφυγον, the author seems to have regarded ἵνα rather as a relative,[1] and the same may be true of the other four examples.

---

[1] Or perhaps as consecutive = 'so that (if I had been successful) I should have . . .', etc. Cf. *de luctu* 19, mentioned on p. 73 below. The relative seems more likely, but there is little difference when the action described is hypothetical.

But as the indicative without ἄν was regular in Attic in final clauses of the type described above (Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553. 7 and Anmerkung 7), he may simply have chosen to adopt the rarer final construction with ἄν. There are also four examples of ὡς+optative in similar conditions; *Hist. quom.* 40 ἡδέως ἂν πρὸς ὀλίγον ἀνεβίουν . . . ἀποθανών, ὡς μάθοιμι . . . (where the wish, though impossible, is for the future, not the past), *Herm.* 19, 86, and *Conv.* 39, where perhaps the wishes are represented as attainable (cf. Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553, Anm. 8).

7. The optative is used in a final clause depending on a primary main verb in the following cases:

1st sing. Anach. 14, 18, 40, Char. 1 (two), 6, Dial. mer. 12. 2, Dial. mort. 13. 3, Eunuchus 2, Fug. 20, Herm. 13, 58, 86, Hist. quom. 3, 4, Imag. 12, pro Laps. 19, Lex. 1, 13, Phal. I. 10, Prom. (Cauc.) 4, Pseudol. 3, Saturnalia 7, Somn. (Gall.) 20.

2nd sing. Adv. Ind. 20, 25, Alex. 1, 21, Anach. 15, Char. 2, de Merc. Con. 26, Herm. 61, 78, Hist. quom. 57, Iup. trag. 11, Lex. 20, Pisc. 47, Prom. 2, Pseudol. 3, Rhet. praec. 6, 10, 11, de Salt. 85, Somn. (Gall.) 11, 20, 22, Tox. 35.

3rd sing. Anach. 19, 20, 24, 28, 35, Apol. 7, 10, 14, Conv. 27, de Dipsadibus 6, de Dom. 9, Dem. 2, Dial. mar. 9. 1, Fug. 31, 33, Herodotus 5, Hist. quom. 23, 45, 50, Muscae encomium 5 (two), Pisc. 13, 16, Prom. 21, Rhet. praec. 11, de Salt. 29, Scy. 9, Tim. 44, 54.

1st pl. Alex. 21, Char. 3, Dial. de. 4. 4, Ep. Sat. 22, Herm. 21, Imag. 1, 16, Lex. 13, Pseudol. 14.

2nd pl. Anach. 32, de Dips. 9, Lex. 3, de mor. Per. 8.

3rd pl. Anach. 2, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21 (two), 22 (two), 24, 28, 29, 36, 37, Cron. 11, 15, de Dips. 9, de Luc. 11, de Mer. Con. 1, 29, Dial. mer. 8. 2, 13. 6, Dem. 2, Ep. Sat. 23, 32, Fug. 18, Herm. 10, 30, 56, 86, Imag. 3, Iup. trag. 6, 18, Phal. I. 13, Pisc. 44, Prom. 1, 19, Pseudol. 31, de Salt. 11, Scy. 11, Tim. 45.

Summary

	1	2a	2b	3	4	5a	5b	6 Ind.	6 Opt.	7
1st sing. .	27	10	20	2	—	1	4	2	2	24
2nd sing..	3	32	8	3	2	—	1	—	—	23
3rd sing..	—	25	37	8	3	2	3	1	—	29
1st pl. .	2	15	3	2	1	2	—	—	1	9
2nd pl. .	—	4	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	4
3rd pl. .	—	15	18	4	2	1	1	1	1	41

ὡς+fut. indicative	3
Consecutives	2 (+2?)
Other noun-clauses	6

Perretti remarks (p. 87): 'Via via che lo stile di Luciano diventa più personale e indipendente della tradizione scolastica, dalla pedissequa imitazione dei suoi modelli, all' ottativo consueto nelle condizionali, da qualsiasi tempo esse dipendano, si aggiunge, per quanto meno frequente, l'ottativo nelle frasi

finali, relative, interrogative, causali, senza riguardo al tempo principale della regente.' But as far as Lucian's works can be arranged chronologically, they do not show a gradual increase in the proportion of optatives to subjunctives in final clauses in primary sequence. *De Mercede Conductis*, which Helm in Pauly–Wissowa (xiii. 1765) calls 'eine Altersschrift', has only three optatives against eight subjunctives. The *Anacharsis*, in which the optative predominates and which includes about 20 per cent. of the examples of the Lucianic final sentence (section 7) in the whole of his works, is also placed fairly late by Helm, though it was attributed by Croiset[1] to a period immediately after Lucian's renunciation of rhetoric. *De dipsadibus*, in which all the verbs in final clauses in primary sequence are in the optative, appears to be an earlier work still;[2] in fact, both this construction and the regular Attic forms were in use at all stages of Lucian's writing, and in both dialogue and other passages.[3]

Lucian's choice of moods in final clauses, which show so many errors and incoherences if judged only by the Attic sequence of tenses, is according to the sense of the context rather than its grammar. It is not only a question of the 'grado di elaborazione formale',[4] though this explains some cases; it seems that attention was also paid to the degree of dignity which Lucian allowed to his speakers, the nature of the subject and the tone (e.g. the degree of courtesy) which he intended to convey. The optative is used to indicate elevation in all these respects. Although final clauses are not necessary for the discussion of all subjects, nor are they used by all speakers, I hope that the examples which follow will support this statement. 'O' refers to the use of the optative in a final clause after a primary main verb, as in section 7, 'S' to the Attic use of the subjunctive, as in section 2(*a*), with which it is contrasted.

Of the speakers in dialogue, Solon (O 15) and Anacharsis (O 7, S 2) are treated with most respect. The former is the wise Athenian lawgiver, the latter the wise visitor from Scythia, whose inhabitants are represented by Lucian as very brave and otherwise virtuous.[5] The discussion is on the important subject of the training of the young, and is maintained with a consistent politeness not equalled elsewhere. There are, however, other men of eminence or culture: Toxaris (O 1, S 1),[6] Alexander the Great (O 1), Timon (O 3; all other speakers in the *Timon* S); the philosophers Hermotimus (O 3), Diogenes (O 2, S 1), Plato (O 1, S 2), and Micyllus (O 1, S 2), with whom should perhaps be numbered the Cock in the *Somnium (Gallus)* (O 2, S 2), who has previously lived as Pythagoras; Polystratus in the *Imagines* (O 2, S 1); and Lexiphanes (O 2), Sopolis (O 1), and Megalonymus (O 1), characters in the *Lexiphanes*, which satirizes the extreme forms of Atticism. Lucian allows the gods less dignity than the best men: Hera, Apollo, Aphrodite, Heracles, Pluto, Minos, and

[1] *Essai sur la vie et les œuvres de Lucien*, p. 48.
[2] Ibid., p. 45. It cannot be definitely dated, but Christ–Schmid, *Griech. Lit.-Gesch.*, ii, p. 718 says 'der rhetorischen Periode scheint περὶ διψάδων anzugehören'.
[3] Perretti's statement (p. 78), 'la forma dialogica o non dialogica non influesce per nulla sull' uso più o meno frequente dell' ottativo in Luciano', may perhaps be qualified or expanded. The grammar of dialogue tends to be different from that of other writing; e.g. the proportion of verbs in the second persons and first person plural is

higher, and so is the proportion of present and future tenses and imperatives. Thus there are fewer opportunities of using the optative according to Attic rules.
[4] Perretti, p. 92.
[5] Cf. the *Toxaris*, throughout.
[6] Some of the subjunctives attributed to characters mentioned in this paragraph and some attributed to persons who do not use the optative at all, though of similar status, are due to other considerations and are discussed below.

Rhadamanthus use only the subjunctive. The treatment of Zeus (O 4, S 8), Hermes (O 6, S 7), and Poseidon (O 1, S 1) varies according to the context. Only Cronos (O 4) uses only the optative.[1] Among other divinities or personifications, Philosophia (O 2) uses the optative only, Dike, Paedeia, Penia, Aletheia, Academia, and Arete only the subjunctive. Charon has two optatives and three subjunctives, the subject and tone having influence on all these cases.

The subject-matter and the tone with which it is expressed are in many cases closely bound together, but the choice of mood for a final clause appears sometimes to be due to one rather than the other. In *Somn.* (*Gall.*) 6 the cock, who is personally distinguished enough to use the optative and does so elsewhere, says . . . εἰπέ, ὡς μάθω . . . . In this case 'the purpose of the utterance is stated'[2] in the final clause no less than in some of the elliptical examples of section 1, and the subjunctive is used on the analogy of such clauses. The final clauses of *Somn.* (*Gall.*) 21 (ὡς μάθω), *Charon* 7, *Somn.* (*Gall.*) 7, *de Salt.* 35 (ὡς μάθης), *Tox.* 36 (ἵν᾿ εἰδῇς) are similar; and others involving such verbs as μανθάνω are formed on the same analogy; *Somn.* (*Vita*) 15, *Somn.* (*Gall.*) 28 (ὡς ἴδῃς— Harmon ἴδοις), *Abd.* 8, *Icarom.* 11, *Phal.* 1. 12, *Scy.* 1, *Bis. Acc.* 17. Others which more remotely suggest the examples of section 1 are *Herc.* 8 (where a quotation is introduced), *de mor. Per.* 43, *pro laps.* 7 (τοῦτο μὲν παραιτήσομαι, ὡς μὴ εἰς ἀπειροκαλίαν τινὰ μειρακιώδη ἐκπέσῃ μοι τὸ σύγγραμμα, ὀλίγα δὲ . . . προσγράψαι καλῶς ἔχειν παρέλαβον), *Calumn.* 2, *de Domo* 21.

Final clauses occurring in threats, and more generally where there is a prospect of violence, punishment, or loss of dignity, have the verb in the subjunctive. For example, in *Dial. marini* 2. 4, Poseidon, promising the Cyclops his revenge on Odysseus, says θάρρει, ὦ τέκνον· ἀμυνοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ὡς μάθη ὅτι, καὶ εἰ πήρωσίν μοι ὀφθαλμῶν ἰᾶσθαι ἀδύνατον, τὰ γοῦν τῶν πλεόντων ἐπ᾿ ἐμοί ἐστι. *Dial. mort.* 22. 3 Menippus, οὐκοῦν ἄπαγέ με αὖθις ἐς τὸν βίον. Charon, χάριεν λέγεις, ἵνα καὶ πληγὰς ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ τοῦ Αἰακοῦ προσλάβω. Similarly *Bis Acc.* 5, *Cataplus* 24, *Fug.* 33, *Iup. trag.* 25, 32, 52, *Icarom.* 34, *Pisc.* 2, 14, 39, 48, 51, *Prom.* 1,[3] *Timon* 19, 32, 40, *Cataplus* 28, *Dial. mort.* 30. 1. In the last two examples the speakers are respectively Rhadamanthus and Minos sitting in judgement on the dead. The only optative which occurs in circumstances of this kind is in *Prom.* 2, which is strongly ironical: Hermes καταπτήσεται δὲ ἤδη καὶ ὁ αἰετὸς ἀποκερῶν τὸ ἧπαρ, ὡς πάντα ἔχοις ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς καὶ εὐμηχάνου πλαστικῆς. But where the subject is elevated enough to merit greater solemnity the optative is used; e.g. death, when not inflicted as a punishment: thus *Dial. mar.* 9. 1 where Poseidon gives instructions for the burial of Helle; *Dial. mer.* 12. 2 where the courtesan Ioessa threatens suicide; law-giving, as several times in the *Anacharsis* and *Cronosolon* 11, 15; philosophy, rhetoric, and the arts, as *Herm.* 13, 58, 61, 78, 86, *Hist. quom.* 4, 23, 45, 50, 57 (advice to historians),[4] *Prometheus* 4 (on a proposed speech in his defence), *Herodotus* 5 (description of a picture), *de Salt.* 11. Similarly *Charon* 1, 2, 3, 6, where Charon and Hermes are preparing to survey the world with philosophic detachment.

The optative is used in a final clause where the tone is serious, dignified, or respectful, the subjunctive when it is harsh, abrupt, flippant, or discourteous,

---

[1] It is assumed that Lucian intended to subject the gods to indignity through ridicule as well as to compose charming fantasies. Cf. Caster, *Lucien et la pensée religieuse de son temps*, iv. i.

[2] Liddell and Scott, s.v. ἵνα 3(*a*).

[3] Where Harmon reads optatives.

[4] The subjunctives in 5, 33, 61 in this work are perhaps used to indicate a continued state of affairs; cf. p. 64, n. 9 above.

or in very familiar conversation. Thus Zeus in *Iup. trag.* 6 says ἀποσεμνῦναί φημι δεῖν τὸ κήρυγμα μέτροις τισὶ καὶ μεγαλοφωνίᾳ ποιητικῇ, ὡς μᾶλλον συνέλθοιεν, and in 18 κήρυττε οὖν, ὦ Ἑρμῆ, τὸ κήρυγμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, ὡς ἀνιστάμενοι συμβουλεύοιεν; even if the Lucianic Zeus is not always a noble figure, his official pronouncements are treated with the appropriate dignity of language. But in 13 he says κατασίγησον αὐτούς, ὦ Ἑρμῆ (= 'shut them up'), ὡς μάθωσιν ὅτου ἕνεκα ξυνελέγησαν τοὺς λήρους τούτους ἀφέντες. The conversation of goddesses is never dignified; Hera in *Dial. de.* 5. 2 is nagging Zeus, not without justification; she in *Dial. de.* 20. 10, and Aphrodite in 20. 15, are both attempting to influence Paris by familiarity. Cf. also *Dial. de.* 17. 1, 20. 5, *Dial. mort.* 4. 1, 6. 3, 10. 2, *Iup. trag.* 1 (in which, however, Athene declaims a parody on Homer), 34, *Bis Acc.* 2, 7, *Dial. de.* 4. 1. The last example is from the conversation of Zeus with Ganymedes; in para. 4 of the same dialogue διὰ τοῦτό σε ἀνήρπασα, ὡς ἅμα καθεύδοιμεν the optative may be intended to convey a delicate touch of diffidence.[1] In *Saturnalia* 7 Cronos, boasting of the past glories of his régime, uses the optative. In *Eunuchus* 2 the optatives seem to indicate politeness.[2] In non-dialogue passages, the optative in *Pro laps.* 19 appears to be a symptom of elaborate respect; so perhaps is that in *Ep. Sat.* 23, a prayer which is to be made to Cronos.[3] In the rhetorical pieces the language is an end in itself, and the self-conscious artistry which is displayed involves the use of the optative; *Phal.* I. 10, 13 (both of these are somewhat pompous, in a recital of the speaker's own merits), *de dips.* 6, 9 (two), *de domo* 9, *Musc. enc.* 5 (two). The only subjunctives in final clauses in these four works are in *Phal.* I. 12 and *de domo* 21, mentioned above owing to their similarity to the elliptical usage (section 1). In the diatribes the subjunctive predominates owing to the hostile tone; thus *de Mer. Con.* 3 (two), 10, 13, 14, 18, 38, and 42. There are optatives in 1, 26, and 29.[4] Subjunctives occur in *de Sacr.* 11, 12 and *de Luc.* 13, 24; there is an optative in *de Luc.* 11, but the passage is ironical. In *Rhet. praec.* 6, 10, 11 the optatives are again used with irony; the first two of them affect to encourage the bad teacher's progress in his false art, so that he may gain benefits, and the third describes an effeminate male figure as θεσπέσιον χρῆμα. Subjunctives occur in 17 and 20 where the rudeness is of a more direct kind; the former is introduced by the words ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγίγνωσκε τὰ παλαιὰ μὲν μὴ σύ γε . . . . If Nilén's text is right in *Pseudol.* 14 the subjunctives, ἐκμάθῃς and ᾖ, may be due to the insulting tone of the passage; they are unique after a main verb such as ἐχρῆν . . . διαλέγεσθαι. Other examples of the use of the optative include *Somn. (Gall.)* 20, where Micyllus addresses the Cock with exaggerated deference as Pythagoras; *Imag.* 1, 3, 12, 16 in an elaborate compliment; *Somn. (Gall.)* 22, *Conv.* 27, *Prom.* 21, *Herm.* 21, in all of which the speakers are concerned with their own dignity; *Alex.* 1, 21, *Pseudol.* 3, *Tox.* 35, *de mor. Per.* 8, *Dem.* 2, *de Salt.* 27, in which 'elaborazione formale' by the author seems to be a factor (*Alex.* 1 and *Dem.* 2 are part of the introduction to the works), and *Fug.* 18 and 31, which are ironical.

---

[1] The optative may follow the aorist, but the action is future.

[2] Οὐκοῦν λέγοις ἂν ἤδη τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς δίκης, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς εἰδείην ὅ τι τὸ κεκινηκὸς εἴη τὸν τοσοῦτον γέλωτα.

[3] It concerns the distribution of food among guests, and the misfortunes the rich should suffer if they do not feed the poor properly. Eating is a serious subject in Lucian; cf. *Somn. (Gall.)* 9–11, *de Mer. Con.* 26.

[4] Those in 1 and 29 are 3rd pl., of which, for whatever reason, there are 41 examples of the optative against 15 of the subjunctive. The proportion for all persons together is 3 to 2.

Thus where Lucian's final sentences differ from those of his Attic models they do so in a regular way, and there are few exceptions to the rules. Attraction between one mood and the other occurs sometimes, though it has seemed better not to include the cases where the main verb is an optative+ἄν (= indicative or imperative) and the final clause has an optative, under this heading, but to treat them with section 7.[1] There seems to be a clear case of attraction in *Anach.* 31, where the optative might be expected in accordance with the manner of the rest of the dialogue. The subjunctive is used by attraction to the mood used after a verb of fearing: φεύγουσι δεδιότες μὴ σφίσι κεχηνόσι πάττητε τὴν ψάμμον ἐς τὸ στόμα ἢ περιπηδήσαντες, ὡς κατὰ νώτου γένησθε, περιπλέξητε αὐτοῖς τὰ σκέλη περὶ τὴν γαστέρα, etc.; and perhaps the subjunctive occurs also in *Nav.* 10 by attraction to the jussive subjunctive: ἐπιτείνωμεν δὲ ὅμως τὸν περίπατον, ὡς καταλάβωμεν αὐτόν.

There is no evidence that Lucian confused the subjunctive and optative; even if he considered them equivalent in meaning (as in subordinate clauses they are), it is usually possible to account for the chosen form being preferred. In some cases the reason seems to be phonetic, parts of verbs being chosen which were not likely to be mistaken for other parts. Some of the examples of the 3rd pl. forms of the optative (e.g. *de Mer. Cond.* 1, 29) may be due to the author's preferring forms such as -οιεν, -ειεν, -οιντο to -ωσιν, -ωνται. The latter, especially if unaccented, would have been liable to confusion by many people with -ουσιν, -ονται and the correctness of the expression could not have been admired.[2] Again, although there are 32 cases of second person singular verbs in the subjunctive (2(*a*)) against 23 of the optative (7), there are 9 cases of -οιο and -αιο, but only one of the corresponding subjunctive forms (γένη in *Herm.* 77). It seems likely that Lucian was avoiding forms in -ω, -η which were not active, in case of ambiguity. Thus in *de Salt.* 76 τούτων οὐ τοῦ γελοίου ἕνεκα ἐπεμνήσθην, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἴδῃς, etc., but in 83 ταῦτά σοι . . . παρέδειξα . . . ὡς μὴ πάνυ ἄχθοιό μοι, etc.; the main verb in each case sums up what has gone before, and the only circumstance which differs is the voice of the verb in the final clause. Similarly καθέζοιο in *Iup. trag.* 11.

The future indicative occurs in three cases listed by Heller (p. 24); (*a*) *Iup. trag.* 27 δεῖ . . . τούτου μάλιστα πολλὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ὡς ξυνήσουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες, which is a normal noun-clause after such verbs as ὁρᾶν (Kühner–Gerth, ii. 552). (*b*) *Hist. quom.* 61 μὴ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ὁρῶν γράφε, ὡς οἱ νῦν ἐπαινέσονταί σε καὶ τιμήσουσιν is placed by Heller under the same heading. But to regard ὡς . . . τιμήσουσιν as the object of ὁρῶν is unnatural with this order of words, and it is easier to assume that ὡς has a relative sense as in (*c*) *Vit. auct.* 1 στῆσον ἑξῆς παραγαγὼν τοὺς βίους, ἀλλὰ κοσμήσας πρότερον, ὡς εὐπρόσωποι φανοῦνται καὶ ὅτι πλείστους ἐπάξονται. ὡς+subjunctive in *Anach.* 40 and ὡς+ optative in *Charon* 2, *Anach.* 1, *Ep. Sat.* 25, and *Fug.* 5 are also noun-clauses, the main verbs being respectively αἰτήσειν ἔοικα, σκεπτέον, ἱκετεύων, ἐπιστέλλω, and ἐπιμεληθῆναι; this alternative to the future indicative is quoted by Kühner–

---

[1] In *Pisc.* 7 the best sense is made by Harmon's text, omitting ὡς: ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἀλήθεια, ἐν δέοντι συνδικάζοις ἂν (ὡς) καὶ καταμηνύοις ἕκαστα.

[2] The identification of ο, ω, and later η, ει, ειη, οι of course reduced the real number of parts of Greek verbs, though distinctions in the spelling are still maintained (cf.

Hatzidakis, pp. 305 ff.). A sophist in the second century A.D. would no doubt have made ὡς εἰδῆτε sound different from ὡς εἰδείητε. The latter occurs, contrary to Lucian's practice, in *de mor. Per.* 8, but is fitting in the mouth of the man referred to as ἄλλος, who is beginning an elaborate speech.

Gerth, loc. cit., from Herodotus onwards. *De Luc.* 19 οὐχ οὕτως ἄσπορος ἡ τοῦ Πλούτωνος ἀρχὴ οὐδὲ ἐπιλέλοιπεν ἡμᾶς ὁ ἀσφόδελος, ἵνα παρ' ὑμῶν τὰ σιτία μεταστελλώμεθα is really consecutive (Kühner–Gerth, ii. 553, Anm. 3); so is *Saturnalia* 4 and possibly *Somn.* (*Gall.*) 1 and 28 ad fin. The construction of *Phal.* I. 12 is unique in Lucian: ἀπολάμβανε . . . τὸν ἄξιον μισθὸν τῆς θαυμαστῆς σου τέχνης, ἵν' ὁ διδάσκαλος τῆς μουσικῆς πρῶτος αὐτὸς αὐλῇς. The clause ἵν' . . . αὐλῇς is not final, but a noun-clause which explains μισθόν and is in apposition to it.[1] The spread of ἵνα+subjunctive as a noun-clause from sentences where it is the object (as in the examples above) to other contexts is one of the main changes which began in the Hellenistic period;[2] such clauses eventually replaced the infinitive and led to its loss from the spoken language. This is a curious lapse into κοινή idiom by such a conscientious and successful Atticist.[3]

B. J. SIMS

Newcastle upon Tyne

---

[1] A close parallel in form is St. John 17. 3 αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή, ἵνα γιγνώσκωσί σε τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν, etc.

[2] Hatzidakis, pp. 214 ff.

ETHICAL ANALYSIS IN PLATO'S
EARLIER DIALOGUES[1]

In the dialogues earlier than the *Republic*, Plato indicates in many ways his lack of confidence that any method of ethical analysis will lead to a discovery of the truth. The doubts which he expresses or implies have not always been given the attention which they deserve, and there has often been a reluctance to accept them as an expression of Plato's genuine conviction. There is, admittedly, some justification for this reluctance. Plato does not always seem to be consistent. In his attitude towards the results attainable by the use of a method of joint inquiry, he is sometimes extremely optimistic, at other times sceptical; and it seems a not unreasonable explanation of his scepticism to ascribe it to his desire to preserve a consistent portrait of the 'ignorant' Socrates. Thus the hesitation and reserve with which Plato immediately qualifies his dogmatic presentation of the theory of ἀνάμνησις in the *Meno* is explicable as a concession to dramatic realism.[2] His reference to the method discussed in the *Phaedo* as a δεύτερος πλοῦς may be dismissed as 'ironical',[3] as 'the habitual playful self-depreciation of Socrates'.[4] The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the development of Plato's views on method in the dialogues as far as the *Republic* can be traced more consistently if we accept Plato's doubts, as well as his optimism, about ethical analysis, as the expression of his genuine conviction.

In the very early dialogues which seek the definition of some 'virtue', Socrates is represented as employing a conversational method of examining familiar moral concepts. According to Socrates' frequent avowals, it is impartially conducted; it simply follows the argument indefinitely whithersoever it leads.[5] It anticipates no results; indeed Socrates' gift for dialectic is something which thwarts his desire for a definite conclusion—ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός,[6] he says to Euthyphro. He would give anything to have the arguments 'immovably settled',[7] but no definite conclusion can be reached. The discussions end negatively. The rules of the method indicate the simple aim that it professes—to promote consistency of opinion between the speakers. The rules are that there should be no disagreement between the speakers, and that any opinion expressed should not conflict, either itself or in its consequences, with any other opinion which is held just as strongly.[8] Agreement and consistency, then, are the criteria. And just as Socrates shows his uncertainty of reaching the truth by exclusive reliance on those criteria, so Adeimantus insists[9] that Socrates' ability to refute other people's opinions by applying those criteria does not make his victims any more inclined to think that the truth of Socrates' own opinions has been established. For him, as for Socrates, the criteria are in that respect inadequate.

Thus Socrates is portrayed as the 'ignorant', disinterested inquirer, illustrating in conversation how to conduct an inquiry into the meaning of a word

[1] A paper—here presented in an amended form—read to the Classical Association at its General Meeting in Bristol in April 1950.

[2] Cf. Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic* (trans. D. J. Allan), p. 6.

[3] Burnet, in his note on *Ph.* 99 c 9.

[4] A. E. Taylor, *Mind*, xlvi. 232.

[5] *Rep.* 394 d.

[6] *Euth.* 11 d; cf. *Hip. Min.* 373 b.

[7] *Euth.* 11 d.

[8] On this point see Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (1941), pp. 82–83, where full references are given.

[9] *Rep.* 487 b–d; cf. *Hip. Mai.* 304 a–b. Socrates occasionally seems to suggest that the criteria are sufficient: e.g. *Rep.* 348 a–b.

as it is used in ordinary speech, and how to avoid the inconsistencies of loose thinking. The insistence on the 'ignorance' of Socrates and on the inconclusive nature of the discussions is in marked contrast to the attitude towards Socrates of the other 'Socratic men', of Aristophanes, and of Aristotle. If we relied on the evidence of these writers rather than on Plato for our picture of Socrates, there would be practically nothing to suggest that Socrates either disclaimed knowledge or habitually showed a lack of confidence in ever reaching it by a method of joint inquiry.[1] Why then does Plato *insist* on the ignorance and scepticism of Socrates? His main purpose seems to be to point out the limitations, as far as the attainment of knowledge is concerned, of the method practised. He makes it clear that it is not a method which should lead us to anticipate any positive result, entailing as it does a virtually infinite examination of assumptions, and that even if some proposition were finally agreed upon, it would be the agreement of two particular people, a personal and particular criterion. The negative ending emphasizes too that the method is inadequate to substantiate the positive doctrine which Plato has contrived to introduce into the discussion. Thus Plato does not wish seriously to pretend that the general assumptions, through which he governs the discussion, themselves depend for their validity on the criteria of agreement and consistency. And he does indicate, though not at first explicitly, what kind of criterion is for him adequate as a criterion of knowledge. His own view is that there is necessarily an intuitive element in true knowledge. One rather interesting indication of this is the way in which he sometimes introduces into the discussion his own assumptions as 'divinations'. The verb μαντεύομαι is not one which Plato uses very often, but in its non-technical meaning of 'divining' he uses it in some significant contexts. In the *Charmides*, for example,[2] Socrates says that he does not trust his ability to decide whether σωφροσύνη is a 'knowledge of knowledge'. He divines, however (μαντεύεται), that σωφροσύνη is something useful and good (ὠφέλιμόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν), and refuses to consider the proposed definition unless it is shown to be ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν. This assumption governs the rest of the discussion; the definition is abandoned since it cannot satisfy the assumption; and at length, after throwing out various suggestions as to the required object of knowledge, Charmides is made to suggest—almost casually—the Good. The *Lysis* follows much the same course. What is loved, it is suggested early in the conversation, is what is useful and good. A wise man is everyone's friend since he is χρήσιμος καὶ ἀγαθός.[3] Attempts to reach a more exact definition fail, since Socrates wishes them to satisfy his earlier assumption. At length he introduces the solution. After some pretence of hesitation he asserts ἀπομαντευόμενος[4]—he divines—that τὸ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν is the object of affection for all who lie

---

[1] From Aristophanes, Aeschines, Xenophon, and Aristotle I can think of only two passages which might give such an impression. The first is Xen. *Mem.* 4. 4. 9, which is curiously inconsistent with the tone of the rest of the work. Socrates' dogmatic method of argument in the rest of the chapter almost suggests that Xen. introduced the preliminary remarks to enable him to correct an impression of Socratic method given by Plato. E. C. Marchant (Loeb, Introd., p. xx), in commenting on the awkwardness of the chapter as a whole, suggests as an

explanation of the content of the argument that it is designed as a corrective to Plato. Cf. *Mem.* 1. 4. 1, which seems to be pointed against the influence of Plato's presentation of Socrates. The second is Arist. *Soph. El.* 183ᵇ7. This is so exactly a description of Socrates' attitude as presented by Plato that it is most naturally explained as a reference to the Platonic Socrates. A. E. Taylor (*Varia Socratica*, p. 63) considered it 'a plain allusion to the complaint of Thrasymachus (*Rep.* 337 e)'.

[2] 169 a–b.   [3] 210 d.   [4] 216 d.

between good and evil. And this object is seen to be, ultimately, a πρῶτον φίλον, an ἀρχή,[1] the object to which the objects of all other desires are ultimately united.[2] The Form of the Good is referred to in much the same language in the *Republic*. The *Republic* describes it as that which every soul pursues as the end of all its actions, divining (ἀπομαντευομένη)[3] that it is something (τι εἶναι), that it is real. Plato divines too, as he had done in the case of σωφροσύνη in the *Charmides*, that the particular virtues must be defined in relation to the Good. A guardian who does not know how just and beautiful things are also good will be worthless. 'For I divine (μαντεύομαι),' says Socrates, 'that no one will know such things adequately until he knows the Good.'[4] And that knowledge itself must be divined. When Plato returns to the Good in the *Philebus*, he says that in trying to learn what the Good is, in man and in the universe, and what Form (ἰδέα) it has, we must divine (μαντευτέον) that Form.[5]

Plato is uneasy, however, about any direct appeal to intuition, and is anxious to show that the intuition of the philosopher is superior to that of the poet, prophet, or statesman. He is willing to grant that to poet, prophet, and states-man the truth has been revealed in moments of inspiration,[6] and speaks of the inspiration of poet and philosopher in the same terms.[7] Yet he does deny true knowledge to any but the philosopher. Poet, prophet, and statesman are ranked lower than the philosopher in their degree of insight into the truth.[8] It is in the *Meno* that he first attempts to explain at length the distinctive nature of the intuition of the philosopher. Meno asks Socrates what the criterion is of the truth of a proposition. If, he says, you do not know what a thing is at the begin-ning of an inquiry, how are you to decide which answer is the one you are looking for?[9] How are you to distinguish a true solution from one which is untrue but plausible?[10] Socrates surprisingly treats this objection as an ἐριστικὸς λόγος, but goes on to give the theory of ἀνάμνησις as an explanation of how the truth is recognized.[11] It is recognized because of its conformity with the soul's previous experience of reality. In this way ἀνάμνησις provides a criterion of knowledge as against right opinion.[12] It ties opinions down so that they cannot run away (δραπετεύειν), just as the 'ignorant' Socrates had always prayed that they might be tied down and immovably settled. This is one way of saying that in the course of an argument there does come an intuitive recognition that some view that has been formulated corresponds with the truth, a recognition accom-panied by a feeling of absolute conviction.[13] And this state of mind is in the true sense an intuition, superior to the revelation of seer and prophet; *they* have only true or right opinion.[14] Thus Plato suggests that the certain recognition which ἀνάμνησις provides is in itself a perfectly adequate reason for accepting a particular opinion as true knowledge. It shows why the opinion must be knowledge. This seems to be the meaning of the far from clear αἰτίας λογισμός of 98 a. Plato chooses the solution of a geometrical problem to illustrate the

---

[1] 219 c–d. [2] 220 b.
[3] 505 e. [4] 506 a.
[5] 64 a; cf. 67 b. In *Ph.* (84 e, 85 b) Socrates professes to have, like the swans, a gift of divination (μαντική) from Apollo, which allows him, in his swan-song, to speak of the nature of the soul and of its immorta-lity. Cf. *Apol.* 39 d; *Tht.* 142 c.
[6] *Meno* 99 c; *Apol.* 22 c; *Ion* 533 e, 534 b–d, 542 a.

[7] ἐνθουσιάζων (*Phdr.* 249 d), of the philo-sopher, and in *Meno* 99 c etc., of the poet. Cf. F. M. Cornford, *J.H.S.* lxii. 4–5.
[8] *Phdr.* 248 d–e; cf. 265 b (the madness of the 'philosophic-lover' is the *best* kind of madness). [9] 80 d.
[10] In Grote's words (*Plato*, 1865, ii, p. 16).
[11] 81 a ff. [12] 98 a.
[13] Cf. K. W. Wild, *Philosophy*, xiv. 332–4.
[14] 99 a ff.

theory, and we would agree that the logical certainty which belongs to some mathematical propositions is very naturally considered a sufficient criterion of truth. But Plato goes on to assume that the same logical certainty is attainable in ethics, and that ethical analysis can be prosecuted with the same success, the same precision and conviction, as mathematical analysis. He says that the whole of nature (ἡ φύσις ἅπασα) can be revealed in reminiscence, thanks to the kinship and interdependence pervading all nature.[1] You need recollect only a single part to make it possible to recollect all the rest (καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων). And he repeats later on that the theory is not confined to mathematical knowledge: οὗτος γὰρ (the slave) ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων.[2] Similarly in the *Phaedo* he insists with equal optimism that everything (πάντα ᾗ ἔχει 73 a) can be discovered through reminiscence 'if the proper questions are asked'. As in the *Meno*, the first illustrations come from mathematics, but Plato adds that the argument includes αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, everything in fact on which we put the seal of αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι.[3] Thus a criterion, above mere consistency and agreement, does exist to save the method of question and answer from inconclusiveness.

If such a clear-cut criterion of the truth of ethical propositions does exist, it is difficult to see at first sight why it should not apply to the introspection of the poet or to the deliberations of the statesman.[4] Yet though the distinction between knowledge and true opinion is introduced in the *Meno* strictly as a distinction between states of mind, Plato seems to suggest that it belongs peculiarly to the philosopher to be able to discover systematically through precise methods of analysis the interrelated body of truths which can be recollected. And the theory of ἀνάμνησις reflects an unusually optimistic attitude towards the possibility of achieving this. The optimism is not, however, long maintained. Socrates is made to say immediately that he does not wish to be dogmatic about the theory;[5] it is only a conjecture.[6] And Plato's re-examination of some of the main assumptions of the theory suggests that we should take the hesitation here expressed as Plato's hesitation, and not as a dramatic compromise in favour of Socrates' agnosticism.[7] What Plato is suggesting is that the λόγος is ἀληθής (81 a) in so far as it does express his conviction that ethical and mathematical truths are alike in the absolute certainty which belongs to a knowledge of them. Such knowledge is quite distinct from opinion, and this he confidently asserts.[6] And he insists that we shall be better for abandoning an attitude of complete scepticism, and for persevering in the search for the truth.[5] But he is unwilling to press the detail of the theory. Whether we do in fact reach knowledge in quite the way that the theory suggests (or quite so easily), and whether the distinction between knowledge and opinion should be explained in this particular form, are questions upon which he does not wish to be dogmatic. And Plato does show that he intends his reservation to be extended to the methodological aspect of the theory. For he

---

[1] 81 c-d.   [2] 85 e.   [3] 75 c-d.
[4] Plato does suggest (*Phdr.* 248 d-e) that their souls never had an adequate knowledge of reality before incarnation, and thus can never adequately recollect it!
[5] 86 b.   [6] 98 b.
[7] The question is an important one, as

Stenzel insists (op. cit., p. 6). Cornford (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 3) thought that 'owing to Plato's dramatic method we cannot fix the extent of Socrates' reservation'. His own view was that the reservation extended only to 'the details of re-incarnation, purgatory, and so forth' (ibid.).

examines further, with a less optimistic attitude, the implicit assumption of the theory that ethical analysis can give the same sure results as mathematical analysis, and in addition attempts to find an alternative explanation of the αἰτίας λογισμός which in the *Meno* was made equivalent to ἀνάμνησις.

It is in the *Meno* that Plato first makes a tentative application to ethical problems of a new and more precise method of analysis. The ensuing discussion provides a striking contrast to the previous triumphant dialogue with the slave. The context is a very familiar one. The problem before Meno and Socrates is whether or not virtue can be taught. And Socrates suggests that the question may be examined ἐξ ὑποθέσεως,[1] by a method of hypothesis as used in geometry. It is the method later to be known as geometrical analysis.[2] And Plato soon shows his lack of confidence that in its application to ethical analysis it will lead to a discovery of the truth, or to the same definite solution of particular problems as in geometry. In its application in geometry it is described by Pappus[3] as a method in which, assuming your problem to be solved, you look for the prior proposition from which the solution follows, and then again for the proposition prior to that, until by tracing your steps backwards in this way you reach something already known or standing as a first principle. Applying this procedure to the problem of whether virtue can be taught, Socrates and Meno ask on what assumption virtue would be teachable, and try to reach, by analysis, a proposition to which they both agree. This they fail to reach. Moreover, Plato clearly confesses that for the discovery of the 'essence' of a thing the method is quite inadequate. It is only under considerable protest that Socrates agrees to consider at all the question of whether virtue can be taught, since it involves postulating what *kind* of thing virtue is before it is known what virtue is.[4] And no hypothesis about the qualities which virtue possesses will lead to a knowledge of virtue itself. You cannot in fact say anything about it until you know what it is. Thus in ethics the method can never rise above the hypothetical, and is treated here as a *pis-aller*.[5] There is nothing known, nothing standing as a first principle, to which problems can be 'tied' as in geometry, and thus be capable of demonstration.

The knowledge of such a first principle in ethics, the good, had always been demanded as necessary by Plato if the εἶδος of any particular virtue was to be known. And in the *Phaedo* the method ἐξ ὑποθέσεως is further examined in the context of a search for the good (99 c 5) considered as a final and universal cause. It is introduced as a δεύτερος πλοῦς,[6] just as in the *Meno* it was treated as a *pis-aller*. A δεύτερος πλοῦς is neither so venturesome nor so easy as a πρῶτος πλοῦς; it is embarked upon more soberly, with high hopes left behind, and with the expectation of a struggle against odds, toiling, as it were, with the sweat of the oars for want of a fair wind. The remarks of Simmias earlier in the dialogue[7] bring out the force of the reference in the present context. In replying to Socrates' swan-song, Simmias expresses scepticism about the possibility of clear

[1] 86 e.

[2] Farquharson, *C.Q.* xvii. 21; Cornford, *Mind*, N.S. xli. 40, 43.

[3] 7 Introd.; quoted and translated by Cornford, *Mind*, N.S. xli. 46.   [4] 86 d–e.

[5] Cf. V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon* (Paris, 1947), pp. 124–7.

[6] For the meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς see Burnet's note on *Ph.* 99 c 9; W. J. Goodrich,

C.R. xvii. 381–2; N. R. Murphy, *C.Q.* xxx. 41–44; and the references to Kock given by W. C. Greene, *Scholia Platonica*, p. 14. It is not suggested that the method of the δεύτερος πλοῦς is inferior to the method of physical observation. The method is 'second-best' in the sense that its limitations are acknowledged as far as realizing the hopes of the πρῶτος πλοῦς is concerned.   [7] 85 c–d.

knowledge. If, he says, you are unable to learn the truth from others or discover it yourself—perhaps through some divinely inspired argument—then the best you can do is to adopt from human arguments the best and the most difficult to refute (δυσεξελεγκτότατον), and trust yourself to this raft in your voyage through life. Socrates explains the circumstances of his own δεύτερος πλοῦς in the same general terms.[1] He has seen that the cause he is looking for, the final cause, is the Good. He fails, however, either to trace out the principle for himself or to find a teacher who will explain to him the processes of the physical universe in the light of it. Consequently he takes the 'second-best' course—the examination of human arguments. From these he will select the most difficult to refute. This new method, it is important to note, is explicitly dissociated from the search for the Good—[2] that hope was abandoned with the failure of the first voyage. Nor is it suggested that *any* definite conclusion can be reached. When Socrates proceeds to give details[3] of the method he lays great stress on the provisional nature of any results obtained by it. The detail shows that the method, in so far as it goes beyond the method of the very early dialogues, is that of the *Meno*, though the development is here represented rather as a direct development of Socratic method than as a method borrowed from geometry. There is no pretence to the *precision* of geometrical analysis. The only criteria appealed to are consistency and agreement between the speakers.[4] And the analysis is continued merely until a proposition is reached which secures the agreement of the company (τι ἱκανόν).[5] The *Phaedo* does, admittedly, reflect a rather more confident attitude towards ethical analysis than the *Meno* and the very early dialogues. Socrates is intent on holding on to his postulate once he is convinced that it is free from inconsistency. He intends to use it to make further deductions, and if it is challenged he proposes, not to abandon it, but to show its dependence on something to which all the company agree. And he is quite confident of being able to do this. He does anticipate a series of provisional results. But clear knowledge—τὸ σαφὲς εἰδέναι —lies beyond the method. Plato makes no appeal here to reminiscence or to intuition. Indeed his remarks amount to a criticism of the theory of ἀνάμνησις as unduly optimistic in its attitude to ethical analysis, and he appears to be attempting to give a different explanation of the αἰτίας λογισμός of the *Meno*. The resort to a higher hypothesis is described as 'giving an account'[6] of the lower one, and Plato seems to be trying to find his 'account' within the confines of the hypothetical method, without resort to the succession of intuitions envisaged in the ἀνάμνησις theory. The attempt represents an alternative explanation of how opinions may be 'tied' to knowledge. They may be so 'tied' by linking them with more general assumptions. Plato does not, unfortunately, give an example of this procedure. He restricts himself to a particular demonstration from the postulate that there are Forms, without questioning the postulate itself, since it has satisfied the criteria of agreement and consistency. He does, however, at the end of the demonstration, reiterate his lack of confidence in human arguments, both through Simmias' remarks (καὶ τὴν ἀνθρω-πίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν κτλ. 107 b), and through

---

[1] 99 c.   [2] 99 c–d.   (100 b).   [5] 101 e.
[3] For a full and valuable discussion of the details see Richard Robinson, op. cit., pp. 128–47.
[4] συμφωνεῖν (100 a, 101 d), συγχωρεῖν

[6] 101 d; cf. 76 b, where the distinctive ability of the ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος to 'give an account' (δοῦναι λόγον) is associated, as in the *Meno*, with ἀνάμνησις.

Socrates' insistence[1] that one's primary postulates (τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας) must never be taken for granted, and that the further analysis of them is necessarily restricted by the limitations of human argument.[2]

Stenzel explains these doubts as part of Plato's attempt to retain a consistent portrait of Socrates.[3] He seems to feel that this is the only way to explain why the *Phaedo* should dissociate the method ἐξ ὑποθέσεως from the search for a metaphysical first principle, whereas the *Republic* should not do so. He points out quite rightly that this difference should not be explained by postulating a development in Plato's metaphysical doctrine between the two dialogues;[4] the *Phaedo* does recognize the Good as the true cause. He suggests further that if we accept Socrates' doubts in the *Phaedo* as Plato's doubts, then Plato would appear to be presenting the Forms in the *Phaedo* as 'hypotheses' without 'metaphysical significance', and that this is quite inconsistent with the evidence that Plato's metaphysical doctrine has not developed between the *Phaedo* and *Republic*.[5] This argument seems to confuse a difference of attitude towards the question of how we come to a knowledge of a thing, with a difference of view about the nature of the object to be known. Plato is viewing the question of method in retrospect. One of the purposes of the dialogues is to suggest to others some method which will lead them to see the truth as Plato sees it, and to realize the ideals which he puts before them. And Plato's various attempts to find a method adequate to lead to a discovery of the Forms reflect his growing appreciation of the difficulties in the way of certainty. This does not alter his conviction of the reality and 'metaphysical significance' of the Forms. The *Republic* reiterates that conviction, and at the same time attempts to overcome the doubts and misgivings of the *Meno* and *Phaedo* by making a different approach to the problems of method.

This difference of approach is very noticeable. The political idealism of the *Republic* demanded, of course, that to some few at least insight into the Good should be granted.[6] There must be no room for scepticism in the education of philosopher-kings; and the influence of the purpose of this particular dialogue on Plato's attitude towards method should not be overlooked. The programme of education is very carefully planned to forestall scepticism. It is significant that the prospective rulers of the State are forbidden to indulge in dialectical debate until they are thirty years of age, or to pursue any method of inquiry into ethical problems. The beautiful, the just, and the good are explicitly mentioned as subjects to be avoided.[7] To pursue them would, Plato fears, make the Guardians objects of pity, and discredit both themselves and the whole cause of philosophy.[8] Plato prefers to ground the education of the Guardians on a study of those sciences through which he has most faith that the intelligible world can be ordered, on the mathematical sciences. And the method which will lead them to view these sciences synoptically, lead them in truth to real being,[9] is the method of analysis of the *Meno* and *Phaedo*. The only difference is in the scope and purpose of the analysis. The analysis is now extended beyond what ranked as first principles, those principles which constituted at the time the limits of mathematical analysis. It is continued until such assumptions are themselves united under a single principle (ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχή), a principle moreover which is 'not hypothetical'. In the light of that principle the assumptions will no

---

[1] 107 b.   [2] 107 b 8.   [5] Ibid., pp. 10–12.
[3] Op. cit., pp. 12–14.   [6] *Rep.* 517 c; cf. Stenzel, op. cit., p. 46.
[4] Ibid., pp. 10–11.   [7] 538 d–e.   [8] 539 c.   [9] 537 c–d.

longer be assumptions: as assumptions they will be 'destroyed'.[1] Plato adds little precise information about the nature of the method in the *Republic*. He is more concerned with emphasizing its scope. That is why Glaucon's request to be told the methods of dialectic is met by a statement of its results. It is significant that when Plato attempts to state with some precision in what direction dialectic extends its analysis,[2] he mentions exclusively the mathematical sciences, merely *implying* that the same method can be applied successfully to moral and practical notions. We are left to infer in fact how moral and practical notions are incorporated in this scientific ascent. Plato appears to be resolving his doubts about the method of ethics by assimilating ethics more closely to mathematics, a step which would provide an escape from verbalism, 'from the vaguely defined relations which result from a simple play of concepts'.[3] The precise relations that he demanded could be found in mathematics. And with this emphasis on mathematics it is not surprising that no appeal is made in the *Republic* to reminiscence, although Plato's previous optimism had coincided with the introduction of that theory. There is no need now to appeal to it, for with his increasing confidence in the scope of mathematical interpretation Plato no doubt felt that the essential point of the theory could be safely assumed without further illustration. What is perhaps surprising is to find Plato talking for a moment in terms of the elenchus and of the method of the very early dialogues when he discusses the definition of the Good.[4] This passage certainly appears to be inconsistent with the previous passages dealing with the 'upward path'. It led Professor Cornford to postulate two different methods of research in the *Republic*, one for mathematics and one for ethics.[5] Yet Plato would surely have been more explicit about this if he had in fact intended that there should be two separate 'upward paths'. What he envisaged was a single method to embrace in its application both ethical and mathematical knowledge, and, as we have seen, he did try to apply to ethical analysis methods more obviously applicable to mathematics. And he did confess that the same sure and precise results could not, in ethics, be expected. Plato always felt, I think, that the approximative method of the 'Socratic' dialectic was the method ideally suited to ethical inquiry. It was his desire to treat ethics as a highly exact science which led him to try to apply to it more precise methods, and to anticipate, as he seems to do in the *Republic* after many previous misgivings, that both ethics and mathematics could be incorporated in a single upward path ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν, and the functions of dialectic thus unified. It is

---

[1] 533 c (τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα). There has been considerable discussion of this phrase. The main reasons for interpreting it in the sense of 'destroying as ultimate principles', by showing the ὑποθέσεις to be merely derivative, are (a) the object to be understood after βεβαιώσηται (533 d 1) must clearly be ὑποθέσεις, and it is inconsistent to speak of confirming the ὑποθέσεις by 'overthrowing them like bad definitions of justice' (cf. the use of βεβαιοῦσθαι in *Phil.* 14 c, *Lach.* 194 c, 200 b, *Soph.* 250 c); (b) this interpretation is more consistent with the previous discussion of method, particularly 511 a–b. The context itself supports this interpretation. The distinctive power of dialectic is its ability to give an account of its ὑποθέσεις, in

contrast to the deductive method of mathematics which leaves its ὑποθέσεις unexplained (533 c 1–3). And λόγον διδόναι is explained in *Ph.* 101 d as confirming an original postulate by deriving it from some higher principle: cf. λόγον διδόναι in *Rep.* 510 c. It should be noted that 533 c is the only instance in Plato of ἀναιρεῖν used in reference to method, and that the word does not seem to have acquired a strictly logical meaning before Aristotle. It is not safe to argue from Aristotle's use of the word, especially when we remember that Plato suits his vocabulary to the needs of familiar conversation.

[2] i.e. in the Divided Line.

[3] L. Robin, *Platon*, p. 332.

[4] 534 b–c.   [5] *Mind.* N.S., xli. 167–83.

very doubtful of course whether he had seriously considered the detailed application of this analytic procedure, or whether he was convinced at this stage that ethical analysis could successfully be extended in the systematic manner envisaged by the *Republic*. The inconsistency we have mentioned suggests that he still found it natural to treat ethical analysis as different in its procedure from mathematical analysis, and that he still doubted the assumptions implicit in the previous description of the 'upward path'. That description, and the assumptions it makes, may not after all be true: θεὸς δέ που οἶδεν εἰ ἀληθὴς οὖσα (ἡ ἐμὴ ἐλπὶς) τυγχάνει (517 b). Plato still recognized the ethical limitations of the method ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, and had still to find a method adequate to his purpose.

In this general survey I have tried to show that the development of ethical analysis in Plato's earlier dialogues can be traced most consistently on the assumption that Plato is throughout expressing his own views. The assumption that any reservations and criticisms are merely dramatic concessions tends to isolate the various discussions on method, treating them as though they each afforded a finished solution, and consequently obscuring the connexion between them. Thus in the *Meno* reminiscence is treated as a theory which, with no reservations, answers the problem of an adequate criterion of knowledge. In the *Phaedo* consistency is treated as an answer to the same problem, the indication of its limitations being dismissed as ironical. In the *Republic* Plato's reluctance to dogmatize about the Good[1] or about the method of attaining it[2] is explained as the uncertainty and diffidence proper to Socrates.[3] The explanation of the reservations and criticisms as Plato's way of indicating that the solutions he offers are merely provisional and subject to criticism and further development is thus passed over in favour of an explanation in terms of Socratic portraiture. Such an explanation would perhaps be more acceptable if the 'Socratic' traits on which it relied were in fact important traits in Socrates' own philosophy. I have suggested that these traits belong almost exclusively to Plato's portrait of Socrates, and that it is therefore probable that Plato had more serious purposes in introducing them than the preservation of a realistic portrait.

NORMAN GULLEY

University of Bristol

[1] 505 a, 506 d–e.   [2] 533 a.   [3] Stenzel, op. cit., p. 15.

WHO INVENTED THE GOLDEN AGE?

THERE are many passages in ancient literature which depict an imaginary existence different from the hardships of real life—an existence blessed with Nature's bounty, untroubled by strife or want. Naturally this happy state is always placed somewhere or sometime outside normal human experience, whether 'off the map' in some remote quarter of the world, or in Elysium after death, or in the dim future or the distant past.[1] Such an imaginary time of bliss in the past or the future has become known as the 'golden age'. This is the name which modern scholars generally give to the ancient belief. The phrase is often echoed by modern poets. The same language has been transferred from the unknown to the known, and it has become a commonplace to describe an outstanding period of history or literature as a 'golden age'.

The view put forward in this article is that, in spite of modern usage, phrases implying a connexion with gold were not the terms traditionally or normally employed in antiquity, at any rate before the Roman Empire, to describe an idealized past or future, but were first introduced by Hesiod and used later only by writers who, directly or indirectly, derived the concept from him. To be more precise, by considering the relevant passages from ancient authors I shall attempt to establish five points:

   (i) the picture of a happy existence remote from ordinary life was traditional, or at least came from sources earlier than any extant classical literature;

  (ii) this traditional picture was normally known in antiquity before the Roman Empire as the age of Kronos or Saturnus;

 (iii) gold and the use of gold had no place in the traditional picture;

 (iv) terms which associate the traditional picture with gold are all ultimately derived from Hesiod's χρύσεον γένος, and the phrase 'golden age' emerged out of this among Latin writers of the Augustan and post-Augustan periods;

  (v) it is reasonable to conclude that Hesiod invented this association with gold, or at any rate was the first to introduce it into Greek thought.

I. THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE

There is no need to labour the point that the idea of a different and happier existence is a traditional belief going back beyond any extant classical literature. When first mentioned in the *Works and Days* (42–46) it is not explained, but briefly alluded to as the state which men would now enjoy if the gods had not hidden the means of life from them. Only later (90–92), as a prelude to the story of Pandora's box, is it said that this happy condition existed in the past. As Sinclair comments ad loc., 'the previous state of man is only clearly explained now. Of course it was well known to the audience all along.' A fuller description is given in the account of the χρύσεον γένος (109–20). Thereafter more or less the same picture is given again as the life of heroes transported to

---

[1] Whatever the time or place, the picture itself is essentially the same. Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, Engl. tr., pp. 76 and 249 (n. 18).

the Islands of the Blest (166–73), and as the reward of those who follow justice (225–37).

The conclusion seems clear that the idea of such an existence was not only familiar to Hesiod's contemporaries, but had already taken several different forms, none of which is brought forward by the poet as anything new. References in later literature show an even greater variety of belief about the time and place of the happier life—a variety which cannot be traced back to Hesiod or any other single source, but suggests an old and widespread tradition handled at different times and places, and by different authors, in many different ways.[1]

If further confirmation is needed, it may be drawn from the character of the picture itself. The joining of nature and man in the same state of felicity, the uncertainty concerning its time and place, possibility or impossibility—all these and other features stamp the picture as a typical piece of primitive thinking, to which, of course, many parallels can be found elsewhere.

2. THE REIGN OF KRONOS

Among men whose thoughts took a mythical rather than an abstract form the remote past, the past beyond normal human ken, might well be described in terms of an earlier divine régime than the present—the reign of Kronos, for example, before the lordship of Zeus. This connexion of the 'good old days' with Kronos also occurs for the first time in literature in the *Works and Days*, where it is said of the χρύσεον γένος (111):

οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Κρόνου ἦσαν, ὅτ' οὐρανῷ ἐμβασίλευεν.

Hesiod does not attempt to explain or justify this statement. Later evidence shows that the association with Kronos was taken for granted both by writers and the common people. The author of the *Alcmaeonis* is said to have described the happiness τῆς ἐπὶ Κρόνου ζωῆς.[2] When the peasantry of Attica praised Peisistratus' régime they compared it with ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος, not the 'golden age'.[3] When Cratinus put before the same peasants' descendants the first of the remarkable series of caricatures of Utopia drawn by the fifth-century comic poets, he described the men of old as those

οἷς δὴ βασιλεὺς Κρόνος ἦν τὸ παλαιόν.[4]

How familiar the idea was to the popular mind is indicated by Aristophanes' readiness to use it in jokes against out-of-date, 'antediluvian' characters. Strepsiades is Κρονίων ὄζων, the Right Logic, κρόνιππος; Chremylus and Blepsidemus have Κρονικαὶ λῆμαι in their minds.[5] When Plato in the *Politicus* (268 e–74 d) and the *Laws* (712 e–14 b) gives his own version of the belief in a happier past existence, he calls it the reign or the time of Kronos, never the 'golden age'. Exceptions to the general rule only confirm it: when Empedocles (fr. 128) insists that Kypris was queen in those early days, and the Orphics put

---

[1] The tradition, of course, may not be Greek in origin, but may have been derived by the Greeks from the East, where various parallels can be found, or shared by them with other peoples of the ancient world. Nilsson (*Minoan-Mycenaean Religion*, p. 545) has shown that one version at any rate—the concept of Elysium—can be traced back through the Minoans to Egypt. The question whether the reference to Elysium in the *Odyssey* (4. 561–9) is earlier than Hesiod does not affect my argument.

[2] *ap.* Philodemus, *De Pietate*, p. 51 (Gomperz).

[3] Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 16. 7; cf. [Pl.] *Hipparchus*, 229 b.

[4] *ap.* Athenaeus 6. 267 e. For evidence that this was the first of such caricatures cf. 268 e.

[5] *Clouds* 398, 1070; *Plutus* 581. Cf. *Clouds* 929.

Phanes first and relegate Kronos to the silver age,[1] these are clearly divergences deliberately made by philosophers from a generally accepted belief.

Among Latin writers, of course, Kronos was commonly replaced by Saturnus, and *Saturnia regna* became a customary description of a happier existence in the past or to come. There is no need to consider here the difficult question whether Saturn owed his connexion with such blissful times entirely to his Greek counterpart, or derived it also from a separate Italian tradition and the nature of his own cult.

Nilsson holds that all this began with Hesiod: 'Das erste Anzeichen findet sich schon an der Stelle der Werke, nach der das goldene Geschlecht von den Göttern unter Kronos geschaffen wurde (109 ff.). Dann ist der ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος gleich dem goldenen Zeitalter ein geläufiger Ausdruck geworden.'[2] He treats the idea of Kronos as ruler of Elysium, first mentioned in Pindar's second *Olympian*,[3] as a still later development. But there are reasons for regarding both conceptions as much older than this—for seeing the link with the god as part of what I have called the 'traditional picture', from which his rule both over the 'good old days' and over Elysium can be derived. Those versions of the picture which call it only the age of Kronos, unlike those which include phrases like the 'golden race' or the 'golden age', seem to represent an independent tradition and show no clear evidence of derivation from the *Works and Days*. Further confirmation may be sought in the various parallels contained in Eastern literature, notably the Indo-Iranian myth in which Yima of the *Avesta* and Yama of the *Vedas* must have had their common source—the story of a past age of happiness under a ruler who, when it ended, became lord of a Paradise inhabited by the souls of the blessed. Whatever the connexion—if any—between the Greek version and such Eastern beliefs, they suggest that Kronos' association with the 'good old days' and with Elysium is likely to be a tradition older than Hesiod.

This is not the place to discuss the general problem of Kronos' origins and history, but the line of thought followed above is clearly in close accord with the widely accepted view[4] of him as an early harvest-god, displaced by Zeus, but leaving some relic of his worship in the Kronia. The 'traditional picture' is one that must have grown up and been kept alive among the country-folk, and it is no accident that our chief early sources for it are the farmer-poet Hesiod and the writers of Attic comedy. It was the hard-worked peasant, the weary harvester, who longed for nature to produce her fruits without ploughing or reaping, and dreamed of the time when

$$καρπὸν \ldots ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα$$
$$αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον.[5]$$

For such a picture no more suitable central figure could have been found than the harvest-god at whose festival, as Pohlenz says, 'mochte man sich eine Zeitlang in die schönere Welt versetzt glauben, die man damals wie heutzutage gern in *die gute alte Zeit* verlegte'.[6]

Tradition, it is suggested, made Kronos ruler of the 'good old days' and of

---

[1] Cf. Proclus, *in Remp.* 2, p. 74 (Kroll).

[2] *Geschichte d. Gr. Religion*, i. 485.

[3] I assume that *Works and Days* 169 is spurious.

[4] Adopted by Kaibel, Pohlenz, Farnell;

rejected by Nilsson, op. cit., pp. 480–6, but reaffirmed by Guthrie, *The Greeks and their Gods*, pp. 52–53.

[5] *Works and Days* 117–18.

[6] P.–W., s.v. 'Kronos', col. 2007.

Elysium long before he became the villain of the *Theogony*. The idea that he owed his lordship of Elysium to a forgiving Zeus must then be regarded as a later attempt to reconcile the traditional view of him with the story of Zeus' rise to power among the gods.

3. GOLD AND THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE

The keynote of the traditional picture as Hesiod and others present it is not wealth, but simplicity; not accumulated riches, but dependence on the bounty of nature. Two apparent exceptions to this general statement must be considered:

(a) Pindar's Isles of the Blest contain flowers of gold (*Ol.* 2. 72) and golden fruits[1] (fr. 129). But Pindar's Paradise, though no doubt ultimately derived from the traditional idea of the happy life, is a dwelling for aristocrats, described (at any rate in *Ol.* 2) to please a noble and wealthy patron.

(b) Some descriptions by the comic poets portray a life of luxury, in which Gomme finds a parallel to Thucydides' reference to more luxurious days in Athens' early history.[2] But the elaboration in these passages from comedy only arises from the playwrights' desire to caricature the traditional belief by carrying it to absurd lengths—in particular, the idea of Nature producing her fruits of her own accord. Hence Telecleides' rivers of soup and self-frying fish, and Crates' self-moving gadgets which will end the need for slaves. Although Cratinus called his play on this theme *Riches*, there is nothing in our remains of fifth-century comedy to disprove the general claim that in the traditional conception of an ideal past or future there was no place for gold or the use of gold.

This paradox, that gold played no part in the generally accepted picture of those whom Hesiod called the 'golden race', raises the problem of the meaning of χρύσεος and its Latin equivalent, *aureus*. How far were the words literally meant, and how far was their use metaphorical or symbolic? For Hesiod the question probably did not exist. His 'bronze race' and 'iron race' are so called because they use these metals (cf. *Works and Days* 150–1), but he does not explain—and presumably did not ask himself—in what sense the first race was χρύσεον. The question is first brought forward by Plato in the *Cratylus* (398 a), where Socrates argues that Hesiod meant by 'golden' οὐκ ἐκ χρυσοῦ πεφυκὸς ἀλλ' ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν.

Most Roman writers did not take *aureus* literally. Seneca, it is true, cites the use of the phrase *aureum saeculum* as evidence of the prevailing admiration for gold and wealth,[3] while Ovid follows the same line of thought to satirize modern methods of courtship:

> aurea sunt vere nunc saecula: plurimus auro
> venit honos, auro conciliatur amor.[4]

But Ovid's *vere* confirms the impression that for the Latin poets the word

---

[1] If Boeckh's χρυσέοις καρποῖς is correct for the MSS. χρυσοκάρποισι. Paton (*C.R.* xxv, 1911, p. 205) suggests that χρυσόκαρπος may be a yellow-berried ivy, or perhaps mistletoe. But it seems more likely that Pindar has in mind the golden apples of the Hesperides.

[2] *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. i, p. 104. [3] *Epistle* 115. 13.

[4] *Ars Amat.* 2. 277–8. Cf. Tibullus 1. 10. 2: the inventor of the sword is *vere ferreus*, not merely one of the iron race in the normally accepted sense.

aureus in such phrases did not normally imply any literal connexion with gold. Consequently it was they who gave clearest expression to the paradox that the 'golden age' knew nothing of gold. In their accounts of mankind's degeneration from the 'good old days' they found a place for the use of gold, but not as a feature of the ideal past. Like Lucretius[1] they regarded gold as a later discovery which was one of the causes of decline. 'Divitis hoc vitium est auri', says Tibullus (1. 10. 7), complaining that the sword has replaced the ancient simplicity and peace. Ovid describes the gold, silver, and bronze races, but introduces the use of gold only in the iron age:

> iamque nocens ferrum ferroque nocentius aurum
> prodierat.[2]

Seneca, describing those who lived 'illo saeculo, quod aureum perhibent', declares: 'illi quidem non aurum nec argentum nec perlucidos lapides in ima terrarum faece quaerebant. . . . nondum texebatur aurum, adhuc nec eruebatur.'[3]

4. From 'Golden Race' to 'Golden Age'

To trace the line of thought which Hesiod started with his 'golden race', and out of which writers under his influence developed the concept of the 'golden age', brief consideration is needed of the numerous passages after Hesiod which use language of this kind.

According to Proclus (*in Remp.* 2, p. 74 Kroll) Orpheus distinguished three races of men—the golden, the silver, and the Titanic. We cannot date this doctrine, but it is certainly later than Hesiod and, as already stated, looks like a deliberate divergence from his account of the races of man. As Guthrie says, 'the Orphics adopted the succession of ages and adapted and altered it to fit their own scheme'.[4]

The comic poet Eupolis wrote a play called Χρυσοῦν Γένος, perhaps a satire on Cleon's régime. The title is presumably drawn from the *Works and Days*:

> χρύσεον μὲν πρώτιστα γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων . . . .

Plato, *Republic* 3. 415. Socrates' 'noble falsehood' is not strictly relevant to discussion of the 'golden age', but may be mentioned as evidence that the association of different γένη with metals was derived from the *Works and Days* rather than from a general tradition. Plato specifically acknowledges his indebtedness to Hesiod for the idea (546 e; cf. 468 a). The line of thought which led him from Hesiod to the 'noble falsehood' is apparent in the *Cratylus* passage already mentioned (398 a); and here also the doctrine that χρυσοῦν γένος τὸ πρῶτον γενέσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων is ascribed expressly to Hesiod, not to any wider tradition.

According to Porphyry (*De Abstin.* 4. 2) Dicaearchus in his Βίος Ἑλλάδος stated that the men of old were regarded as a χρυσοῦν γένος. He went on to say that the poets gave them this name, and quoted *Works and Days* 116–19.

---

[1] 5. 1113–14, 1241, 1423, 1428.
[2] *Met.* 1. 141–2. Cf. *Amores* 3. 8. 35–38.
[3] *Epistle* 90. 5 and 45. If Bücheler's reading *secutast* is right in para. 36, Seneca is here describing an age that followed the golden age. But the conclusion that the people of the golden age had no knowledge of gold

remains valid. Cf. *Phaedra* 527–8, [*Octavia*] 419 and 426; also Virgil, *Georgic* 2. 507; Propertius 3. 13; Manilius 1. 75 and 5. 277, 293; Persius 2. 59–60; Boethius, *De Consol. Phil.* 2. 5.
[4] *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, p. 197.

Aratus, *Phaenomena* 96 ff. Aratus is describing the constellation Παρθένος, who once lived among men and was called Δίκη. Her stay lasted and brought peace and well-being to the world 'as long as the earth nourished the golden race (γένος χρύσειον)'. With the silver race (ἀργύρεον γένος) she associated less readily, and at the coming of the bronze race (χαλκείη γενεή) she departed. Aratus is obviously drawing from Hesiod here, as he often does elsewhere.[1]

Theocritus 12. 15–16. The poet prays that he and his beloved may become a song on the lips of posterity, telling that such lovers must have belonged to the golden race:

> ἀλλήλους δ' ἐφίλησαν ἴσῳ ζυγῷ. ἦ ῥα τότ' ἦσαν
> χρύσειοι πάλιν ἄνδρες, ὅτ' ἀντεφίλησ' ὁ φιληθείς.

A contemporary parallel, pointed out by Gow ad loc., is Arcesilaus' statement (Diog. Laert. 4. 22) that Crates and Polemo were θεοί τινες ἢ λείψανα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους.

These Greek authors, like Hesiod, all refer to a golden *race*. It is only in Latin poetry that this is sometimes replaced by a golden *age*, and here careful examination of the relevant passages suggests that *aurea saecula* and *aurea aetas*, usually translated 'golden age', were often intended by the poets as equivalents of Hesiod's χρύσεον γένος. The transition to 'golden age' may well have been facilitated by the ambiguity of *aetas* and *saecula*.

Horace, *Epode* 16. To escape the disasters threatening Rome the good must depart to *beata arva divites et insulas*. Horace's description of the happy life there follows the traditional picture, but contains no reference to gold until it ends with four lines clearly reminiscent of Hesiod:

> Iuppiter illa piae secrevit litora genti
>   ut inquinavit aere tempus aureum;
> aere, dehinc ferro duravit saecula, quorum
>   piis secunda vate me datur fuga.

Tempus aureum is clear enough, and *saecula* also probably, but not certainly, means 'time' rather than 'race'. It is Jupiter, like Zeus in the *Works and Days*, who is responsible for the successive stages, but Horace's link between the Isles of the Blest and the 'golden age' in the past may be his own idea.

Horace, *Odes* 4. 2. 39–40. Fate and the gods will give nothing better than Caesar to man

> quamvis redeant in aurum
tempora priscum.

This looks like an echo of Virgil's *Fourth Eclogue*, but the reference is too slight to give any clear indication of the source of its thought.

Virgil, *Eclogue* 4. Virgil's prophecy combines ideas drawn from several origins, but one of these is obviously the *Works and Days*. His debt to Hesiod is apparent in lines 6–10, in which *progenies* and *gens* are equivalents for Hesiod's γένος:

> iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna;
> iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.
> tu modo nascenti puero, quo ferrea primum

---

[1] Cicero in the *De Nat. Deorum* (2. 159) quotes three lines of this Aratus passage in translation, incorrectly giving *ferrea proles* for χαλκείη γενεή, and contrasts this with the *aureum genus*. Another Latin version is Germanicus, *Aratea* 103 ff.

> desinet ac toto surget gens aurea mundo,
> casta fave Lucina: tuus iam regnat Apollo.

This is the only reference in the poem to gold.

Virgil, *Georgic* 2. 458–540. The farmer's happy lot is described in lines often reminiscent of Hesiod. This was the life of the good old days, and before the time of Jupiter

> aureus hanc vitam in terris Saturnus agebat.

The traditional 'reign of Kronos' has so far coalesced with Hesiod's version that Saturn himself has become 'golden'.

Virgil, *Aeneid* 6. 791–3. Anchises points out Augustus Caesar as the man

> aurea condet
> saecula qui rursus Latio, regnata per arva
> saturno quondam.

Saecula here may mean either 'race' or 'age'. This brief identification of *aurea saecula* with the reign of Saturn is expanded in *Aeneid* 8. 314–29, when Evander describes to Aeneas the early history of Italy. Saturn, he says, came to Italy after being expelled by Jupiter from Olympus, and brought civilization to the primitive inhabitants. He goes on:

> aurea, quae perhibent, illo sub rege fuerunt
> saecula: sic placida populos in pace regebat;
> deterior donec paulatim ac decolor aetas
> et belli rabies et amor successit habendi.

The meaning of neither *saecula* nor *aetas* is clear here, but the adjective *decolor* obviously refers to Hesiod's story of the metals, denoting the inferior brightness of bronze or iron when compared with gold.[1]

Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1. 89–150. This is the fullest of all accounts, after Hesiod, of the successive ages of man. Ovid, of course, puts the whole story into the past, and he omits the race of heroes. But it is manifest that he is indebted to the *Works and Days* both for the general framework of his narrative and for many details. His initial 'aurea prima sata est aetas' (89) is a clear echo of Hesiod's χρύσεον μὲν πρώτιστα γένος . . ., and *aetas* should be translated 'race'. The golden race in the time of Saturn is succeeded under Jupiter by 'argentea proles, auro deterior', and this in turn gives way to a bronze race 'saevior ingeniis et ad horrida promptior arma'. Compare Hesiod's description (145–6) of the χάλκειον γένος as

> δεινόν τε καὶ ὄβριμον οἷσιν Ἄρηος
> ἔργ' ἔμελεν στονόεντα καὶ ὕβριες.

The number of such parallels leaves no doubt that Ovid had the *Works and Days* in front of him, in writing or in memory, when he composed his version of the decline of man. He puts two further reminiscences of Hesiod into the mouth of Pythagoras in Book 15:

(a) 96–98.　　at vetus illa aetas, cui fecimus aurea nomen,
　　　　　　fetibus arboreis et, quas humus educat, herbis
　　　　　　fortunata fuit nec polluit ora cruore.

---

[1] Cf. Conington on 324.

That *aetas* here means *race* is shown by its use as subject of *polluit ora cruore*.

(*b*) 260–1.   sic ad ferrum venistis ab auro,
          saecula.

Saecula here could be either 'ages' or 'races'.

Ars Amatoria 2. 277–8 has already been quoted in section 3.

After the Augustan period *aurea saecula* and similar phrases become a commonplace of Latin literature. The author of *Aetna* (line 9) regards this as a hackneyed theme:

          aurea securi quis nescit saecula regis?

Tacitus (*Dial.* 12. 3) describes such terms as customary: 'ceterum felix illud et, ut more nostro loquar, aureum saeculum . . . '. In Florus (1. 19. 2–3) we find the contrast between 'golden' and 'iron' ages already transferred to periods in the history of the Roman Republic. To Juvenal (13. 28–59) the idea is so well known that he caricatures it by exaggeration: we have now reached the *nona aetas*, for which no metal has been named. The commonest motive for allusion to the 'golden age', or 'golden race', is flattery of the emperor as creator of a new millennium. Begun by Horace (*Odes* 4. 2) and Virgil (*Aeneid* 6. 791–3), this now becomes a regular means of currying favour,[1] although one anonymous versifier quoted by Suetonius (*Tib.* 59) puts such language to a different use:

          aurea mutasti Saturni saecula, Caesar;
          incolumi nam te ferrea semper erunt.

There is nothing to be gained here from examination of every passage: the concept has now become so familiar that in most instances we can no longer decide whether the author has drawn it directly from Hesiod or from Virgil—Hesiod's chief Roman imitator—or one of the other Latin poets. I will conclude this survey with one more passage from a Greek writer—Maximus Tyrius, who, after repeating the traditional picture of the easy life of olden times, adds a sentence which distinguishes Hesiod's contribution to the 'fable' from the rest:

δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐγγύτατα εἶναι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ τούτῳ μύθῳ, ὑπὸ Κρόνῳ θεῶν βασιλεῖ τοιοῦτόν τινα αἰνιττόμενοι βίον, ἀπόλεμον, ἀσίδηρον, ἀφύλακτον, εἰρηνικόν, ἀπεριμάχητον, ὑγιεινόν, ἀνενδεᾶ· καὶ τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Ἡσίοδος καλεῖ, νεανιευόμενος πρὸς ἡμᾶς.[2]

5. THE ORIGINALITY OF HESIOD

The conclusion which the preceding argument suggests—that Hesiod was the first to bring the 'golden race' or any such phrase into classical thought— is at variance with the views of most modern authorities. Pohlenz seems to regard the golden age as a traditional concept. Eduard Meyer[3] held that Hesiod invented all the story *except* the golden age, while James Adam[4] thought the insertion of the race of heroes was Hesiod's only contribution. According to Sinclair,[5] Hesiod 'certainly did not invent' the golden age. Yet I believe the claim that he invented this way of describing the 'good old days', or at any rate

[1] e.g. Calpurnius, *Ecl.* 1. 42; 4. 5–8; Seneca, *Apocol.* 4; *Einsiedeln Ecl.* 2. 21–24; *Consol. ad Liviam* 343–4; Statius, *Silv.* 1. 6. 39–42; Ausonius, *Epist.* 12. 27–30; *Carmina Latina Epigr.* 285 (Bücheler).

[2] *Or.* 36. 1.
[3] *Genethliakon Carl Robert*, pp. 159 ff.
[4] *Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 77.
[5] *Hesiod, Works and Days*, p. 16.

first introduced it to the Greeks, is justified not only by the later evidence but by the character of Hesiod's own work. (I assume, *pace* Gilbert Murray and others, that Hesiod existed, and was the author of the *Works and Days*.)

Hesiod was a farmer-poet, who followed the traditional lore of the country-folk, including their traditional picture of the 'good old days'. But he was much more than this. He was a thinker, moulding his thoughts in story form, a myth-maker. Jaeger writes: 'In Hesiod we find more than passive submission to an urge for mythical narration: when he resorts to telling the old myths he has actual problems in mind which he feels he is now equipped to answer.'[1] I would go farther, and add that he *creates* myth in order to solve his problems; and this is the motive behind his story of the five races. His purpose is to explain the present condition of man, particularly his need to work. Why should he labour, when once, it is said, he lived on nature's bounty without toil? Hesiod's answer—the only kind of answer he could give—was to construct a story showing how the past ease and bliss of which tradition told had turned into the grim present. Looking back from his own day he saw the prevailing picture of man's past as consisting of three phases—the present period of the use of iron, the period of heroes, and the period of the use of bronze. Following the train of thought suggested by iron and bronze, and seeking a metal which could give its name to the happy time when men lived like gods, he chose gold, the metal associated with the gods. What more natural than to place before the other three periods a race of silver and one of gold? It is significant that although the *Works and Days* contains five versions of the traditional picture of a happier life, only in this passage, where Hesiod has a particular problem to solve, is there any reference to gold.

An alternative to the view that Hesiod invented the 'golden race' is that he introduced it into Greek thought from elsewhere. Reitzenstein, for example, finds the origin of Hesiod's story in the doctrine of Zarathustra that there will be four ages of the world, symbolized by a tree with four branches—of gold, silver, steel, and an iron alloy.[2] Nock comments: 'Certainly the insertion of the Heroic Age in the sequence of metals suggests that the poet has borrowed a scheme, but modified it because the popular memory of the Heroic Age excludes belief in continuous degeneration. The Orphic version, like Ovid, has four ages, not five, and a Zoroastrian certainly postulated four ages, and it is possible that ideas, like art-motives, came to Greece from the East in Hesiod's time.'[3] There is some cogency in this, although Zoroastrian and other Eastern pictures of a happier existence *in the past* show no connexion with gold, and the doctrine mentioned by Reitzenstein looks more like late allegory than early myth; while other reasons could well be found to explain why Hesiod put the heroes in, and the Orphics and Ovid left them out. But, whether the 'golden race' was born in Hesiod's own fertile brain or in the East, it would appear to have made its first bow to the Greeks in the lines of the *Works and Days*.

To sum up:

The Greeks cherished a traditional picture of a happier existence remote from present hardships, one version of which placed it in the distant past. This picture was associated by tradition, or at any rate before Hesiod, with the rule

[1] *The Theology of the Early Greek Philo-* *sophers*, p. 12.
[2] *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus aus Iran* *und Griechenland*, Leipzig, 1926.
[3] *J.H.S.* xlix (1929), p. 114.

of Kronos, and this (or, in Italy, the rule of Saturn) was the name normally applied to the idealized 'good old days'. Gold, far from having a place in the traditional picture, was seen as one of the causes of degeneration from that happy state.

Hesiod, seeking a link between the reign of Kronos and his own time, invented or borrowed from outside Greece a story that a 'golden race' and a race of silver had preceded the race of bronze, the heroes, and the present race of iron. This tale found few echoes in Greek writers before Alexander, but was frequently imitated or mentioned by Roman poets. It was Roman writers who made the transition from a golden race to a golden age, and from them the concept was handed down into more modern literature.

H. C. BALDRY

The University of Cape Town

CALLIMACHUS, HECALA (Fr. 260, Pfeiffer)

(1) 19–21　τῆς μὲν ἔσω δηναιὸν ἀφῆ δρ[ό]σον Ἡφαίστοιο,
　　　　　μέσφ' ὅτε Κεκροπίδησιν ἐπαλέα θήκατο λᾶαν,
　　　　　λάθριον ἄρρητον . . .
　　　　　19 δηναιὸν ἀφῆ, 'diu reliquit'

(2) 39–41　οὗτως ἦ χ' ἑτέρην μὲν ἀπέστυγεν οὐδὲ γενέθλην
　　　　　ἡμετέρην ἔκλεινε [τό]σ[ο]ν [θεό]ς· ἀλλὰ πέσοιο
　　　　　μηδέποτ' ἐκ θυμοῖο·
　　　　　39 οὗτως, sc. 'si tacuissem'.

(3) 47–49　ἀλλ' οὔ οἱ χάρι]ς οὔτις ἐπέσσεται, [ἡνίκα λέξει
　　　　　φήμην Ἀπόλλω]ν[ι] κακάγγελον· εἴθε γὰρ [εἴης
　　　　　κεῖνον ἔτι] ζώουσα κατὰ χρόνον, ὄφρα τ[ό γ' εἰδ]ῇς . . .

(4) 51–54　ὄλβιος] οὐ γάρ [τι]ς πάντ' ἤματα· ναὶ μὰ τὸ ῥικνόν
　　　　　σῦφαρ ἐμόν, ναὶ τοῦτο τὸ δένδρεον αὖον ἐὸν περ,
　　　　　ῥυ]μόν τε καὶ ἄξονα καυάξαντες
　　　　　οἱ μεγάλοι ποι]ρέων εἴσω πόδα πάντες ἔχουσι.
　　　　　53 desiderantur verba 'serius ocius' significantia.

Exeter College, Oxford

E. A. BARBER

ONE ca
disparag
some fas
in a me
this use
ridiculi
suggest
the fam

I sha
and ἀπ
author,
I distin

1. *A pr*
The
Aristotl

I find

(a) i
　　i
(b) i

One m
exampl
presen

2. *An i*
Of t

(a) i
　　g
(b) i
　　c

3. 'Int
This
It may
an ins
contac

(1)

PLATO'S USE OF THE WORD *MANTEYOMAI*

ONE cannot but notice Plato's interest in prophecy and divination. He speaks disparagingly of the art and of those who practised it, yet it seems to have held some fascination for him. Moreover, he frequently uses the language of prophecy in a metaphorical sense, and it is this which I am to examine. Often, of course, this use is facetious, especially with the nouns 'prophet' and 'prophecy': he is ridiculing obscurity or playfully lending dignity to an obvious inference. But I suggest that this facetious usage is common enough to be in itself evidence for the familiarity of Plato with this way of thinking.

I shall notice some examples of the metaphorical use of the verbs μαντεύομαι and ἀπομαντεύομαι. Plato uses these words more commonly than any other author, so that he seems at times to have passed the stage of conscious metaphor. I distinguish roughly three senses in which they are used.

1. *A probable inference concerning the future*

The later development of this usage is illustrated by two passages from Aristotle:

μαντεύεσθαι τὸ συμβησόμενον ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων *G.A.* 4. 1. 23.
καταμαντευόμενοι τὰ μέλλοντα κρίνομεν *Rhet.* 1. 9. 40.

I find two examples of this in Plato:

    (a) in *Rep.* 516 d, where the watchers in the Cave *guess* what is to come next in the procession of shadows, and
    (b) in *Phaedr.* 278 e, where Socrates *guesses* at the future career of Isocrates.

One might compare the fairly common use of μαντική in this connexion; for example in *Phd.* 84 e and *Theat.* 179 a. A probable inference concerning the present is sometimes expressed by τοπάζω, cf. *Theat.* 151 b, 155 d.

2. *An imaginative reconstruction of the past*

Of this use also I find two examples:

    (a) in *Crat.* 411 b, where Socrates *pictures* the methods of those who first gave names to things, and
    (b) in *Rep.* 538 a *bis*, b, where he *pictures* the manner in which degeneration of constitutions might have come about.

3. *'Intuition'*

This is the most common and important sense in which the words are used. It may be described according to taste as a reference to *a priori* knowledge, to an instinctive feeling based on emotion and experience, or to a mysterious contact between the soul and reality.

    (1) *Charm.* 169 b. Socrates refuses to dogmatize about the possibility of a 'knowledge of knowledge' or to accept its equation with temperance until he has seen whether such a science would be good and useful: for he *divines* that temperance is of this nature.

(2) *Rep.* 431 e. 'So we were not far wrong when we *divined* a resemblance between temperance and some kind of harmony.' (The reference is to 430 e.)

(3) *Soph.* 250 c. (Theaetetus) 'We really do seem to *divine* that Being is a third thing when we speak of both Rest and Motion as being.'

(4) *Rep.* 506 a. 'I *divine* that no one will know properly what is good till he knows how and why it is good.'

(5) *Rep.* 523 a. 'I will try to express how I distinguish things which tend to draw us towards reality; do you listen and say yes or no, so that we may see more clearly if it is as I *divine*.'

(6) *Rep.* 531 d. 'All these studies are only worth while if . . . .' (Glaucon) 'Yes, I *divine* so too.'

(7) *Phil.* 44 c. 'I do not advise you to believe those who say that pleasure is merely a refuge from pain, but to make use of them as a kind of *prophet* when they *divine* . . . through an innate and noble fastidiousness . . . that there is something to be mistrusted in the power and charm of pleasure.'

(8) *Lys.* 216 d. 'I suggest that what is in itself neither good nor evil is dear to what is good and beautiful; now listen to my reasons for this *divination*.'

(9) *Rep.* 505 e. 'The Good which the soul pursues, dimly *divining* its existence, but unable to grasp its nature with clearness . . . .'

(10) *Sym.* 192 d. 'Lovers want something more than each other's company, though they cannot say what this is, but can only *divine* and hint at it.'

(11) *Phil.* 64 a. '. . . wishing to try to find out what is the good among men and in the whole, and what Form one must *divine* it has.'

The first three of these examples fall naturally together. In (1) temperance is under discussion, an exact definition of it is wanting: the speakers do not have a clearly defined and clearly related notion of it. But for each of them the *word* 'temperance' has already a definite atmosphere, definite associations, among which is its necessary association with the other word—or notion— 'good'. Each speaker starts from an undeveloped notion of temperance, a vague complex of emotional associations; so that although he cannot see the picture as a whole he can insist on certain essential features in it (in other words, though never able to judge a particular action with certainty as temperate, he might often be sure that a particular action was not). Plato's method here might be justified by a positivist on the grounds that he was investigating and defining the context, the permitted usage of the word. But that Plato meant to do more than this is shown by (2). Before tracing the mode of action of the virtue temperance in the state, he remarks that it seems at first sight to be a kind of harmony; he then proceeds to gather a general meaning for the word—and to base on this a theory of the nature of the soul—from the manner in which it is ordinarily used. Here the atmosphere attaching to a word, seen in this case to arise from its normal usage, is used as a clue to objective reality. In (3) the grammatical structure, as opposed to the normal usage of individual words, is taken to indicate the direction in which truth lies.

The next four examples have also some connexion. (4) I take to refer to Plato's conviction that the only satisfactory explanation of anything is a teleological one; the same impulse which led him to posit a *summum bonum*

demands that the subsidiary goodness of individual things should be looked at in relation to this. (5) is clearer still. It might seem that 'divine' here is only a facetious form for 'infer', but it is noteworthy that the explanation *follows*; the other speakers are to help him express his own feeling in philosophical language so that they may all 'see more clearly'. He begins perhaps with a feeling that the sense world is deceptive, that mathematics is a haven of certainty in the universal flux, and that anything associated with certainty must lead towards truth and reality. He begins with this feeling, of which he is sure, and later expresses it, develops it, fits it to more general philosophical theories. Similarly in (6) Glaucon expresses his instinctive feeling that specialized study is only valuable if it leads towards the understanding of the single reality which is agreed to be the aim of all philosophical inquiry. (7) is the clearest of these examples. Certain men feel instinctively that pleasure is a thing to be regarded with suspicion—an attitude which we automatically regard as noble. We are justified in rejecting the theory they erect for themselves on the basis of this feeling; but the feeling itself is valuable raw material for philosophy. An excellent example of the 'emotional prejudice' method illustrated by these examples is afforded by *Phd.* 97 c where Socrates remarks, apropos of his excitement about Anaxagoras, that it 'seemed somehow good' to him that all things should be regulated by *Nous*.

The method in (8) seems characteristic. In the middle of a somewhat fruitless discussion Socrates has a feeling in what direction truth lies. He states this; and the demonstration which follows, often careless or even fallacious, seems intended to enable his audience to share his own feeling or to clarify it. One is struck on occasion by the way in which, after much unprofitable airing of the subject, a solution is suggested, accepted, and the whole matter dropped with what may seem undue alacrity. (One might compare here the use of the verb ὑποπτεύω in *Gorg.* 453 b, 454 b, where Socrates explains at some length that, although he might guess the next step in the argument, the rules of methodical discussion demand that this should follow in its proper time and place. For an answer suspected to be correct but without consciously logical justification cf. ὑποπτεύω in *Theaet.* 164 a, 191 b, *Meno* 87 d, and εἰκάζω in *Meno* 89 e.)

Numbers (9), (10), and (11) are perhaps the most significant of these examples. Beauty and Goodness are among the most fruitful and active themes in Plato's thought; and we are told that ordinarily the one is not clearly known, the other not consciously desired. Our ordinary knowledge of both is based on an obscure and irrational feeling. The importance of (11) is immediately obvious to anyone interested in the development of Plato's epistemological method. The mixture which makes up the good both for man and the whole has an Idea, and this Idea is to be gathered by 'divination'. This is not the place to discuss the methodology of the *Philebus* or to analyse Plato's general treatment of induction-cum-intuition. But it is clear that any treatment of his methodology must take 'divination' into account. Plato has explained at some length the analytical limb of the later dialectic, laid down rules for it, illustrated it with copious examples. But the correlative synthesis, collection, is treated less fully and precisely. Divination cannot be taught by rule of thumb.

The examples I have quoted range from the *Lysis* and *Charmides* to the *Sophist* and *Philebus*, and I have made no attempt here to interpret them in relation to Plato's changing views of epistemology. But the use of the metaphor—whether it refers to personal predilection or to language as an instrument for the

discovery of truth, or whether it alludes to the intuitive grasp of an Idea in the later dialectic—is always epistemological. I believe that, as in the case of certain other ideas, divination is a *leit-motif* recurring throughout the dialogues and developing in meaning with the whole structure of Plato's thought. If this is so, one way of tracing the development of his epistemology would be to trace that of these *leit-motifs*, first individually and then in relation to one another. In such a study divination would have an important part to play.

R. J. COLLIN

King's College, Cambridge

E L

DE 18

pour la

dans la

scrits

la conn

collatio

On s

copie i

là où

illisible

tions se

    6.

    8.

En out

    2.

RSV o

    1.

    2.

Mais β

de D :

    2.

C'est su

et 31 s

dans R

premiè

(Brique

Au li

à parti

les édit

copie d

D'autre

    1.

    2.

    5.

    9.

D'ailleu

('The M

plus an

prend l

qui cor

ELIMINATIO CODICUM HERODOTEORUM

DE 1872 à 1921, le manuscrit D d'Hérodote, *codex* du XIe siècle, a été perdu pour la philologie. C'est seulement en 1927 qu'il en a été publié une collation, dans la troisième édition de Hude. Il s'agit maintenant d'éliminer les manuscrits dont l'intérêt avant 1927 était de permettre de reconstruire D. Bien que la connaissance de D les rende inutiles, Hude, qui a pris tant de peine à les collationner, n'a pas eu le cœur de leur dire adieu.

On sait que la constellation DRSV est constante. β, modèle de RSV, est une copie indirecte de D. D présente des restitutions conjecturales en petite onciale là où la première main a laissé des blancs correspondant à des lettres illisibles ou à des lacunes de son modèle en onciale. Le fait que ces restitutions se retrouvent dans β démontre la dépendance de β par rapport à D:

> 6. 69. 4. φήσειέ ABCP, φησί D, φησί RSV
> 8. 111. 2 ταῦτα ABCP, τάΔE D, τάδε RSV

En outre, β présente une conjecture suggérée par un grattage de D:

> 2. 93. 6 κόθεν δὲ ABCP, κόθεν δέ+τε D, ὅθεν δεύτερον RSV (β a interprété δέ+τε comme δεύτερον)

RSV ont en commun des fautes de β que ne présente pas D:

> 1. 191. 3 saut du premier λίμνην au second
> 2. 176. 1 ὁ Ἄμασις . . . ἐλλογίμοισι om. RSV ex homoeoteleuto

Mais β a été collationné à une autre source, car il ne présente pas une omission de D:

> 2. 142. 2 γενεαὶ . . . ἔτεά om. D

C'est sur B que β a été collationné: trois scholies du Livre I (71. 2 ; 71. 4 ; 215. 1) et 31 scholies du Livre II, du chapitre 11 au chapitre 108, sont passées de Bᵇ dans R. Bᵇ, main secondaire de B, est de la fin du XIe siècle. R est de la première moitié du XIVe siècle, comme l'indiquent trois de ses filigranes (Briquet 2844, 3781 et 14076).

Au lieu de RSV, il serait plus juste de considérer U (écrit par Jean Rhosos) à partir de 3. 26 et RV. En effet, d'après M. A. M. Desrousseaux, U, que les éditeurs utilisent au Livre V pour suppléer à la défaillance de R, est la copie du Laurentianus LXX. 6 jusqu'à 3. 25, et le frère de R à partir de 3. 26. D'autre part, S est une copie indirecte de V:

> 1. 212. 3 τριτημορίδι uel τρίτη μορίδι reliqui, τρι̃ μερι̃ V, τρίτην μερίδα S
> 2. 175. 3 ἐκόμιζον reliqui, ἐκόμι̃ V, ἐκόμιζε S
> 5. 69. 2 πάντων reliqui, πα̃ν V, πάντα S
> 9. 120. 4 σανίδας reliqui, σανι̃ V, σανίδα S

D'ailleurs, M. J. E. Powell a montré que S appartient au milieu du XVe siècle ('The Manuscript S of Herodotus', *Classical Review*, 1937, pp. 118–19). Or V est plus ancien, puisqu'il appartient au début du XVe siècle, comme nous l'apprend l'examen de ses filigranes: l'un d'entre eux est constitué par le poisson qui correspond au numéro 12412 du répertoire de Briquet.

H

R étant de la première moitié du XIVᵉ siècle, il est permis de penser que β est une édition planudéenne. On peut dire de l'auteur de cette recension ce que Brunck dit de Planude éditeur de l'*Anthologie* (*Analecta*, tome i, p. iv) : 'Obscena resecandi consilium in homine illius professionis culpandum non fuisset' — β omet le chapitre 1. 199, relatif à la prostitution sacrée, et qui se trouve dans D. 'Multa quidem reliquit, sed non tam pudoris quam compendii habita ratione' — β omet νυκτὸς (8. 76. 3) . . . οὕτω δὴ (8. 84. 1), passage qui ne contient rien qui puisse alarmer la pudeur la plus farouche, et qui se trouve dans D. En outre, β choisit le texte, déjà expurgé et abrégé, de D, alors que B permettait d'en

combler les lacunes. 'Tum ex obscenorum aceruo non pauca quaedam tulit, quae si cum relictis comparentur, flagitii et turpitudinis palmam sibi uindicant' — β a le chapitre 2. 89. En réalité, c'est dans une intention moralisatrice que Planude ne recule pas devant les obscénités, pourvu qu'elles soient particulièrement rebutantes. Enfin, ce qui est très caractéristique de la philologie planudéenne, β a été collationné en 4. 23. 5, non sur un manuscrit d'Hérodote, mais sur Zénobios (*Proverbes* 5. 25) :

Ἀγριππαῖοι ABCP, Ὀργιμπαῖοι D, Ὀργεμπαῖοι R Zenobius, Ὀργιεμπαῖοι V et sa copie S : cette dernière leçon suggère que β avait Ὀργίμπαῖοι.

On a de même en 4. 17. 1 : Ἀλαζόνες ABCP, Ἀλαζῶνες D, Ἀλιζῶνες RSV, Ἀλιζώνους Strabo p. 550

Il ne faut plus utiliser que les trois plus anciens manuscrits, ABD.

B, manuscrit du XIᵉ siècle, dont le texte est très voisin de celui de A, du début du Xᵉ siècle, n'en est pas une pure copie :

4. 86. 1 νυκτὸς δὲ ἑξακισμυρίας B : om. AD. Dans A, c'est une main plus récente qui a écrit en marge, avec une encre beaucoup plus noire que celle du texte, νύκτωρ δὲ ἑξακισμυρίας.

N'ayant plus que trois manuscrits, les éditeurs pourront y consacrer tous leurs soins. Ils devront s'attacher à distinguer les mains secondaires, et se méfier des collations de Stein, qui, par exemple, en 7. 98, écrit: ' Μαργὴν A '. Il a évidemment été victime du tracé du double τ dans la minuscule ancienne, où la faute classique consiste à le lire τγ.

B. HEMMERDINGER

Exeter College Oxford

OBSERVATIONS ON EPIC 'ΑΛΛΑ

THE following notes are the result of an examination of all the early Epic passages containing ἀλλά which I made for the purposes of the lexicon of Homer and the older Epic now under preparation by the Archiv für griechische Lexïkographie at Hamburg. The texts surveyed were Homer, including the Hymns, Hesiod, and the Epic fragments. I also examined Apollonius Rhodius for the purpose of comparison.

§ 1. ἀλλ' ὅτε (δή)

One of the most familiar sentence connectives in Epic is ἀλλ' ὅτε (δή). I am not aware that the force of ἀλλά in this usage has received any special notice, but it is sufficiently curious to deserve it.

ἀλλ' ὅτε δή is more frequent than ἀλλ' ὅτε. Of ἀλλ' ὅτε there are 16 examples, and of ἀλλ' ὅτε δή 122. The apodosis may have no temporal adverb to introduce it (6 examples with ἀλλ' ὅτε, 30 with ἀλλ' ὅτε δή); or, more often, is so introduced (in the remaining examples).

The general use of ἀλλ' ὅτε is to introduce a further episode in a narration which has already been begun. Ebeling (*Lexicon Homericum*, s.v. ἀλλά, Sec. 15) remarks of ἀλλ' ὅτε δή, *quibus transitus fit ad nova et inexspectata*. This phrasing implies that there is present an adversative sense; which is also reflected in the almost universal (and often, perhaps, unthinking) English rendering 'but when'. In fact this is by no means always so.

First, three passages where adversative sense is allowable and, in the third, essential. Λ 714: the men of Elis besieged Thryoessa, intending to destroy it. ἀλλ' ὅτε πᾶν πεδίον μετεκίαθον, Athena came to warn Nestor and his men to arm themselves to oppose them. ε 400: Odysseus, swimming in the sea, was glad to see land, and made towards it. ἀλλ' ὅτε τόσσον ἀπῆν ὅσσον τε γέγωνε βοήσας, he heard the sound of water breaking on reefs, and his heart sank. Θ 23: Zeus tells the other gods that they could not pull him by a rope from heaven. ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πρόφρων ἐθέλοιμι ἐρύσσαι, | αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσαιμ' αὐτῇ δὲ θαλάσσῃ.

But consider now such cases as the following. γ 388: Nestor led his guests and relatives to his house. ἀλλ' ὅτε δώμαθ' ἵκοντο ἀγακλυτά . . . | ἑξείης ἕζοντο . . . . The story is simply continued, with no trace of adversation: Ebeling's general verdict of something not only *novum* but *inexspectatum* is plainly out of place. Γ 264: Priam and Antenor mounted their chariot and drove out through the gates. ἀλλ' ὅτε δή ῥ' ἵκοντο μετὰ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιούς, they stepped down and went between the two armies. Ψ 816: Ajax and Diomedes came forward to meet in combat, and wonder possessed the Achaeans. ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ σχεδὸν ἦσαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἰόντες, they made three charges at each other. Such examples could be multiplied, where the traditional 'but when' makes nonsense.[1]

Is it possible that we have, in passages of this second type, a weakened form of ἀλλά 'but', with its adversative sense diminished almost to vanishing point? It might be argued that the use of ἀλλά in such passages is due to the Greek love of antithesis, which often sees a contrast where we should not expect it: many examples of μέν . . . δέ are evidence of this. But against this, ἀλλά is

[1] Thus at K 494, Λ 737, μ 181.

usually a stronger adversative than δέ; and in any case there does not seem to
be even a trace of antithesis in these passages.

Is ἀλλά here purely progressive, then? This would not, of course, be at
variance with its etymology. The particle ἀλλά (or, more properly, proclitic
ἀλλὰ: Vendryes, *Traité d'accentuation grecque*, § 75) is an unaccented form of
ἄλλα, neuter plural of ἄλλος, used adverbially. Its development of adversative
meaning was parallel to that of Latin *ceterum*: the something 'other' which was
added was not only an addition but an opposition. But obviously, from the
etymological point of view, a purely progressive ἀλλά causes no surprise.[1]

There is a special Homeric use of ἀλλ' ὅτε δή which must also be taken into
account, in which the words are repeated four times at short intervals, always
at the start of a line, and mark different stages of a self-contained sequence of
thought or action. So first at Γ 209, 212, 216, and 221. The whole passage runs
from 204 to 224, and contains Antenor's appraisal of Menelaus and Odysseus.
(Introduction) Antenor says that he knows their appearance and their minds.
(1st ἀλλά) When they joined with the Trojans, Menelaus was taller when they
stood, but Odysseus more imposing when they sat. (2nd ἀλλά) When they
spoke in public, Menelaus spoke fluently . . . . (3rd ἀλλά) But when Odysseus
rose, he looked down . . . you might have thought him a fool. (4th ἀλλά) But
when his voice came out strong, . . . no one would be a match for him. The
sequence in this passage is logical rather than chronological: the account is a
general one, as is shown by the verb forms (imperfect tenses, frequentative
optatives, -σκω formation). The third and fourth examples of ἀλλά are adversa-
tive: but the second is not, and the first, which marks the start of the series,
cannot be either.

There are two other clear examples of this fourfold use, in both of which
there is a series of actions taken in temporal succession. The second group is at
Z 172, 175, 191, and 200, where the whole story of Bellerophon is told. B. went
to Lycia, escorted by the gods. (1st ἀλλά) When he arrived he was welcomed,
and entertained for nine days. (2nd ἀλλά) But on the tenth day he was asked
for his credentials . . . . Then he was given various tasks. (3rd ἀλλά) Then when
the king realized that he was a son of the gods, he kept him there and gave him
his daughter's hand. (4th ἀλλά) But when even B. was hated by the gods, he
wandered away from the haunts of men. Here the second and fourth cases of
ἀλλά are adversative, but not the first and third.

The third group is in the Doloneia, at K 338, 351, 357, and 365, and marks
stages in the pursuit. Dolon sets out on his spying expedition. (1st ἀλλά) When
he had left the throng of the army, he sped on his way. Odysseus sees him and
advises Diomedes to let him go past them. (2nd ἀλλὰ) When he had gone by,
they chased him, and Dolon stopped, thinking that they were friends. (3rd
ἀλλά) But when they were near, he knew that they were enemies, and the
pursuit proper began. (4th ἀλλά) When he was about to run among the out-
posts of his army, Athene gave Diomedes extra speed to overtake him. Here

---

[1] Denniston, *Greek Particles*, pp. 21–22,
allows a progressive ἀλλά, which he finds most
often in Hippocrates: but he has no examples
from Homer, and says that verse examples
generally are few. His earliest verse example
is from Alcman. Hartung, *Lehre von den Parti-
keln der griechischen Sprache*, ii, pp. 34–35 says
of ἀλλά ('im responsiven Gebrauch') that 'es
einen Übergang zu etwas Verschiedenem
oder Entgegengesetztem ausdrückt' (my
italics). But his examples do not bring out
the sense of something different which is not
also in opposition. Schwyzer, *Griechische
Grammatik*, ii, p. 578, will not ad it pro-
gressive ἀλλά at all.

ends the pursuit (but not, of course, the whole story of Dolon). In this sequence the third ἀλλά only is adversative.

It appears clear that, in the technique of oral recitation, this fourfold repetition of ἀλλ' ὅτε δή is intended to mark strongly for the audience closely connected stages of thought or action; perhaps accompanied by appropriate gesture, to hold the listeners' attention. A similar purpose is served in writing if we mark successive paragraphs with (1), (2), etc.

With ἀλλ' ὅτε δή we should compare the use of αὐτὰρ ἐπεί (Denniston, *Greek Particles*, p. 55). This phrase is used in similar circumstances, being fourfold (*A* 458 ff. = B 421 ff., γ 447 ff.) or once threefold (*I* 212 ff.). The action described is perhaps more unified than with ἀλλ' ὅτε δή. In each case it is concerned with the stages in the ritual of sacrifice, or in the preparation of a feast, or both. Only γ 447-74 passes in one particular outside this narrow ambit; here the episodes are the start of sacrifice and roasting of the victim, the bathing of Telemachus, and finally the feast. In *I*, where αὐτὰρ ἐπεί is threefold, the episode, the preparation of a feast, runs from 206 to 224; and here a start is made with αὐτάρ alone, which is followed by the three examples of αὐτὰρ ἐπεί at 212, 215, and 222. So even here αὐτάρ is fourfold, though αὐτὰρ ἐπεί is not. The connexion of thought in all these cases of αὐτὰρ ἐπεί is purely progressive. αὐτάρ, of course, when used independently, can be either adversative or progressive. We must note that αὐτὰρ ἐπεί, like ἀλλ' ὅτε δή, marks the initial as well as the following stages in the sequence of action.

I have examined the use of ἀλλ' ὅτε (δή) in Apollonius Rhodius, in order to see how the Epic idiom is continued by him. There are seven examples (1. 1164, 2. 148, 644, 1081, 3. 1201, 4. 1537, 1731); of which the first four are adversative and the three others are not. There is no use of the pattern of fourfold repetition: this may be due to the absence of the genuinely oral element in him, in contrast to Homer.

I think that we may *provisionally*, at this stage, form the conclusion that ἀλλά sometimes has a progressive, non-adversative sense in the Epic combination ἀλλ' ὅτε (δή), used either singly or in a fourfold sequence. But the question will be considered again after the case of ἀλλά followed by μέν . . . δέ, to which I now turn.

§ 2. ἀλλά . . . μέν . . . δέ

Here ἀλλά introduces a sentence (or clause) containing μέν, and is followed by another sentence (or clause) containing δέ, or its equivalent (ἀλλά, αὐτάρ).

Ξ 119: Portheus had three sons, who lived in Pleuron and Calydon—Agrius, Melas, and thirdly Oeneus, my grandfather, who was the bravest of them. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτόθι μεῖνε, πατὴρ δ' ἐμὸς Ἄργεϊ νάσθη | πλαγχθείς. There is no trace of adversative sense between the μέν-clause and the preceding passage. But there are here two points of contrast, that between the δέ-clause and the preceding passage, and that between the μέν- and δέ-clauses. This suggests two possible explanations of ἀλλά, taken with adversative sense. In the first place, it may mark the external contrast: they lived in Pleuron and Calydon, but (while my grandfather stayed) my father went to Argos. In this case the μέν-clause will be regarded as merely parenthetic. Or, secondly, can ἀλλά be anticipatory, looking forward to the purely internal contrast? If so, this would be a new use of ἀλλά.

γ 359: you have spoken well, and it is fitting for Telemachus to obey you (and go to your palace to sleep). ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν νῦν σοι ἅμ' ἕψεται, ὄφρα κεν

εὕδῃ | σοῖσιν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν· ἐγὼ δ’ ἐπὶ νῆα μέλαιναν | εἶμ(ι). There are the same two possible reasons for ἀλλά, the external and the internal, as in Ξ 119. Cauer remarks: ‘ ἀλλά ist im voraus auf den zweitfolgenden Satz (ἐγὼ δ’ . . . εἶμι) bezogen’, but does not make it clear which of the two forms of contrast he has in mind. Presumably it is the external. He compares τ 594 and Ζ 279, but these are doubtful examples.

In other cases, however, there is no external contrast. Thus λ 275: Epicaste married her son, Oedipus, who killed his father; but the gods made this known. ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἐν Θήβῃ πολυηράτῳ ἄλγεα πάσχων | Καδμείων ἤνασσε . . . ἡ δ’ ἔβη εἰς Ἀΐδαο. The only adversative notion is the internal one between the μέν- and δέ-sentences, describing the respective fates of Epicaste and Oedipus. υ 83: Penelope prays that she may die rather than wed a man inferior to Odysseus. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀνεκτὸν ἔχει κακόν, ὁππότε κέν τις | ἤματα μὲν κλαίῃ . . . | νύκτας δ’ ὕπνος ἔχῃσιν . . . | αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὀνείρατ’ ἐπέσσευεν κακὰ δαίμων. τ 182: Odysseus speaking: Deucalion was father of me and Idomeneus. ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἐν νήεσσι κορωνίσιν Ἴλιον εἴσω | οἴχεθ’ ἅμ’ Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν, ἐμοὶ δ’ ὀνομακλυτὸν Αἴθων, | ὁπλότερος γενεῇ. Here the opposition is slight, but appears stronger in the general context. The speaker says that his elder brother had gone off to Troy, but he himself, the younger and less warlike, had stayed at home. Ψ 319: skill is needed in the lumberman, helmsman, and charioteer: by skill one charioteer beats another. ἀλλ’ ὃς μέν θ’ ἵπποισι καὶ ἅρμασιν οἷσι πεποιθὼς | ἀφραδέως ἐπὶ πολλὸν ἑλίσσεται . . . | ἵπποι δὲ πλανόωνται ἀνὰ δρόμον, οὐδὲ κατίσχει· | ὃς δέ κε κέρδεα εἰδῇ . . . | αἰεὶ τέρμ’ ὁρόων στρέφει ἐγγύθεν. Here ὃς μέν is answered by ὃς δέ (δέ after ἵπποι being in apodosis). Eustathius was puzzled by the sense of ἀλλά: ὅρα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦ νοήματος τούτου ἐκ περισσοῦ κείμενον τὸν ἀλλά σύνδεσμον καὶ οὐδεμίαν δηλοῦντα ἑρμηνείαν αὐτῷ ἀνήκουσαν. Despite that, he retained the reading ἀλλ’ ὃς μέν. If we put this passage along-side the others here examined, there is no real difficulty in the ἀλλ(ά), and so no reason to accept the old variant ἄλλος, which was read by Antigonus.[1] Hes. Op. 130: secondly, the gods made the race of silver, unlike the golden race in body or spirit. ἀλλ’ ἑκατὸν μὲν παῖς ἔτεα παρὰ μητέρι κεδνῇ | ἐτρέφετ’ ἀτάλλων . . . | ἀλλ’ ὅτ’ ἄρ’ ἡβήσαι . . . | παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον.

Less easy to classify is Σ 252: Polydamas and Hector were comrades, born on the same night. ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἄρ μύθοισιν, ὁ δ’ ἔγχεϊ πολλὸν ἐνίκα. Have we here anticipation of the μέν . . . δέ contrast; or is there a sense of adversation in ‘They were comrades and born at the same time, yet their powers were differ-ent’? Compare ζ 11 and η 60.

We should not overlook the frequent instances where ἀλλά has more normal use, either adversative or otherwise. Thus adversative ἀλλά at Β 771; hortative ἀλλά at Ζ 279. It is unnecessary to provide further examples of this kind.

In Apollonius Rhodius there are ten uses of ἀλλά . . . μέν . . . δέ (1. 164, 315, 2. 38, 1150, 3. 41, 1000, 4. 1216, 1472, 1645, 1764). Of these three seem to have ἀλλά anticipating the internal contrast (3. 41, 1000, 4. 1645).

§ 3

We have thus found two special uses of ἀλλά in Epic, where the ordinary interpretations of it do not apply; and we may possibly be content to leave the matter at that.

---

[1] Hdn. Gr. 2. 122. 3 Lentz δασυντέον τὸ ὅς. ἔστι γὰρ ἄρθρον . . . Ἀντίγονος μέντοι ἄλλος ἀνεγίνωσκεν, οὐ παραδεχόμενος τὸ ἄρθρον.

But another line of explanation offers itself, not normally available in linguistic analysis, but arising from the peculiar nature of the Greek Epic language itself. It is an artificial language, making use of formulae and repetitions. Leumann has recently drawn attention (in *Homerische Wörter*) to the fact that words are sometimes used in Homer in a strict sense inappropriately, being taken from one context (in 'Homer', or in earlier Epic) where they were at home, and misapplied elsewhere.[1] This method of argument is surely applicable with special force to particles. μ 181 (ἀλλ' ὅτε τόσσον ἀπῆμεν ὅσον τε γέγωνε βοήσας) is the same verse as ε 400 and ι 473 (with the slight change of ἀπῆμεν ὅσον to ἀπῆν ὅσσον). At μ 181 ἀλλά is not adversative: Odysseus' crew bound him up, so that he should not fall a prey to the Sirens, but themselves rowed. Then when (ἀλλ' ὅτε κτλ.) they were within earshot, the Sirens noticed the ship. But in both ε 400 and ι 473, ἀλλά is probably adversative. If the line at μ 181 was borrowed from either of the other two passages, it would be used in its new context without regard to the fact that ἀλλά was not properly at home, since no adversative sense was required, nor any of the other accepted senses of ἀλλά. It is, of course, not necessary to assume that this was the original passage where the transfer was made. What is suggested is that a process of that sort did occur, probably in pre-Homeric Epic, and that it established the use of ἀλλ' ὅτε (δή) in contexts where ἀλλ(ά) was not required by the preceding passage. The metrical convenience of ἀλλ' in that position must also have been a factor in maintaining it. A formula ἀλλ' ὅτε (δή) was thus obtained which simply meant 'when'; and so it was open to take the next step, and use ἀλλ' ὅτε δή in a fourfold series marking emphatically the stages in a time-sequence, where the word ἀλλά in the first stage of the four is perhaps seen at its most otiose.

In a similar way ἀλλά . . . μέν . . . δέ could be extended to passages where ἀλλά had lost its vital meaning.

If this is the right form of explanation, we should have to conclude that a true progressive sense of ἀλλά had not developed in Epic, and only appeared later. Perhaps its growth was encouraged by the weakening of sense in the formula ἀλλ' ὅτε (δή). But it must at any rate be noticed that there is no trace of it at all in Epic apart from the formula.

<div align="right">A. C. MOORHOUSE</div>

University College, Swansea

---

[1] So in the striking case of κελαινεφής, which he explains as properly an epithet of Zeus: its use as an epithet of αἷμα is due to a misunderstanding of a context where it was a vocative address to Zeus, but was thought to be an attribute of αἷμα. Op. cit., pp. 202–6.

PLATO'S DESCRIPTION OF DIVISION

THERE are many passages in Plato which look as if they alluded to well-worn practices, discussions, or lessons in the Academy. As is natural with allusions, they are often marked by a puzzling brevity or oddity of expression. One need not assume that they are always conscious allusions; for every writer has moments of obscurity which are due not so much to his conclusions as to his reaching them along lines that have long been familiar to *him*. To appreciate his whole meaning the reader has then to infer as best he can the writer's train of thought. I wish to suggest that the language in which Dialectic is described in the later Dialogues presupposes a particular and probably familiar method of illustrating it. This was a geometrical illustration of the rules of Division by means of a divided line. By failing to notice it readers have not been led into any important misunderstanding of the Academy's rules. But I hope it will appear that the recognition of it makes Plato's manner of describing Division intelligible to an extent that is otherwise difficult. It is only a tentative suggestion, and would perhaps not have been worth making but for the possibility that some points of interest might at the same time emerge for those who were unconvinced by it.

So much only is the direct intention of this article. But if the suggestion is correct, it has also in my view an indirect importance. For Plato was fascinated by the mathematical puzzles of infinite divisibility. And by the time he wrote the *Parmenides* he considered (I believe) that Zeno's paradoxes indicated a solution of his own paradoxes about the One and the Many. I do not want to defend this suggestion here: but its upshot may be put very roughly and dogmatically in the following equations. The Many = the Indeterminate = the *infinite*, i.e. indefinite, number of parts of a whole. The 'Ones' or species = the *finite* or determinate number of parts into which a whole or genus must be divisible if it is to be an actual whole. For in mathematics magnitudes are infinitely divisible:[1] but such magnitudes are only abstractions; and in reality there are always indivisible parts. And just as mathematical objects are images of the real, so the infinite Many are only appearances (due to inadequate division) of the One. Both horns of Zeno's dilemma are grasped:[2] one accounts for the intelligible, the other for the sensible. Being is shot through with Not-being (or Otherness or Matter): but the first forms a plurality, the second an infinity.[3] Dialectic meant always the discovery of the One in the Many, and in the later Dialogues this consisted of Collection and Division.

In my opinion, then, the illustration of Dialectic by the division of a line into parts would be a natural result of Plato's great imaginative feat—his theory that there was (as we should say now) identity of logical structure between Zeno's continuous magnitude and the world itself as an object of experience and knowledge. And the choice of illustration would help to confirm the

---

[1] This is not to be contradicted by Aristotle's statement (*Met. A* 992ᵃ22; cf. *M* 1084ᵇ1–2) that Plato believed in indivisible lines. For there is more than one sort of mathematics according to Plato. *Parm.* 164 c–165 d, where magnitudes are infinitely divisible, applies to 'popular' as opposed to 'philosophical' mathematics (v. *Phil.* 56 d–e; *Rep.* vii. 525 d–526 a). I hope to offer an explanation of this on another occasion.

[2] Cf. *Parm.* 142 c 7–145 a 2.

[3] *Soph.* 255 e, 256 e–257 a.

interpretation of his metaphysics. It was probably used in the Academy for refuting Zeno. But let me repeat that to show this is only an indirect or secondary purpose here. For the recognition of the illustration does not depend on accepting the metaphysical interpretation. It depends only on an examination of Plato's expressions. And to this I now proceed.

After the *Phaedrus* the chief passages in which the theory of Dialectic is expounded are two. The most generalized account is in *Philebus* 16d ff. It can be divided for convenience as follows:

δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων (1) ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν—εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν—(2) ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, (3) καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, (4) μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, (5) τότε δ᾽ ἤδη τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν. (6) οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἓν μέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει . . . .

We are to imagine, as it might be drawn or composed of pebbles on the ground, a line *AB* of unknown length. This is τὸ ἄπειρον, though not because it is infinitely divisible but because it is not known of how many divisions it is capable.

(1) We place provisionally[1] between *A* and *B* a point *C*, thereby 'finding' in *AB* a line *CB* (the μίαν ἰδέαν). (2) *CB* is divided at *D*, giving us *CD* and *DB* (μετὰ μίαν δύο). (3) *CD* and *DB* are similarly divided at *E* and *F* respectively.

A		C	E	D	F	B

(4) The divisions of *CE*, *ED*, *DF*, *FB* are continued as far as necessary, i.e until it is seen how many indivisible lines there are in *CB* (τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἕν, the generic Idea). (This is not of course derivable from the diagram; in Dialectic it involves Collection. We shall suppose the process already completed.) This is equivalent to refraining from considering *CB* (τὸ πλῆθος) as infinitely divisible (τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν προσφέρειν) before the exact number of its components is known.[2] πλῆθος is a word which Plato uses when he means it to be undetermined whether a magnitude is ἄπειρον or πεπερασμένον (cf. 18 b 2). The number of lines, viz. *CD*, (*DB*,) *CE*, *ED*, *DF*, will be seen to be between (μεταξύ) *AC*, which is the remaining still divisible part (τοῦ ἀπείρου) of the original line, and the last indivisible line, *FB* (τοῦ ἑνός). The objection to this is that τοῦ ἑνός has a different denotation both from that of κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἕν and from τὸ ἕν in (6), which, we shall see shortly, cannot be the lowest species.

---

[1] θεμένους refers not merely to the diagram but to the fact that in Dialectic all Ideas start as hypotheses. For, incidentally, Plato never said there is an Idea corresponding to every general name, although this is now attributed to him by writer after writer. *Rep.* 596 a says εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι, 507 b

τιθέντες. Cf. *Phaedr.* 237 d 1 (ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον) for connexion with Socratic method.

[2] For the use of 'number' where we should say 'number of parts' see *Theaet.* 204 d. But it has also an esoteric meaning, as is mentioned below.

*Partial right column (page edge):*

One
occur
new s
origin
a littl
conce
divisi
genus
  (5)
thing,

CF be
things
diagra
genus
Acade
left-ha
for the
side (t
'other
  (6)
too qu
put to
CB on
ἄπειρα
lowest
ἄπειρα
more
of ἀπε
CB.)
examp

[1] *So*
[2] Ib.
πολὺ μ
ὄν . . .
λεκτέον
ἄλλα, κ
ὂν ἓν μ
τἄλλα
οὕτως
ἑτέραν
ὁρῶμεν
ἄρα πο
αὐτῶν
οὔτε ἓν
τἄλλα
Philop.
Zeno o
[sc. ὁ

One may reply (*a*) that if Plato visualized a diagram the difficulty would not occur, since the 'one' in question could be pointed to; and (*b*) that (6) is a new sentence in which the thought makes it quite natural to return to the original 'one'. (There is, however, an alternative, which strains the expression a little, but which would avoid the difficulty: the intermediate lines could be conceived metaphorically as 'standing between' *CB as a unit* and the indefinite divisibility of *AB*; for Plato is thinking as much of the understanding of the genus [*CB*] as of the lowest species [*FB*].)

(5) The lines *CD*, *CE*, *ED*, *DF* are then ignored—or, what comes to the same thing, we attend only to *CB*, *DB*, *FB*.

$$A \qquad\qquad\qquad C \quad E \quad D \quad F \quad B$$

CF becomes again indefinitely divisible and we lose *CD*, *CE*, *ED*, *DF*. Two things are to be noticed in this. First, we are now left, as can be seen from the diagram below, with the lowest differentia, the superordinate species and the genus; and this gives us a definition of the lowest species according to the Academy's rules. Secondly, this definition, which amounts to ignoring the left-hand side of a division, amounts also to 'dismissing it into the ἄπειρον'; for the left-hand side contains those things which the contents of the right-hand side (the defining characteristics) *are not* or *are other than*;[1] and the former, the 'others', are, in respect of their otherness, ἄπειρα.[2]

(6) Plato goes on to say that people erroneously reach the limit of division too quickly, i.e. do not put enough points between *C* and *B*, or too slowly, i.e. put too many. In the first case they might, for example, omit *DB* by dividing *CB* only at *F*. (Thinking of Dialectic *only* as definition of the ἄτμητον and of ἄπειρα *only* as individuals, editors have often taken the ἕν in (6) to be the lowest species.[3] But (*a*) μέσα would naturally mean between the ἕν and the ἄπειρα, while if the former is the lowest species there are no such μέσα; (*b*)—more conclusively—it is *not* 'eristic' but correct 'dialectic' to apply the notion of ἀπειρία after the lowest species has been reached. τὸ ἕν is therefore the genus, *CB*.) Such division would be equivalent to 'bad' definition—in Aristotle's example, to defining Man as Two-footed Animal instead of Two-footed

---

[1] *Soph.* 255 ff.

[2] Ib. 256 e: περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν . . . καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον . . . καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὁσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἕν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ. *Parm.* 158 c: οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὁρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει; 159 d: οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τἆλλα· ἕν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἕν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἐστι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει. Philop. *in Ar. Phys.*, ed. Vitelli, 80. 29 [Lee, *Zeno of Elea*, fr. 3]: εἰ μὴ τὸ ἕν εἴη, φησί [sc. ὁ Ζήνων], καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, οὐδὲ πολλὰ

ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ ἐκ πολλῶν ἑνάδων.

[3] For the error of this view cf. 18 c 7–d 1. It is the same reason which has led to suspicion of the text—both καὶ πολλά and βραδύτερον. The latter was thought inconsistent with ἄπειρα εὐθύς. But to suppose too many species is similar to supposing too few: a wrongly supposed species (a μέρος instead of an εἶδος, *Pol.* 263) is no species at all and therefore ἄπειρον—συναγωγή has simply not taken place. Failure to emphasize this point makes Prof. Hackforth's note (*C.Q.* xxxiii (1939), 23–24) on this sentence a little unsatisfactory; especially so since his notes (*Plato's Examination of Pleasure*, 23–24) on our (4) and (5) do make the point.

Footed Animal as Plato required.[1] This is at once seen if the scheme is represented thus:

```
                    (AB)
            AC              CB (Animal)
                    CD              DB (Footed)
            CE          ED   DF            FB (Two-footed)
```

This is the more familiar representation, and no doubt it is the one that Plato generally had in mind when he was making applications of διαίρεσις. But when he is more concerned with theory—and with the structure of reality as revealed by Division, rather than our piecemeal discovery of it—his language is that of the *Parmenides*; and since the language there is appropriate to the division of lines it is natural to expect it to be so here. Moreover it was from this geometrical point of view that mutual implications were first seen among the concepts of irrationality, indefinability, and infinite divisibility.[2] And the last forms the limiting case of the second possible error, the error of completing the division too slowly. It is what is only prevented from happening, according to Plato, by the fact that if we collected merely particulars even these would have a share in Ideas.[3] So Plato refers to the danger on this side— represented by Protagoras' sensationalism—by describing his opponents as 'crumbling' reality into fragments (θρύπτειν).[4] The Eleatics represented the extreme case of the alternative error, for they allowed only a single 'One' to be discovered. The *via media*, advocated by Plato, is that reality is, rather, 'chopped up' (κεκερματισμένον, κατακεκερματισμένον).[5] So that he exactly describes the attempt to treat changing particulars as reality by saying, θρύπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἄν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ (*Parm.* 165 b 4–6).

There is one point which presents some difficulty if we do not recognize the suggested illustration. I hope, however, that a discussion may be helpful also to those who do not accept my 'divided line'. In (5) τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων must refer to all the unities, i.e. Ideas, which have emerged by Collection and Division. For to take them as individuals[6] is surely inadmissible when ἕν is just

[1] Ar. *Met. Z* 1038ª9–25; *De part. an.* 642ᵇ5–9.

[2] ὅπου γὰρ ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἡ διαίρεσις, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον (Procl. *in I Eucl.*, ed. Friedlein, p. 60. 15).

[3] For this lesson in the *Parmenides* cf. 158 b 2–d 8; 164 c 7–d 8; 165 a 5–c 3.

[4] Cf. *Soph.* 246 b 9–c 1: the Idealists repudiate the 'reality' of the materialists, τὰ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

[5] Ib. 258 d: ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὐσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ... (cf. 257 c 7). It is in respect of its having Being that Not-being is 'chopped up'. The metaphor is, of course, explained by its being used for the division of a genus into species (*Meno* 79 a 10; c 2; *Pol.* 266 a 2).

[6] As does Stenzel, *Studien z. Entw. d. plat. Dialektik*[2] (Leipzig–Berlin 1931) 104, at least in Allan's interpretation ([Stenzel] *Plato's method of Dialectic*, tr. and ed. D. J. Allan, Oxford 1940, 146). Mr. Allan, who has very kindly read my manuscript, suggests that Stenzel 'could say that ἕν, which has just been used in the dialectician's sense, (4), is then used as a man in the state of πίστις would use it, (5), i.e. "those alleged unities" '. But how many readers would grasp this from Plato's text?

what is being distinguished from ἄπειρον, and when τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον had denoted species in the previous sentence. Now we are told to dismiss them into the ἄπειρον. But why? All we should be left with is a genus and the arithmetical number (say 4 or 6 or 8) of its species. And if it is important to know *how many* species there are, this can surely only be because we cannot do this without knowing *what* they are. In what circumstances ought we then to forget this latter knowledge? The purpose of Division here may be one or more of the following possibilities: (*a*) to define or understand a genus; (*b*) to define a lowest species; (*c*) to show how a genus (or any divisible Idea) is both a Many and a One; (*d*) as part of an argument (e.g. to refute the thesis, 'Government is necessary, Athenian democracy is government, therefore Athenian democracy is necessary').

But as for (*a*) we do not define or understand a genus by saying that it has *m* species, where *m* is a mere number. In (*b*) to omit the superordinate species from the definition of a lowest species is un-Platonic, as we have seen; and secondly, it is not obvious—except on my (first) interpretation of (4)—that we shall have been left with even a lowest species. (*c*) at least must be admitted here, because Plato explicitly says so (16 a–c). He is, for the purpose of this dialogue, fitting his Dialectic into the Pythagorean formula in which τὸ ἕν is the first product of πέρας and ἄπειρον, and in which reality is generated by the imposition of Number or τὸ πόσον on the ἄπειρον. So once the species have been enumerated the genus has been shown to be a Many, and we can return to its unity. And it is to be added that the dismissal of the Many into the ἄπειρον will show how the One and Many together are *also* ἄπειρα—as we were told in (4) —not simply in respect of the lowest species, but all of them.[1] This Pythagorean framework would explain the emphasis on the mere number of species, for 'the' number has then an esoteric meaning (cf. especially 17 c 11–e 6).[2] (*d*) is an aspect to which Hackforth has drawn attention. It too might explain the 'dismissal'. For in our example it is sufficient to know that democracy is a species of government; and if one asks, 'Why the emphasis on the *number* of species?' it could be replied that until the whole division is completed it is impossible to know that any single division was a 'real' one and therefore to be admitted in a genuine, instead of an eristic, argument.[3]

(*d*) is not so important, I think, as (*c*). Nevertheless all four purposes are present to Plato's mind. For it is notable that when he goes on to illustrate the method there is no hint of the 'dismissal'.[4] With the possible exception of the continuation (18 b 6 ff.) of the first one, it seems essential in the illustrations to know not only how many the species are, but what they are. The improbability of both (*c*) and (*d*) as explanations could be supported by *Politicus* 285 a–b, where knowledge of all the species was necessary to an understanding both of

[1] Cf. L. Robin, *Platon: œuvres complètes*, ii (1942), 184 n. 20: 'une fois qu'on est arrivé à l'espèce dernière . . . l'impossibilité de "spécifier" davantage nous met en présence, et de l'individu, avec la multiplicité de ses caractères singuliers, et du nombre infini d'individus auxquels s'étend la notion de l'espèce dernière, avec tout ce qu'elle implique et qui constitue la chaîne des intermédiaires.' But his *translation* 'c'est alors que désormais on doit abandonner l'infini et lui dire adieu', is inexplicable.

[2] Cf. J. Stenzel, *Zahl u. Gestalt* (1924), 7, 13–18; A. Preiswerk, 'Das Einzelne b. Platon und Aristoteles', *Philologus*, suppl.-Bd. xxxii, Heft 1 (1939), 55–56.

[3] Cf. οἱ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοί of (6) with the νέος of 15 d–e, who 'at one moment kneads any argument into one ball, then unrolls it again and chops it into pieces'. Compare also *Phaedr.* 237 d.

[4] Nor elsewhere. (*Pol.* 286 e 6, despite Campbell's note, has nothing to do with the present point.)

the lowest species and of the genus. Still more could it be supported by the next page (286 c–287 a). For there, in an apology for the length of preliminary discussions, μακρολογία and βραχυλογία were also required to be tested against the rules of Division (πρῶτον τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν τιμᾶν τοῦ κατ᾽ εἴδη δυνατὸν εἶναι διαιρεῖν). But this criterion was, in fact, the correctness of the definition of the lowest species, viz. the 'royal art'. Indeed when a concrete application of the rules was made (287 b ff.), a number of species *were* 'dismissed', namely those on the left-hand side of the division. And these were just the ones which would have been dismissed in our suggested interpretation of the *Philebus* passage, but not on the normal interpretation. The trouble is, in fact, that (*a*) and (*b*) as explanations are incompatible with (*c*) and (*d*). However, this need not rule out the normal interpretation. For one may concentrate on (*c*) and possibly (*d*), and say that both Socrates' examples and the *Politicus* illustrate a use of Division beyond that for which it is introduced in the *Philebus*. This further use would be its more common one in the sciences, and one which had already been alluded to by Socrates in 16 c 1–3. An alternative, which I should prefer, is to claim that Plato is trying to combine (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*). For he has a habit of combining two levels of thought—of teaching an immediately relevant lesson in method at the same time as an indirect lesson in metaphysics. And it is a habit which is at once idiosyncratic and rather vulnerable to strict logic. To conclude, then, the 'dismissal into the ἄπειρον' is readily intelligible for any of the purposes of Division that may be intended, if the 'divided line' is agreed to illustrate it: but it does not contain sufficient difficulty to make it positive evidence for the illustration.

The second passage which describes the method of Dialectic is in *Sophist* 253 d:

τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτὸν μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι; . . . οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν (1) μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, (2) καὶ μίαν αὖ δι᾽ ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας.

Especially since Stenzel's work[1] it has been widely agreed that the passage refers to the method of Division. To suppose it merely describes four different kinds of relation between Ideas, two of Communion and two of non-Communion is not at all satisfactory; for instance ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένην is taken[2] to mean 'remaining on its own' or 'self-sufficient', which does not seem to do justice to the Greek. It is much easier to follow if we think of the same illustration of the divided line—though, once again, only as influencing the expression: it is not necessary to it, and if Plato had thought it necessary he would have made it explicit. But this second passage is closer, of course, chronologically, to the *Parmenides*.

μία ἰδέα (our *CB*) is drawn or stretched across the whole of the shorter lines (πάντῃ διατεταμένην);[3] they are contained by it (ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας), but are

---

[1] *Studien*, 62–71 [tr. Allan, 96–106].

[2] e.g. recently by B. Liebrucks, *Platons Entw. z. Dialektik* (Frankfurt-a.-M. 1949) 148.

[3] The collection of parts is mentioned before the Division. Mr. Allan therefore

suggests that, if a line is intended, a *discontinuous* one would be more comprehensible:

$$A \; \cdots \!-\!\! \cdots \!-\!\! \cdots \; B$$

'For here some αἴσθησις *is* required to see

still units (χωρὶς διωρισμένας). περιέχειν is the technical term for the relation of of a magnitude to its parts,[1] and is contrasted in *Parmenides* 150 a with δι' ὅλον τεταμένην εἶναι, which is coextensiveness.[2] ἔξωθεν alludes to the paradox of the whole–part relation disclosed by Zeno (v. *Parm.* 145 b–e, and 149 d 8 ff., specially 150 e 5–151 a) and well known in the Academy (v. Ar. *Top.* VI. xiii; cf. *Phys.* Δ 210ᵃ16–17).[3] In (2) it is possible that μίαν denotes the generic Idea as it did in (1), and ἑνί the lowest species. But it is preferable to take them the other way about. The emphasis of the first half will then be upon Collection, the emphasis of the second (marked by αὖ) upon Division, and the two will form respective explanations of μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτόν. ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένη is a variation from ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἰδέας περιεχομένη and represents the passive of συλλαβών as it was used at 250 b 9. . . . But the terms he is employing belong so much to the logic of geometry that the Stranger finds it necessary to explain that all this is the same thing as what the others will already have understood by 'Dialectic'![4]

There is one other passage to be discussed; for unlike the previous two it does, I believe, provide some *positive* evidence for our suggested illustration. The *Politicus* has a puzzling remark in repeating the rule that dichotomy is to be preferred but, failing that, division into three or more parts:

κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἷον ἱερεῖον διαιρώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν. δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὅτι μάλιστα τέμνειν ἀριθμὸν ἀεί (287 c).

The usual view of the second sentence is stated by Diès:[5] 'pour la division dans le nombre le plus proche, [cf.] *Philèbe* 16 d: μετὰ μίαν (ἰδέαν) δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν. Principe d'économie, âme de toute méthode.' But the *Philebus* passage did not *say* that we should try the lower number first. For the μετὰ μίαν δύο had nothing to do with alternatives. True, Plato regards dichotomy as preferable. But this appears to be for no better reason than the attractiveness of τὸ μέσον.[6] And once the division of mankind by races into *two* parts, like Greeks and Barbarians, is seen to be merely nominal (*Pol.* 262 d–e), it is unlikely to be an economical method to proceed by trying three.

At the same time 'the nearest number' must denote the next number, sc. in the number-series. (It cannot, for example, mean 'nearest to reality', nor, of course, 'the nearest number' in the English sense of nearest the right one.) I suggest that the expression contains a reference to the position of divisions in the

---

that μία ἰδέα stretches through from beginning to end.'   [1] Cf. *Parm.* 145 b 8.

[2] This is not to reject C. Ritter's contention (*Neue Untersuchungen über Platon* (1910) 57 ff.) that διατέτασθαι refers to the μέγιστα γένη, like Otherness which is διὰ πάντων διεληλυθυῖαν, and περιέχεσθαι to the species of ordinary genera—though 250 b 8 is against it.

[3] Plato's final interest, even in the *Parm.* passages, is not (*pace* Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, 179 ff.) in infinite divisibility, but in a whole, i.e. genus, which is, and yet is more than, its parts. Cf. *Theaet.* 201 e–205 e with Ar. *Met.* Z 1041ᵇ9–33 and the neglected

passage, *Hipp. ma.* 300–2, which looks to me like a set piece of the Academy's Ideal theory.

[4] τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται, καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

[5] Budé edition, ad loc.

[6] *Pol.* 262 b 6–7; 265 a 4. The reason is *not* that which a nominalist logic would give, viz. the exhaustiveness of a class-concept and its contradictory (although this doubtless influenced him in practice, especially in the *Sophist*), for a negative class is likely to be ἄπειρον (cf. *Pol.* 262 d); cf. Ar. *Met.* A 990ᵇ13 and Ross ad loc. (Platonists' denial of Ideas of negations).

line. Thus if *DB* had been divided at *F* and *G* instead of *F* alone, it would not have been divided at the nearest point *to ED* (the last line).

E	D	F	B		E	D	G	F	B

In other words *FB* (the last *definiendum*) should be pushed nearer to *ED*. The result is the same as if Plato had said 'the lowest number'; but the lack of justification for the principle would have been glaring had he been thinking simply of what we call numbers. Pythagorean mathematics would not distinguish, in the absolute way in which ours would, lengths from numbers—which had extension. And I suspect that Plato was thinking too of what would have been at least an exact analogy (and for him perhaps more than an analogy) of this process of Division, namely the generation of numbers by the 'drawing in' of τὸ ἔγγιστα τοῦ ἀπείρου.[1]

A. C. LLOYD

St. Andrews

[1] Ar. *Phys.* Δ 213ᵇ22; *Met.* N 1091ᵃ17; fr. 201 (Rose).

ld not

. The
ack of
nking
t dis-
ers—
would
an an
y the

LLOYD

CORRECTION

The reduced subscription prices should read as follows:

CLASSICAL REVIEW	18s. 0d.
CLASSICAL QUARTERLY	£1. 0s. 0d.
(*Combined*)	£1. 15s. 0d.
GREECE & ROME	14s. 0d.